RI Structure of Knowledge Worksheet 2023

RI KI JC1 Term 2/Weeks 5-6 Structure of Knowledge 1 Foundationalism, Reliabilism, Coherentism Foundationalism Coherentism Reliabilism a) Definition: the formal definition of this theory of epistemic justification Knowledge should be built on basic, secure (indubitable or incorrigible) pieces of knowledge. In other words, justification for all of our beliefs is ultimately derived from the basic beliefs that act as the foundation for all that we know. Knowledge should not contradict existing pieces of knowledge. Knowledge should lend mutual support. And a set of knowledge should have as wide a scope as possible. In other words, whole systems of beliefs are justified by their coherence. Some beliefs are better supported than others (centre vs peripheral), but none completely justified and indubitable. Knowledge should be constructed through reliable means. Reliable here means most likely to produce a true belief. In other words, a belief is justified based on how it is formulated, rather than by being based on good reasons per se; it is justified if it can give us the results. b) Illustration: draw how such a structure of knowledge would look like c) Examples: Any disciplines / areas of knowledge that exemplify such a structure? d) What are some advantages of structuring knowledge in this

RI KI JC1 Term 2/Weeks 5-6 Structure of Knowledge 2 Foundationalism Coherentism Reliabilism way? How might it be better than the other 2 theories? Make sure you give reasons for the advantages. e) What are some drawbacks of structuring knowledge in this way? Give reasons for the disadvantages. f) Criticisms of this theory • Idea of basic belief doesn’t make sense. • Sense data is corrigible. • A priori beliefs can’t really support a useful belief set. • The choice of basic beliefs seems arbitrary. • Direction of justification not one way. • Some beliefs should not be revised. Doesn’t account for a priori truths. Eg – math? • Plurality: what happens when we are faced with 2 equally justified sets of beliefs? Coherentism doesn’t tell us which to choose. • Difficult to apply reliability consistently. What works for one person may not for another. • May be too loose a requirement for justification – a method could seem reliable repeatedly by luck. We may not be so lucky in the future. • A method may be reliable but false. Supplementary Notes on the Structure of Knowledge: Epistemic Justification Justification, according to the tripartite theory of knowledge (JTB), is the difference between merely believing something that is true, and knowing it. To have knowledge, on this account, we must have justification. How our beliefs are justified is among the central questions of epistemology. Three rival theories of justification are set out here: foundationalism, coherentism, and reliabilism. They are often also referred to as theories of the structure of knowledge (how pieces of knowledge can be connected and built upon each other).

RI KI JC1 Term 2/Weeks 5-6 Structure of Knowledge 3 Foundationalism If we think of justification in inferential terms, i.e. in terms of a belief being justified by being inferred from other justified beliefs, then we face a problem: on this account, for every justified belief there must be at least one other justified belief on which it is based, which must in turn be based on at least one other justified belief, and so on. If all of our beliefs are justified in this way, therefore, there must be an infinite regress of justified beliefs. This implication of the idea that all of our beliefs are inferentially justified has struck many as implausible, if not incoherent. The problem of avoiding this implication has become known as the regress problem of justification. Foundationalism is a response to this problem, an attempt to halt the regress of justification. The foundationalist seeks to avoid the regress problem by positing the existence of foundational or “basic” beliefs. Basic beliefs are non -inferentially justified, i.e. they are justified without being inferred from other beliefs. As basic beliefs are justified, they are able to confer justification onto other beliefs that can be inferred from them. As basic beliefs are non-inferentially justified, however, they halt the regress of justification; we need not posit an infinite series of justified beliefs on which basic beliefs are based, because basic beliefs are self-justifying, and so need no such series. According to foundationalism, the justification for all of our beliefs is ultimately derived from the basic beliefs that act as the foundation for all that we know. Coherentism Coherentism is a rival theory of justification to foundationalism. Unlike foundationalists, coherentists reject the idea that individual beliefs are justified by being inferred from other beliefs. Instead, according to coherentism, whole systems of beliefs are justified by their coherence. What is Coherence? Coherence consists of three elements. A belief -set is coherent to the extent that it is consistent, cohesive, and comprehensive. Consistency A belief -set is consistent to the extent that its members do not contradict each other. Clearly a belief -set full of contradictory beliefs is not coherent. Consistency, however, need not be an all or nothing affair; beliefs may be in tension with each other, without being strictly speaking contradictory. Tensions of this kind, like contradiction, reduces the coherence of a set of beliefs. Cohesiveness Mere consistency is not enough for coherence. For a belief -set to be coherent, the beliefs that it contains must not only be mutually consistent, but must also be mutually supportive. A set of beliefs that support each other, where one belief makes another more probable, is more coherent than a set of unrelated, but consistent beliefs.

RI KI JC1 Term 2/Weeks 5-6 Structure of Knowledge 4 Comprehensiveness Finally, coherence involves comprehensiveness. Comprehensiveness, of course, is not a part of the meaning of coherence in the ordinary sense. In the context of coherentist theories of justification, however, a belief -set increases in coherence as it increases in scope; the more a belief-set tells us about, the more coherent it is. Reliabilism Reliabilism is an alternative theory of justification to foundationalism and coherentism. According to reliabilism, whether or not a belief is justified is not determined by whether or not it is appropriately related to other beliefs. Rather, according to reliabilism, a belief is justified based on how it is formed. There are good and bad ways to go about forming beliefs. Beliefs based on reliable belief - forming mechanisms are likely to be true. Beliefs based on unreliable belief -forming mechanism are not. The reliabilist holds that a belief’s justification depends on whether it is formed using a reliable or an unreliable method. If perception is a reliable method for forming beliefs, then beliefs based on perception are justified. If wishful thinking is a reliable method for forming beliefs, then beliefs based on wishful thinking are justified. Conversely, if either of these methods of belief -formation is unreliable, then beliefs based on them will be unjustified. Adapted from Dr Charlene Tan (NIE) and http://www.theoryofknowledge.info/justification.html Basic Beliefs Don’t Make Sense The concept of a basic belief is key to foundationalism. Foundationalists hold that there are basic beliefs that are non-inferentially justified. These beliefs are supposed to halt the regr