YIJC Prelim 2025 QP
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Text from the first pagesYISHUN INNOVA JUNIOR COLLEGE JC 2 PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION Higher 1 CANDIDATE NAME CG INDEX NO HISTORY Paper 1 Shaping the International Order (1945-2000) No Additional Materials are required. READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST 8838/01 3 September 2025 3 hours An answer booklet will be provided with this question paper. If you need additional answer paper, ask the invigilator for a continuation booklet. Write your name, class and question number on the answer booklet provided. Section A Answer Question 1. Section B Answer two questions. The number of marks is given in the brackets [ ] at the end of each question or part
question. This document consists of 5 printed pages and 1 blank page. ©YIJC 2 Section A You must answer Question 1. The Road to the End of Cold War 1 Read the sources and answer the questions which follow. Source A This treaty, and all that we have achieved during this summit is an understanding that will help keep peace as we work toward the ultimate goal of our foreign policy: a world where the people of every land can decide for themselves their form of government and way of life. We've dealt not just with arms control issues but also with fundamental problems such as Soviet expansionism, human rights violations, as well as our own moral opposition to the ideology that justifies such practices. Mr. Gorbachev and I agreed that we must redouble our efforts to reach agreements on reducing the levels of U.S. and Soviet long-range, or strategic, nuclear arms, as I have proposed in the START negotiations. Now, I believe deep reductions in these offensive weapons, along with the development of SDI, would do much to make the world safer. For that reason, I made it clear that our SDI program will continue which is a defense against offensive missiles, and by going for arms reduction rather than just arms control, we're moving away from the so-called policy of mutual assured destruction, by which nations hold each other hostage to nuclear terror and destruction. An extract from President Reagan’s address to the US public on 10 December 1987 after the Soviet-US Summit with Gorbachev in Washington. Source B Our aim is to prioritise disarmament, the elimination of the nuclear threat, the reduction of global tensions and confrontations, and the strengthening of new approaches to international relations. This was indeed achieved during the talks. The key outcome of the Washington visit was the signing of a treaty eliminating two classes of nuclear missiles. However, calls from some in the United States to halt the disarmament process are growing louder. Some even claim that the talks resolved differences over SDI, using this as a pretext to
accelerate work on the programme. These are dangerous tendencies that must not be underestimated, as they risk undermining the fragile progress towards demilitarising international relations. We hope that the United States, the Soviet Union, and all nations will redouble efforts to preserve the first signs of nuclear disarmament, which have broken through entrenched prejudice and hostility. The focus now must be on deepening positive trends, mutual understanding, and cooperation. An extract from Gorbachev’s televised speech to the Soviet public on 14 December 1987. ©YIJC [Turn over 3 Source C Ronald Reagan came to the presidency as a long-time critic of arms control and detente with the Soviet Union and argued that the United States was falling behind the Soviets in the nuclear competition and thus U.S. long-range ballistic missiles were becoming increasingly vulnerable to Soviet attack. Reagan thus accelerated strategic nuclear modernization plans and launched modern efforts to build a national missile defense system through his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), raising tensions with the Soviet Union and prompting widespread public concern about the possibility of war between world’s two major nuclear superpowers. Yet, Reagan’s early opposition to U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations gradually gave way to a more conciliatory approach that was consistent with his growing concern about the threat of mutual assured destruction. By the time he had left office, Reagan had overcome the reluctance of many of his closest advisers to engage with the Soviets and had forged an enduring diplomatic partnership with Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev. That partnership, combined with strong U.S. and European public pressure for nuclear restraint, led to some of the most sweeping arms control proposals in history and helped usher in a new age in U.S.-Russian relations. An extract from a journal article written by the Executive Director of the Arms Control Association (ACA), a non-partisan think tank, published online in 2004. Source D The fact that the states of Europe belong to different social systems is a reality. The sovereign right of each person to choose their political system at their own discretion is the most important prerequisite for a normal European process. The social and political order in some countries did change in the past, and it can change in the future as well. But this is exclusively a matter for the people themselves and of their choice. Any interference in internal affairs, any attempts to limit the sovereignty of states — whether of friends and allies or anybody else — are inadmissible. It is time to dismantle the Cold War notion that Europe is an arena of confrontation divided into ‘spheres of influence’. No doubt, joint Soviet-US efforts in nuclear disarmament played a major starting role in the process. The philosophy of the concept of a common European home rules out the probability of an armed clash. It suggests a doctrine of restraint to replace the doctrine of deterrence. An excerpt from Mikhail Gorbachev’s speech to the Council of Europe titled ‘Europe as a Common
Home’ on 6 July 1989. ©YIJC [Turn over 4 Source E Published in an American newspaper, 8 June 2004, one day after Reagan’s passing. Now answer the following questions: a) Compare and contrast the evidence provided in Sources A and B on the superpowers’ strategic geopolitical priorities during the 1987 Washington Summit. [10] b) How far do Sources A–E support the assertion that Reagan was the key driving force behind the end of the Cold War? [30]
©YIJC [Turn over 5 Section B You must answer two questions from this section. EITHER 2. ‘Security considerations were the primary catalyst for the 1972 Sino-American rapprochement.’ How far do you agree with this statement? [30] OR 3. To what extent was the development of Japan-US relations between 1952-1991 largely shaped by American Cold War interests? [30] AND EITHER 4. “Soviet and Chinese aid to North Vietnamese forces cemented American defeat in the Second Indochina War.” How far do you agree with this statement? [30] OR 5. To what extent was Singapore’s foreign policy during the Cold War shaped by fears of communist expansion in Southeast Asia? [30] - End of Paper - ©YIJC
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