JJC H1 HISTORY P1

1    JURONG JUNIOR COLLEGE PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION 2014 HISTORY 8814/9731 Paper 1: International History 1945-2000 Thursday 28 August 2014 3 hours    READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST 1. Answer four questions. 2. You must answer Question 1 (Section A), and any three questions from Section B. 3. Enter the questions attempted in the table below. 4. Begin each question on a new sheet of paper. 5. At the end of the examination attach the cover page to the front of your answer scripts 6. Fasten all your work securely together. INFORMATION FOR CANDIDATES All questions in this paper carry equal marks. You are reminded of the need for good English and clear presentation in your answers. NAME: CLASS: This question paper consists of 5 printed pages (including this page & 1 blank page)

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3    Section A You must answer Question 1. THE UNITED NATIONS: ROLE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL 1 Read the sources then answer the question. When answering Question 1 candidates are advised to pay particular attention to the interpretation and evaluation of the sources both individually and as a group. Source A 1. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization. 2. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities Chapter XV Article 100, Charter of the United Nations Source B The other concept I proposed was “peace enforcement,” a rapid-reaction capability. Combat ready units provided by member states would fill the gap between traditional UN peacekeeping units-which were lightly armed, had the consent of all parties, and were not expected to fight- to maintain international peace and security. Such units from Member States would be available on call and would consist of volunteers. These troops would have to be more heavily armed than peacekeeping units and would need to undergo extensive preparatory training within their national forces. My idea at first sparked great interest, but soon it was ignored or declared or declared politically impossible. I called for as many countries as possible to make available up to one thousand troops each on a standby basis, so that operation could get under way in a few days rather than the two or three months that it now took. This readiness to act would itself be a form of deterrence or preventive diplomacy. This was not a radical call for a UN standing army but came from Article 43 of the Charter, under which all members of the United Nations “undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special arrangement...armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.” Boutros- Boutros Ghali in his memoir, Unvanquished. 1999 Source C Boutros-Ghali already has lost his opportunity to put the U.N. on the right footing. In 1993, the Secretary General sought to suppress a report by Under-Secretary General for Administration and Management Richard Thornburgh which concluded that "The United Nations presently is almost totally lacking in effective means to deal with fraud, waste, and abuse by staff members." Boutros-Ghali subsequently established an Inspector General's office, as recommended by the report, but refused to give it the independence it must have to do its job effectively.

4    Under Boutros-Ghali's leadership, the U.N. has accelerated its slide toward bankruptcy. The U.N. budget has increased 20 percent since 1991. Expanded peacekeeping missions have pushed up peacekeeping costs from $700 million in 1990 to $3.5 billion in 1994. But instead of slashing spending, Boutros-Ghali has sought to boost funding. Last January, he proposed that the U.N. acquire the power to levy taxes on fossil fuels, international travel, and currency transactions. Instead of forcing the U.N. to live within its means, he wants to empower the organization to acquire new f unctions, such as a standing army under his command that could lead to even more costly and dangerous peace-enforcement missions. These power grabs by the empire-building Secr etary General are troubling because they set back reform efforts and dilute the U.N.'s accountability to member states. An article from the Heritage Foundation, a Conservative Policy Research and Analysis website, June 24 1996. Source D There is some reason to believe that the Secretary-General’s role expansion in the UN may not continue in the post-Cold War context. The capacity of the Security Council to perform its political functions effectively has narrowed the former role of the Secretary-General as an honest broker between forces locked into intractable enmity. As the UN Charter set down the Secretary-General’s powers in sketchy and vague language, Boutros-Ghali was quick to establis h the Secretary-General as an independent power within the UN system. However, his skills as a communicator and diplomat were so tentative that he aroused a good deal of ill will, resentment and misunderstanding. He was never able to articulate to the public, whether within or beyond the UN, what changes he wanted and how he intended to make them. Perhaps even more important, he failed to make outsiders understand the limits imposed on the UN in crisis countries like Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda. From the Los Angeles Times, 1995 Source E Some of Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s decisions compounded the broader failings of the international community and the Security Counc il. In Somalia, Boutros-Ghali’s diplomatic background linked him to former Somali ruler Said Barre, from the days when Egypt and the US supported his regime against that of pro-Soviet Ethiopia. Boutros-Ghali did not perhaps recognize how much this compromised his position in relation to Mohamed Farah Aideed and other warlords, who saw him as biased against them. Confrontation with Aideed ensued as the mission shifted from its original humanitarian objectives to a broader strategy of peace enforcement and disarmament. Not least, this culminated in the deaths of 18 US Army Rangers (not under UN command) in October 1993, the US withdrawal and May 1994 Presidential Directive that forbade US involvement in peace enforcement missions. A brief history of the UN Secretariat. Now answer the following question.   How far do Sources A-E support the view that the Secretary General has succeeded in enhancing the effectiveness of the United Nations?

5    Section B You must answer three questions from this section. 2. “The superpowers were in the driving seat in their involvement in the Korean War and Cuban Missile Crisis”. Discuss. 3. To what extent is it true that the decline of superpower relations from 1945 – 1949 was caused by American overreaction to Soviet threat? 4. How far can the ebb and flow of the Japanese economy be attributed to the role of external forces? 5. Assess the severity of the problems faced by the global economy from 1973-2000. 6. “The impact of the Kashmiri crisis was limited to India and Pakistan.” How far do you agree with this statement? END