Essay — Effectiveness of Sec-Gens (29/30)

To what extent do you agree that the Secretary-Generals were effective in leading theUnitedNationsduringtheColdWar? In the United Nations, the effectiveness of the Secretary-General (Sec-Gen) must beevaluated based on two distinct yardsticks: not only his administrative competency inoverseeing the Secretariat and managing budgets, but also his political efficacy inspearheading UN efforts to safeguard international peace and security. While someSec-Gens —particularly up to the 1960s and from the 1980s —managed to successfullychampion peace and security by organising peacekeeping operations, brokering peacedeals and sending observers or envoys, the political effectiveness of most Sec-Gens wouldbe significantly constrained by the intransigence of superpowers and local actors. Inaddition, the administrative efficacy of the Sec-Gens would wane over time, as corruptionand bloat became prevalent by the 1980s. Ultimately, while the effectiveness of theSec-Gens fluctuated depending on their individual abilities, the structural contradictions oftherolemeant that theywereineffectiveoverall duringtheColdWar. Particularly up to the 1960s, Sec-Gens successfully reconceptualised and organisedpeacekeeping missions, effectively leading UNefforts to safeguardpeaceandsecurity. Thissuccess is most evident during Hammarskjold’s tenure: although the concept ofpeacekeeping was not articulated in the UNCharter, he conceptualised that peacekeepingcould become “Chapter 6½”, plugging the gap between the passive negotiation authorisedbyChapter 6andforceful interventiondescribedinChapter 7. Theseprinciplesof impartialityand non-use of force would set the precedent for many effective peacekeeping missions inthe future. For example, based on this new formulation of peacekeeping, Hammarskjoldorganised the UN Emergency Force I in the wake of the 1956 Suez Crisis, successfullypreserving the fragile peace between Egypt andIsrael for over 11yearsuntil theoutbreakofthe Six-Day War in 1967. Subsequently, he would also deploy the UN Operations in theCongo in 1960. Under Hammarskjold and later U Thant’s leadership, ONUC wouldsuccessfully stabilise the country by 1965 even after a Belgian invasion, an insurrection inKatanga and the collapse of the central government. Similarly, UThant also effectively ledseveral peacekeepingefforts: inresponsetocommunal violencebetweenGreekandTurkishCypriots in 1964, he oversaw the deployment of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cypruswhich preserved stability until the Turkish invasion 10 years later. Thus, in the first twodecades of the Cold War, Sec-Gens managed to reconceptualise and lead successfulpeacekeepingmissions, effectivelyfulfillingtheir political roleof protectingpeace.

Additionally, Sec-Gens also successfully brokered peace deals that ended conflicts anddisputes, especially during the first and last decades of theColdWar. For instance, in1955,Hammarskjold visited Beijing to negotiate the release of 15 USairmen detained by China,effectively defusing tensions between the two great powers. Ayear later, hewouldalsoplayan important diplomaticroleintheresolutionof theSuezCrisis, persuadingEgypt tosigntheceasefire agreement and accept the deployment of peacekeepers on the border. As ColdWar tensions died down in the 1980s, Perez de Cuellar would also effectively negotiateceasefiresandpeaceagreementsbetweenwarringstates: hepersonallybrokeredthepeacedeal that ended the Iran-Iraq War in 1988 and negotiated the 1991 Cambodian PeaceAccords. Additionally, he managed to end 12 years of fighting between the Salvadorangovernment and its rebels, brokering the Chapultepec Peace Accords after numerousrounds of negotiation in 1990 and 1991. As such, Sec-Gens effectively safeguardedinternational peace and security by fostering diplomacy in the early and late stages of theColdWar. In fact, for the most successful Sec-Gens, they managed to not only react to but alsopre-empt threats to peace: they sent observers to monitor international developments,enabling them to prevent the outbreak or escalation of conflicts. This can be seen duringHammarskjold’s term: Hammarskjold oversawthe deployment of theUNObservationGroupin Lebanon in June 1958, monitoring the local situationtoprevent theinfiltrationof weaponsinto the country fromSyria. This prescient move helpedtopre-emptivelyconstrainthescaleof possible violence before fighting broke out in July, enabling the swift resolution of thecrisis within three months. Asimilar story played out in Laos: Hammarskjold sent a specialenvoy toLaosin1959toinformhimof local developments. Thismeant that whenmartial lawwas declaredafter acoupinAugust 1960, Hammarskjold’senvoywasalreadypresent inthecountry to broker negotiations, mediating an agreement between thepolitical factionsinjust3 weeks to prevent the outbreak of any armed conflict. Hence, proactive and far-sightedSec-Gens —primarily found in the first decade of the Cold War —wereespeciallyeffectivein protecting international peace and security via the pre-emptive deployment of observerforcesandrepresentatives. That said, the political effectiveness of Sec-Gens in safeguarding peace was increasinglyconstrained by superpower interests in the 1960s and 70s, since they vetoed there-appointments of these proactive Sec-Gens and replaced them with comparativelyunimpressive ones. Given that the Sec-Gen was appointed by the Security Council, P5members could use their veto to obstruct the appointment of any candidate that they feltwould compromise their interests. After Lie proactively invoked Article 99 of theUNCharterto convene the Security Council and lobby for a UNintervention in the Korean War against

Soviet forces, the USSRvetoed his re-appointment in 1952, preventing himfromserving asecond term. Similarly, Hammarskjold offended the USSR in 1960 by refusing to placeONUC peacekeepers in service of the Soviet-backed Lumbumba. In retaliation, the Sovietslobbied to replace the Sec-Gen with a troika of appointeesfromeachof theThreeWorldsinthe Cold War, and they voiced their vehement opposition to the re-appointment ofHammarskjold before he died in a planecrash. Assuch, subsequent Sec-Genspanderedtosuperpower interests in order to secure their re-appointments, making them much morepassive in Cold War issues: for example, U Thant and Waldheim did not respectivelyadvocate for action in the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia (1968) and Afghanistan(1979). Thus, as superpower interests started to constrain Sec-Gens’ actions, theireffectivenessinprotectingpeacewanedinthe1960sand70s. Additionally, the effectiveness of Sec-Gens was also hampered by local actors, who oftenresisted their efforts to preserve security. Given the overarching Principle of SovereignEquality that the UN abides by, Sec-Gens could only organise observer forces andpeacekeeping missions if local governments consented to them. This was often not thecase: Hammarskjold’sattempt tosendanobservationcommissiontoHungaryinthewakeofthe 1956 Hungarian Revolution failed as the government refused the observers entry.Similarly, Egypt’s president Nasser ordered UNEF I peacekeepers to leave in1967, leadingto the outbreak of the Six-Day War that same year. As such, the Sec-Gens were only assuccessful as local actors allowed them to be: their effectiveness was limited when theseactorsrefusedtocooperatewiththeir effortsfor peace. Finally, the administrativeeffectivenessof theSec-Genswouldalsodeclinebythe1980s, asthey failed to limit the nepotismand bloat of various UNagencies. UNESCOisaprominentexample: due to severe administrative inefficiencies under Perez de Cuellar, its proposedbudget ballooned 10%in 1984-85 compared to the previous biennium. Additionally, insteadof effectively deploying its employees to oversee activities and programmes across theworld, 70% of its 3400 employees were stationed in its Paris headquarters, indicating abloated bureaucracy. Its efficiency was further limited by the nepotistic appointment of keypersonnel that wer