PJC H1 HIST IH P1

1 Candidate’s Name: _____________________________ CT Group: _______ Index no: ________ PIONEER JUNIOR COLLEGE H1/H2 HISTORY JC 2 PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION 2015 9731/01 International History, 1945 – 2000 DATE: 17/09/2015 (THU) TIME: 0800–1100 INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES: Section A Answer Question 1. Section B Answer any three questions. Write your answers on the separate answer papers provided. If you use more than one sheet of paper, fasten the sheets together. Attach this cover page on top of your answer scripts upon submission of paper. Information to candidates: All questions in this paper carry equal marks. You are reminded of the need for grammatically correct English and clear presentation in your answers. For official use: Question No. Full Marks Marks Obtained ( 1 ) /25 ( ) /25 ( ) /25 ( ) /25 TOTAL: 100

2 Section A You must answer Question 1. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL 1 Read the sources and then answer the question. When answering Question 1 , candidates are advised to pay particular attention to the interpretation and evaluation of the sources both individually and as a group. Source A I hope the Council will understand that the Secretary -General must reserve his right to make such enquiries or investigations as he may think necessary, in order to determine whether or not he should consider bringing a ny aspect of this matter up to the attention of the Council under the provisions of the Charter. Trygve Lie, on sending an independent commission of inquiry to investigate alleged infiltration across Greece’s northern frontier, 20th Sept 1946, 70th Security Council Meeting. Source B A Secretary-General needs at least minimal support from all the Permanent Members and all the major geographical groups in order to carry out the duties of his office adequately. The chances are that, if Hammarskjold had not died at Ndola, the Soviet boycott would have accomplished his political death as it did with Trygve Lie. His three successors in the Cold War years—U Thant, Waldheim and Perez de Cuellar —went out of their way, too far in my judgement, to avoid giving offence to major UN players, in particular the two superpowers. In Waldheim’s last years, I used to wonder whether the rubric about the ‘need to protect the Office’ had not been so rigorously followed as to render the Office scarcely worth protecting. Sir Anthony Parson, UK permanent representative at the UN from 1979 to 1982, in his book, ‘From Cold War to Hot Peace’, 1995. Source C The first Secretary General was by far the most outspoken. His strength reflected the high hopes of the time for the new international organisation in the aftermath of a devastating war. But his readiness to wade in with his own opinions on any and every world issue had mixed results. In supporting (in vain) Communist China’s right to take its seat at the UN after the 1949 Revolution, he was admirably clear-sighted and prepared to stand up to the US. But ultimately his passionate advocacy of the US/UN position in the Korean War won him the enmity of the Soviet Union, who refused to take part in UN activities when he was present, forcing him to resign. The New Internationalist: Heroes and Villains, issue 262, December 1994.

3 Source D There is some reason to believe that the Secretary -General’s role expansion may not continue, or that it may evolve into something qualitativ ely different, or that it may turn to quite a different set of issues, in the post -Cold War UN context. As we have indicated, the capacity of the Secretary -General as an honest broker between forces locked into intractable enmity. The council, now more rea dily able to take decisions, tends to ask the Secretary General to go to Tripoli and to Baghdad not to exercise an independent political role but more to help execute its own plan of action. Members of the Security Council should be aware of some potential costs such missions impose on the Secretary General’s good offices function. When he is perceived as a letter carrier doing the bidding of powerful states, that undermines his credibility as a true mediator. Thomas Franck and George Nolte, law professors on the role of the Secretary General,1993. Source E Q. How much initiative do you think the Secretary -General has under the Charter with respect to critical situations involving peace? A. May I broaden the question in order to make it more difficult? Q. By all means. A. …Under the Charter the Secretary -General has a fairly well defined right of initiative, and I feel that in a situation of the kind you are describing he should use that right of initiative. But when I said that I wanted to broaden th e reply, it is for this reason: I think that the right of initiative in a certain sense, informally, of the Secretary -General goes far beyond what is described in the Charter, provided that he observes the proper forms, chooses his approaches with tact, an d avoids acting in such a way as, so as to say, counteract his own purpose…That is to say I recognise the responsibility going even beyond the Charter, but obviously subject to very many reservations. Dag Hammarskjold in his 1st New York News Conference, May 1953. Now answer the following question. How far do Sources A-E support the view that the UN Secretary-General was unable to act independently from 1945 to 2000?

4 Section B You must answer three questions from this section. 2 ‘The formation of NATO was the key turning point in the development of the Cold War.’ Discuss this view with regard to the period 1945 - 1955. 3 To what extent was the Cuban Missile Crisis the result of superpower rivalry? 4 Assess the view that the oil crises of the 1970s represented the greatest problem the global economy faced from 1945 – 2000. 5 ‘Japan’s post -WWII economic recovery could be primarily attributed to the Japanese themselves.’ How far is this view true from the period 1945 – 1989? 6 To what extent was the failure of the peace negotiations the most important reason for the lack of a lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict by the year 2000? ---THE END---