2023 VJC GP Prelim P2 Insert and Question Paper

1 VICTORIA JUNIOR COLLEGE JC2 PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION 2023 HIGHER 1 GENERAL PAPER 8807/02 Paper 2 1 hour 30 minutes READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST Write your C.T. group, index number and name on all the work you hand in. Write in dark blue or black pen. Do not use staples, paper clips, glue or correction tape. Answer all questions. Note that up to 15 marks out of 50 will be awarded for your use of language. The number of marks is given in brackets [ ] at the end of each question or part question. This document consists of 10 printed pages. [Turn over

2 John Danaher writes about moral change and its implications on the future. * The Homeric epics are poems written by the poet and philosopher Homer. 1 When we look back at the beliefs and practices of our ancestors, we are often shocked at wha t they found morally acceptable: the public torture of criminals, the trading of slaves, and the subjugation of women. The history of moral change – change in what is, and is no t, considered morally acceptable – encourages greater scepticism about our current moral beliefs and practices. We might like to think we have arrived at a state of great moral enlightenment, but there is reason to believe that further moral revolutions await. Taking t his possibility seriously leads to two inquiries. First, we should investigate the mechanisms of moral change and revolution. Second, we must consider the ramifications of future moral revolutions for t hose of us alive today. 5 2 So why did historical moral revolutions take place? And what might cau se them to occur again? The philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre describes the relatively simple morality of the Homeric epics*, where goodness and virtue were associated with performing a set role in a hierarchical warrior culture. But situations can change dramatically. Denizens of the seafaring, trade- dependent Greek city -states which were culturally diverse were much less certain about moral concepts and ideas and had to reshape their moral practices to accommodate new socia l realities. MacIntyre’s comparison of moralities is consistent with the findi ng that geological, ecological, and economic realities often shape our moral practices. Indeed, the history of ethics is one of revolutions caused by changes in how open and closed societies have been to othe r ways of life. 10 15 3 Technology also plays a key role in changing moral beliefs and practices. Technologies give us new powers and choices, altering the weighing of costs and benefits as we make dec isions. This can have profound moral consequences. A prime example of this is the impact effective contraceptives have had on attitudes toward extra -marital (particularly pre -marital) sex. Research estimates that in the year 1900 fewer than 6 percent of unmarried w omen in the US had sex; by 2002 approximately 75 percent of unmarried women had sex. T his technology- induced shift in moral beliefs and practices prevails over the countervailing eff ect of traditional moral institutions, such as religion and law. 20 25 4 This is just one example among many. Medical and digital technologies have had other significant and disruptive effects on our moral beliefs and practices. For example, rese arch has shown how the invention of mechanical ventilators disrupted moral practices assoc iated with death and dying. With this technology, it became possible to keep someone’s body al ive after their brain had ceased to function. This led to a new definition of what it meant to die and required the resolution of a new set of moral questions. Is it permissible to switch off the ventilation machine after brain death? Would this be equivalent to killing someone? Can we keep people artificially alive to harvest organs for the purposes of donation? 30 35 5 There are no formal estimates of the rate at which society undergoes moral revolutio ns. Indeed, the term “revolution” can be slightly misleading. Some revoluti ons may be more akin to evolutions, occurring slowly and gradually and only becoming apparent in retr ospect. Others may be sudden and stark. Nevertheless, the fact that moral disruption tends to be associated with more open societies and greater technological innovation suggests that we might exp ect to see more of it in the future than we did in the past. 40

3 6 This brings us to the other inquiry prompted by the fact of moral change. What are the ramifications of future moral revolutions for those of us alive right now? Most of us care a bout the world we are leaving to our children. This idea has found a home among proponents of “longtermism”, which maintains that positively influencing the long -term future of humanity is a key moral priority for our present era. If we concede this, we should also agree that what matters is not just the physical world they will inhabit, but the moral worl d too. If their moral framework will be radically different from our own, we need to factor that into ho w we plan for the future and which actions to take now. 45 7 There are two clear ways of doing this. The first is to take a progressivist vie w of the future, to assume that future generations will inhabit a better moral world than our own. They wil l be more enlightened, tolerant and egalitarian. Our job, in the present, is to accelerate the tran sition to this more progressive future. A typical progressivist argument might focus on the need to expand the moral circle – the set of individuals or animals to whi ch we owe moral duties and whose existence we treat as a matter of moral concern. The history of morality can, to some extent, be told as a tale of continual outward expansions of the circle of m oral concern, from family to nation and, eventually, to all of humanity. Some progressivi sts argue that we should continue this outward expansion, including sentient machines. 50 55 8 Another option is to take a conservative approach, to assume that future morality is likely to be worse than present morality. Proponents of this view can justify their c aution by pointing to historical examples in which societies, in the name of progress, got things terribly w rong. For example, the 20th century’s dalliance with authoritarian communism resulted in moral catastrophes like mass imprisonment and draconian thought control. Why risk repeating those mistakes? 60 9 The conservative perspective is tempting: there seem to be more ways to get values wr ong than right. Those worried about the risks of superintelligent AI argue that t he set of value systems that are “friendly” to humans is narrow and fragile. It is all too easy to fall outside that range of values and do things that are contrary to human flourishing. Given the history of moral error and the fragility of values, our job should be to preserve the existing moral order as much as possible, instead of seeking progressive change. Present -day regulation of emerging technologies is often guided by this precautionary ethos. We have our current system of values — freedom, dignity, equality, and so on — and we need to ensure that these values are not undermined by morally disruptive technologies. 65 70 10 Progressivism and conservatism are not mutually exclusive, at least not across the full range of moral concerns. We might take a progressive attitude toward certain values, thinking that we need to expand them or cast them off, and a conservative approach to others that seem too precious to risk any loss. But both progressivism and conservatism tend to imply a g reat deal of certainty about future morality. They assume that we can predict whether the future wi ll get things right or