ACJC JC2 H1 History Prelims 2024

ANGLO-CHINESE JUNIOR COLLEGE PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION HIGHER 1 HISTORY 8838/01 Paper 1 The Cold War and the Modern World (1945-1991) 27 August 2024 3 hours Additional Materials: Cover Page, Answer Papers, Strings READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST You should follow the instructions on the cover page. If you need additional answer paper ask the invigilator. Section A Answer Question 1. Section B Answer two questions. Start your answer to each part question or question on a fresh sheet of paper. The number of marks is given in brackets [ ] at the end of each question or part question. Indicate your name, class and tutorial group clearly on each piece of paper. At the end of the examination, fasten and submit your answers separately for Section A and each question in Section B. You should therefore be making 3 submissions. The cover page is to be completed and attached on top of your answer to Section A. This document consists of 5 printed pages and 1 blank page. © ACJC History Unit 2024 [Turn over © ACJC History Department 2020 [Turn over]

2 © ACJC History 2024 8838/01/JC2 Preliminary Examination Section A You must answer Question 1. END OF THE COLD WAR 1 Read the sources and answer the questions that follow. Source A It was over six years ago, that I proposed what c ame to be called the zero option. It was a simple proposal. Unlike treaties in the past, it didn't codify the status quo or a new arms buildup, it didn't simply talk of controlling an arms race. For the first time in history, the language of arms control was replaced by arms reduction. In this case, the complete elimination of an entire class of US and Soviet nuclear missiles. This required a dramatic shift in thinking, and it took conventional wisdom some time to catch up. Reaction, to say the least, was mixed. To some the zero option was impossibly visionary and unrealistic, to others merely a propaganda ploy. With patience, determination, and commitment, General Secretary Gorbachev and I made this impossible vision a reality. This journey of coming to a common understanding with you, Mr. General Secretary, has been a fulfilling one. But the importance of this treaty transcends numbers. We have listened to the wisdom in an old Russian maxim. And I'm sure you're familiar with it, Mr. General Secretary, though my pronunciation may give you difficulty. The maxim is Dovorey no provorey, trust but verify. From Reagan’s address at the White House before the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 8 December 1987. Source B The outcome of our visit to Washington is more significant than the Geneva or Reykjavik summits. We are once again convinced that the best line is the principled and constructive one. Much less apparent in Washington was the manner Reagan used with us before this , making accusations and presenting himself as all good and right. But I told him , ‘You are not a prosecutor, and I am not a defendant. And vice versa. Otherwise, we will not be able to do anything.’ Washington was an important moment in establishing mutual understanding with the American leadership. It was probably a key moment in finding a common language: speaking as equals, each keeping his ideology to himself. The discussion was realistic, with a readiness for reasonable compromises and mutual constructiveness. The central moment of the visit was the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty we agreed on. We had total understanding that everything, Soviet-American relations and the normalisation of the international situation would depend on the outcome of whether we could agree on this Treaty. From Mikhail Gorbachev’s address to the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, December 1987.

3 © ACJC History 2024 8838/01/JC2 Preliminary Examination Source C From an American cartoonist for an American newspaper, July 1989. Source D During his six years in power, Gorbachev accomplished extraordinary things at home and abroad. At the same time, he unleashed forces that he could not control and that would reshape his country and the world, at times in ways he did not desire. At home, he ended communism’s stranglehold over Soviet society, though that was not his original intention. Indeed, when he assumed power, he was a resolute communist who wanted to revive the original Leninist spirit, introduce efficiencies into the planned economy, and ensure that the Soviet Union would enter the next century as a superpower. But as reform stalled, he came to see that communism itself was at the root of the problem, and he did not flinch at the implications. He ultimately abandoned Marxism-Leninism and began to dismantle the power of the Communist Party in favor of a more open political system. His insistence that leaders be accountable to the people led to the freest and fairest elections in Soviet history. From an analysis of the Cold War by an American academic, 2022. Ball with the map of Poland and the USSR on it

4 © ACJC History 2024 8838/01/JC2 Preliminary Examination Source E After the fall of the Berlin Wall, East German protesters who had risked everything to overthrow their government and were now jockeying for position in the emerging new Germany were puzzled by news reports from the other side of the Atlantic. American conservatives, they kept hearing, were claiming credit for ending the Cold War and ‘liberating’ them from the yoke of Soviet communism. What baffled them was that they hadn’t received American help at all. The CIA, by its own later admission, was entirely absent when East German dissidents organised covert meetings in churches and semi-derelict apartment buildings. No Americans had helped the protesters organi se a massive rally on the 40 th anniversary of East Germany’s founding, on October 7, 1989, which embarrassed the leadership in the presence of the visiting Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev. It was rather a coalition of civic leaders, who negotiated a truce in Leipzig two days later and convinced the security forces not to open fire on the 70,000 people in the crowd. An account from an American reporter who was in Leipzig, East Germany, November 1989. Now answer the following questions: (a) Compare and contrast Sources A and B as evidence about relations between Gorbachev and Reagan. [10] (b) How far do Sources A-E support the view that it was the leaders of the superpowers who brought about the end of the Cold War? [30]

5 © ACJC History 2024 8838/01/JC2 Preliminary Examination Section B You must answer two questions from this section. EITHER 2 ‘It was economic interests that largely transformed Sino-American relations in the 1970s.’ How far do you agree with this statement? [30] OR 3 How far do you agree that Japan’s engagement of the USA was more important to its response to the development of the Cold War than its engagement with China? [30] AND EITHER 4 ‘The development of the Third Indochina War was shaped more by Cold War developments than the policies of local actors.’ Discuss. [30] OR 5 How effective was Singapore’s foreign policy towards major powers in responding to Cold War developments in Southeast Asia? [30]

6 © ACJC History 2024 8838/01/JC2 Preliminary Examination BLANK PAGE