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This document consists of 4 printed pages. [Turn over HISTORY Paper 1 International History, 1945 - 2000 9731/01 17 Sept 2014 3 hours No Additional Materials are required. READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST Write your index number and name on all the work you hand in. Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper. You may use a soft pencil for any diagrams, graphs or rough working. Do not use staples, paper clips, highlighters, glue or correction fluid. Section A Answer Question 1. Section B Answer any three questions. At the end of the examination, fasten all your work for each section securely. All questions in this paper carry equal marks. RIVER VALLEY HIGH SCHOOL YEAR 6 Preliminary Examinations in preparation for General Certificate of Education Advanced Level Higher 2 Name: ____________________________ Class:________

© RVHS Preliminary Exam II 2014 Section A You must answer Question 1. The Failure of the United Nations in Rwanda 1) Read the sources and answer the question which follows. When answering Question 1, candidates are advised to pay particular attention to the interpretation and evaluation of the sources both individually and as a group. Source A Mr. Riza was very clear in that I stick to my classic Chapter VI mandate, that I was not an intervention force and that the rules of engagement were to be strictly defense, and nothing more. There was a concern that we could get drawn into this exercise, and you can still see that paranoia of Somalia coming back, you know, “Just stay where you are, you are not in authority to intervene.” Now, in this UN stuff, the commander, although he has troops, they don’t really belong to him. They’re loaned by the country to the UN to be used, but each of these countries provides a contingent commander, a senior guy who communicates directly back to his capital. And so the contingents were over the course of the day getting more and more communications with their international capitals, who were becoming more and more restrictive in what they wanted their guys to do, because the risk was too high, and the situation too confused. And so we entered this arena where I had troops, and I didn’t have troops; and how much of them could I use? And to what avail? And as the day wor e on it proved that there were a bunch of the troops that were absolutely useless, and they were going to do absolutely nothing. General Romeo Dallaire, Commander of UN Forces in Rwanda during the genocide, in 2004. Source B I talked at length with Don Steinberg. He expects Tom Lippman to advance an argument along the following lines: The US ignored warning signs of trouble, we were spooked by Somalia, we got scared off by the costs of an enhanced peacekeeping mission and decided it wasn’t worth it. In the end, we deserve part of the blame for who lost Rwanda, not to mention the fact that Rwanda shows that we are resistant to having US peacekeepers deployed. Arguments to refute Lippman: 1) If anything, this is a case where our experience in Somalia did NOT prevent us from doing the right thing. If we were truly spooked by Somalia, we would have turned away entirely instead of committing 4000 American troops and spending $500 million to give the people of Rwanda humanitarian help and breathing space. We put Somalia behind us and moved into Rwanda in full force. We could have easily argued that we had no vital interests, no refugee flow into the US, no issue of terrorism or drugs, no major destabilization in the region, and that this is a Franco-Belgian problem. We took a different path… 2) If Tom says that we pushed for the UN to withdraw its peacekeepers after the plane was shot down in April, the response should be that it was inappropriate to leave a lightly armed force that had been sent in to monitor the Arusha Accords, to handle the chaos. Other countries were also pulling out. Excerpt from a US National Security Council memo detailing how the White House might respond to a critic on Rwanda, 9th Sept, 1994.

© RVHS Preliminary Exam II 2014 Source C The loss of ten peacekeepers is a t errible blow to any troop contributing country. However, even if the Belgian Government felt that the brutal murder of its para -commandos and the anti -Belgian rhetoric in Rwanda at the time made a continued presence of its own contingent impossible, the in quiry finds the campaign to secure the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR difficult to understand. The analysis of the situation in Rwanda, which was presented as an underlying argument for withdrawal painted a picture of on-going massacres, in addition to the fighting between parties. However, the focus seems to have been solely on withdrawal rather than the possibilities for the United Nations to act, with or without Belgium. Discussions within the Security Council during these first weeks of the genocide sho w a body divided between those, such as the United States, who were sympathetic to the Belgian campaign to withdraw the mission, and others, with the Non -Aligned Movement Caucus in the forefront, advocating a strengthening of UNAMIR… The decision by the Security Council on 21 April to reduce UNAMIR to a minimal force in the face of the killings which were by then known to all, rather than to make every effort to muster the political will to try and stop the killing has led to widespread bitterness in Rwanda. From an independent inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide, 15th December, 1999. Source D Q: When you used the word “genocide” publically, it was a bluff? A: No, I would not say it was a political tactic. If there is, according to the truth, a genocide, they have to intervene. There is an obligation to intervene. From my point of view, how to obtain a decision from the Security Council, I would say, “Could you jam the radio that creates the mobilization of the Hutu aga inst the Tutsi? Stop this radio; jam this radio.” The response was, “It will cost too much.” The whole problem was a marginalization of any event happening in Africa. Former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in an interview. Source E If I can correct one historical inaccuracy, the cliché that the Black Hawk goes down, and President Clinton immediately orders our withdrawal [from Somalia]. In fact, we did not want to leave immediately. We had a difficult negotiation with the Congress, and got an extension of the period over which we had to leave, because leaving immediately puts a bull’s-eye on every American and every UN peacekeeper around the world. So in my memory, there is no linear logic in saying: “Somalia, therefore no Rwanda.” I think what happened in Somalia helped to reinforce our view that we need to be more coherent, and that for the sake of peacekeeping itself, we had to be able to demonstrate that we were doing it in a careful, practical way… Then you have Rwanda. Within our government, the view was that requests for a build-up again of UN forces in Rwanda did not meet those criteria, because they would only deal with the situation in Kigali, not in the whole country, and we had no idea where the troops might come from. So they didn’t meet the criteria. In any case, it seemed as impossible to contemplate American intervention, because nobody was for it. My great regret is, again, that we didn’t say, “Too many people are dying. We cannot accept that this is inconceivable.” I was in more of a position to do it, but I didn’t do it, any more than editorial writers and NGOs, other governments, the UN Secretariat, anybody. Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor to US President Bill Clinton (1993 – 1997), in 2004 Now answer the following question: How far do sources A through E show that the United Nations