[TMJC 2025] P2 Prelim 2025 Suggested Responses

H2 History Paper 2 Prelim 2025 Suggested Responses Section A 1. Compare and contrast the evidence in Sources A and B on ASEAN’s response towards the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. Similarity ASEAN responded to the AFC by organizing efforts to manage its impact on the member states. / ASEAN responded to the AFC by organizing diplomatic meetings and issuing directives / ASEAN’s approach to the AFC was to enlist the aid of international organizations like the IMF Source A ‘ ASEAN produces a tropical cyclone of paper’ inferring of the admin paper generated to facilitate such ministerial meetings. Or ‘it was left to the International Monetary Fund to deal with the crisis’ Source B ‘they had endorsed a proposal for an ASEAN financing arrangement In Phuket, in March 1997’. ‘this would supplement the IMF’s resources and other international financial institutions. Why Similar Sources similarity can be seen in the common context of both sources focusing on ASEAN’s institutional framework at that time and how it responded to the AFC that swept through the region in 1997. Explanation + Substantiation Both sources describe ASEAN as a regional institution. Hence, ASEAN lacked a central bank or monetary fund tor regional pooling resources in place at that time. This meant that ASEAN’s response was limited to issuing joint communiques and pledges of cooperation as described above and thus had to depend on external international organizations for immediate assistance. How Different Differ in the impact of ASEAN’s response to AFC. Source A condemns them as ineffective rhetoric, while Source B argues that there was practical help from the more stable ASEAN countries to those who were struggling. Source A Criticises the ASEAN Way as “a cover for inaction and ineffectiveness” and that ASEAN “specialises in standing around uselessly”. The aforementioned actions had no discernible impact and that it was left to the “International Monetary Fund to deal with the economic crisis.” Hence, very explicit in its condemnation of ASEAN’s ineffective response to the AFC. Source B In contrast, more optimistic of ASEAN’s intended actions to manage the AFC. For example, the statement highlighted the actions to be undertaken by ASEAN such as the agreement to “develop a cooperative financing arrangement for the region” and to “provide financial assistance to any Member Countries requiring such assistance.” Hence, seems to provide concrete actions that would be instrumental in helping ASEAN navigate the AFC. Why Different The sources’ differences can be explained in their differing purpose & context.

Explanation + Substantiation Source A (2009, Australian newspaper), criticizes the weak response by ASEAN. This was because this source written more than a decade after the Asian Financial Crisis. Hence, by 2009, it was clear that the IMF and other global actors had played a more central role in rescuing crisis-hit economies, while ASEAN’s efforts were seen as marginal. Hence, it dismisses ASEAN’s meetings and statements as empty gestures that achieved little. In contrast Source B, (1997, ASEAN ministerial statement). This was an official diplomatic document, produced at the height of the crisis when member states urgently needed reassurance. Its purpose was to project ASEAN as a credible, proactive regional actor, able to coordinate responses and provide support. It emphasized practical initiatives like financial cooperation to signal unity and to reassure both domestic and international audiences that ASEAN was effectively taking steps to assist more vulnerable ASEAN states and the region.

2. How far do Sources A-F support the assertion that ASEAN has succeeded in promoting regional economic cooperation by 2000? Argument of source set Support Challenge Inference from sources Note: Source C can also be seen as a support source if students argue the percentage increase in intra-ASEAN trade exceeds extra-ASEAN increase • Intra-ASEAN almost doubled while extra- ASEAN increased by slightly under 50% Sources B, D and E all show how ASEAN demonstrated promoted regional economic cooperation by demonstrating economic support for member countries during AFC. Start with B affirms that ASEAN did seek to strengthen economic structural policies one month after the AFC, 1 Dec 1997 Further Affirmed by D – Singapore’s support to IMF because of AFC ‘In August 1997, Singapore joined other countries in providing a package of US$17.1 billion to help Thailand in tackling the financial crisis.’ as attested in an in-depth report in 2002. Source E (nuanced) but overall support because attests to structural improvements in ASEAN economic policies after AFC. Sources A, C and F challenge as they show that ASEAN failed to work together to promote greater regional economic cooperation. Start with Source C showing the pattern of trade for ASEAN countries. Heavy dependence on trade OUTSIDE ASEAN than within. Extra-ASEAN trade has increased at a much faster rate compared to intra-ASEAN trade. (E.g. Between 1993 – 2000, extra- ASEAN increased from 350 billion to slightly over 500 billion while intra-ASEAN increased from 100 to slightly less than 200 billion USD) Clarified by Source F which explains why ASEAN struggles to promote greater regional economic cooperation. Attributes to each country prioritizing its economic interests and protectionist tendencies. (E.g. proposing products such as snow ploughs and nuclear reactors to be included in the trade agreements exemplifying how ASEAN countries tried to exploit the efforts to increase regional trade). Also corroborates the slow growth in intra-ASEAN trade by including statistics before 1993. Corroborated by A which argues that the “ASEAN Way” is a mask for inaction. ASEAN failed during the 1997 crisis, leaving the IMF to resolve the problem. (contradicts claims

made by Sources B, D and E on economic cooperation during AFC) Analysis of support set of sources: The support set sources vary in reliability and usefulness in highlighting ASEAN’s efforts to promote regional cooperation during the AFC. Source B (Ministerial Statement of Special ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting, Dec 1997) is reliable in understanding ASEAN’s intentions to manage the AFC. It reflects the commitment of the ASEAN states to implement necessary measures to help its member countries resolve the crisis and promote regional efforts. However, the statement’s usefulness diminished in usefulness as it is a statement of intent which may not have been executed. Cross-referencing to Source A highlights that despite its stated intentions, ASEAN did not live up to its claims. Source D (extract from international conference paper, 2000) reflects Singapore’s contribution to supporting ASEAN’s efforts to manage the crisis. It is reliable because it clearly demonstrates the financial support that Singapore provided to regional efforts. However, its usefulness can be limited because it only focuses on Singapore’s contribution, which were not representative of the other countries’ actions to support regional efforts. Source E (speech by ASEAN Secretary-General Rodolfo Severino, 1999) is not a reliable indicator of ASEAN’s success in managing the crisis. In his position as the ASEAN Secretary-General he would want to present a very positive impression of ASEAN’s work in managing the crisis. Hence, focusing on the progress made for AFTA and regional cooperation. However, could be contradicted by Source F, which highlights the problems with ASEAN’s trade agreements, which would have been persistent in 1999. Hence, even though the sources claim that ASEAN has been effective in increasing regional economic cooperation, the sources’ limited reliability and usefulness mean that they have not presented a convincing argument. Analysis of c