RVHS_H1_Hist_QP_RV

This document consists of 4 printed pages. [Turn over HISTORY Paper 1 International History, 1945 - 2000 9731/01 17 Sept 2014 3 hours No Additional Materials are required. READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST Write your index number and name on all the work you hand in. Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper. You may use a soft pencil for any diagrams, graphs or rough working. Do not use staples, paper clips, highlighters, glue or correction fluid. Section A Answer Question 1. Section B Answer any three questions. At the end of the examination, fasten all your work for each section securely. All questions in this paper carry equal marks. RIVER VALLEY HIGH SCHOOL YEAR 6 Preliminary Examinations in preparation for General Certificate of Education Advanced Level Higher 2 Name: ____________________________ Class:________

© RVHS Preliminary Exam II 2014 Section A You must answer Question 1. The Failure of the United Nations in Rwanda 1) Read the sources and answer the question which follows. When answering Question 1, candidates are advised to pay particular attention to the interpretation and evaluation of the sources both individually and as a group. Source A Mr. Riza was very clear in that I stick to my classic Chapter VI mandate, that I was not an intervention force and that the rules of engagement were to be strictly defense, and nothing more. There was a concern that we could get drawn into this exercise, and you can still see that paranoia of Somalia coming back, you know, “Just stay where you are, you are not in authority to intervene.” Now, in this UN stuff, the commander, although he has troops, they don’t really belong to him. They’re loaned by the country to the UN to be used, but each of these countries provides a contingent commander, a senior guy who communicates directly back to his capital. And so the contingents were over the course of the day getting more and more communications with their international capitals, who were becoming more and more restrictive in what they wanted their guys to do, because the risk was too high, and the situation too confused. And so we entered this arena where I had troops, and I didn’t have troops; and how much of them could I use? And to what avail? And as the day wor e on it proved that there were a bunch of the troops that were absolutely useless, and they were going to do absolutely nothing. General Romeo Dallaire, Commander of UN Forces in Rwanda during the genocide, in 2004. Source B I talked at length with Don Steinberg. He expects Tom Lippman to advance an argument along the following lines: The US ignored warning signs of trouble, we were spooked by Somalia, we got scared off by the costs of an enhanced peacekeeping mission and decided it wasn’t worth it. In the end, we deserve part of the blame for who lost Rwan