MJC SBQ Secretary General in the Rwanda Crisis

History 8814; 9731/1 The Political Effectiveness of the United Nations, 1945‐2000 MJC PRELIMS 2014 [suggested answer] MJC/ History Unit/ September 2014 1 TITLE: The Secretary-General in the Rwanda Crisis QUESTION: How far do Sources A-E support the claim that Boutros Boutros -Ghali’s ineffectiveness as the secretary-general guaranteed the failures of the United Nations in Rwanda? Unpacking hypothesis: 1) In what sense were UN’s ‘failures’ in Rwanda, and in what sense was BBG ‘ineffective’ as an SG? Tangible vs. intangible failure/ineffectiveness? In theory vs. in practice? 2) WHY was BBG effective or not effective? Inability to influence decisions and take concrete actions? Interference or lack of support from member states because of political/economic considerations? (note that the Charter sets BBG as an administrator as well as an initiator and political figure) Introduction: Sources A, C and E support the hypothesis while Sources B and C challenge it. Source A supports the hypothesis as it reveals Boutros -Ghali’s acknowledgement of his inability to draw the appropriate attention to the SC regarding the significance of the developments in Rwanda. [role of SG in taking initiative to draw attention to SC any matters of importance] LIFT/INFER (Be concise. Do not quote extensively. Must pick up on the key points – especially if this is a rich source) EVALUATION OF CONTENT: CROSS-REFERENCES (C-R must match the key source evidence that you have pulled out. CK must have key details. E.g. Data, Event, Year, Outcome) EVALUATION OF PROVENANCE (If the speaker/author does not have vested interest in the speech/extract, then it is likely to be reliable. Pay attention to dates and the occasion.) CONCLUSION (Based on reliability – Provenance; and utility – how useful on its own in helping you to understand the H Considered Rwanda as ‘one of [his] greatest failures’ because: 1. Unable to ‘convince the members of the SC to intervene’ 2. ‘Not able t o understand from the beginning’ that a ‘genocide’ was happening. This suggests that his failure to bring to attention the genocide prevented concrete actions from being taken in Rwanda to prevent the escalation of violence. BG’s admonition of himself was justified when taking into consideration that despite being empowered to ‘ bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security ’ (article 99), he was unable to utilise this power. This can be seen in Source B which shows his inability to convince the SC to take concrete actions quickly – despite asking the SC to consider ‘forceful action to restore law and order and end the massacres’ on April 29, it was only on May 17 that the SC was able to While the interview which was held on 2004 could have attributed hindsight as 10 years had passed since the crisis, but the effec ts of genocide are not ones which can be erased easily. Hence, A’s usefulness can be questioned as it overemphasises the emotional reflection of the SG on his own role. Taking a less personal view, one can argue that BG was being much too harsh on himself as the inability of the SC to take concrete actions arguably laid in US’s national interests where ‘US While this source is reliable in demonstrating the role of the SG, it is far t oo emotional to provide a holistic and fair view of the situation.

History 8814; 9731/1 The Political Effectiveness of the United Nations, 1945‐2000 MJC PRELIMS 2014 [suggested answer] MJC/ History Unit/ September 2014 2 come to a consensus. Even then, it was merely a ‘compromise plan’. However, his repeated use of ‘failure’ seems to highlight an obsessive self -condemnation which might reveal a long -term preoccupation of what he could have personally done to prevent the conflict from escalating. [see evaluation of provenance to further clarify this] refusal to commit its own troops… reduced the prestige of the mission…’ Source C supports the hypothesis more than it challenges as it claims that while Boutros -Ghali was an independent figure, he lacked the skills as ‘communicator and diplomat’ to ensure that his assertive nature brought about any concrete actions. LIFT/INFER EVALUATION OF CONTENT: CROSS-REFERENCES EVALUATION OF PROVENANCE CONCLUSION This resulted in the public being unconvinced by his plans and unable to ‘understand the limits imposed on the UN’ in cases which included Rwanda. The outline of his general failures, therefore, suggests that he was unable to ensure public (within and out of UN) support and hence unable to carry out what needed to be done in Rwanda. True insofar as his ass ertions for the public to take action in Rwanda fell on deaf ears. D demonstrates how he ‘expressed exasperation… at the refusal of most countries to send troops to Rwanda’ even though ‘he had done all he could to persuade African governments to supply the 5, 5000 troops he wants to send…’. Furthermore, he was unable to use the term ‘genocide’ until May 1994, but by then, mass killings had already ‘skyrocketed’ (B), demonstrating the negative implications of his imprecision in communication. Although it was written in 1995, shortly after the failures of Rwanda, it is still a useful source. This is because it is rather balanced in acknowledging that Boutros-Ghali did have an important legacy – his ‘assertion of independence of his office’ – despite being in t he immediate pessimistic aftermath of major disasters such as ‘Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda’. A strong source as it is a fair critique of Boutros -Ghali’s abilities as an SG. However, source B challenges the hypothesis as it shows how it was not Boutros -Ghali but the US who hindered UN efforts by refusing to provide adequate support. [lack of support from members states because of political considerations] LIFT/INFER EVALUATION OF CONTENT: CROSS-REFERENCES EVALUATION OF PROVENANCE CONCLUSION Boutros-Ghali’s attempts to establish a peacekeeping force were sabotaged by ‘US True that the US were reluctant to commit because of their national interests after the end However, the source is from a human rights organisation just a few years This source is strong in terms of

History 8814; 9731/1 The Political Effectiveness of the United Nations, 1945‐2000 MJC PRELIMS 2014 [suggested answer] MJC/ History Unit/ September 2014 3 refusal to commit its own troops’ as well as US’s ‘alternative plan’ . Even when a ‘compromise plan’ was agreed upon, it was still subject ed to US’s interests where the ‘mandate of the fo rce not be expanded’ and with Pentagon ‘successfully block[ing] even the provision of vehicles and equipment’. This resulted in a severe lack of a strong UN presence which could have made a difference to the escalation of violence in Rwanda. of the CW, where the US became increasingly more selective in their military interventions. [insert details of previous problems esp in Somalia as well as the increasing hesitan ce in the US regarding US’s continued role as ‘world police’] after the crisis. Bearing in mind that this was presented at a US congressional testimony, it could be a plea from the or ganisation to get congress to review its foreign policy in order to prevent future humanitarian rights abuses. As such, the source’s overemphasis on the role of the US and to overstate Boutros-Ghali’s ineffectiveness dilutes B’s usefulness. This is becau se it is arguable that the reason for US refusal to lend its support was due to Boutros - Ghali’s inability to communicate the severity of the developments in Rwanda – as E pointed out, ‘[a]s late as April 29… Boutros -Ghali was still insisting that Rwanda wa s a tragedy’ and not a ‘genocide.’ its reliability of US’s role in