YIJC Prelim 2025 SBQ Suggested Approach

1 Yishun Innova Junior College 2025 JC2 H1 History Prelim exam: 8838/01 Suggested answer guide Section A: Question 1 1a. Compare and contrast the evidence provided in Sources A and B on the superpowers’ strategic geopolitical priorities during the 1987 Washington Summit. [10] How are the sources similar/different? Similarity • Inference: Both sources A and B are similar in terms of demonstrating that both the United States and Soviet Union prioritised the altruistic peacekeeping aim of nuclear disarmament to ease the tensions between the Western and Eastern blocs and establish peace and security in Europe. • Evidence: In Source A, Reagan emphasises the importance of ‘deep reductions in these offensive weapons’ and ‘agreed to reach agreements’ with ‘Gorbachev on reducing the levels of U.S. and Soviet long-range, or strategic, nuclear arms’ as part of a broader effort to reduce reliance on ‘mutual assured destruction.’ Similarly, in Source B , Gorbachev resonates with Reagan’s sentiments by underpinning the ‘signing of the treaty on the elimination of two classes of nuclear missiles’ as the summit’s main outcome and expresses hope for the ‘deepening of positive tendencies’ in nuclear disarmament. • Explanation: This reflects a shared superpower interest in de- escalating the arms race and reducing the threat of nuclear confrontation, indicating that disarmament was a common geopolitical priority despite ideological differences. Difference • Inference: Both sources A and B are different in terms of their divergent superpowers’ geopolitical priorities regarding the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), reflecting their contrasting geopolitical concerns . While the United States fervently regarded the continued development of SDI as essential to deterring future Soviet aggression and ensuring strategic superiority even against the backdrop of easing Cold War tensions, the Soviet Union viewed SDI as the ultimate threat to genuine disarmament and advocated for its discontinuation/termination/halt/suspension to uphold the peacekeeping spirit of the 1987 Washington treaty. • Evidence: Source A highlights Reagan’s defense of the SDI program, asserting that the continued ‘development of SDI would do much to make the world safer’ as it functions as a ‘defense against offensive missiles.’ He presents SDI as part of a broader strategic shift away

2 from a reliance on mutual deterrence, where nations ‘hold each other hostage to nuclear terror and destruction.’ However, Source B reflects Gorbachev’s strategic concern that the expansion of SDI mirror ‘dangerous tendencies’ of rearmament which could ‘undermine the nascent turn in the process of demilitarizing international relations,’ thereby threatening the fragile progress prospects made in the disarmament agreement of 1987. • Explanation: While Reagan viewed SDI as an American defense mechanism rather than its weaponisation for future aggression — intended to legitimise U.S. status quo as a peacekeeping superpower, Gorbachev feared that the continued development of the SDI programme would inadvertently derail disarmament efforts and potentially revitalise the Cold War arms race in the long run, highlighting the deep- seated divergent strategic geopolitical priorities between the United States and Soviet Union over the conundrum of how global peace and security should be achieved and sustained against the evolving world order. Why are the sources similar/different? Comparison based on Contextualisation of the Sources Similarity based on Historical Context • Any of the following specific historical content can be used to illustrate how the situational contexts of both the United States and the Soviet Union fostered greater openness to negotiations, thereby enabling both powers to find common ground in recognising the importance of denuclearisation and disarmament in easing Cold War tensions and promoting global peace and security: o Reagan’s doctrine escalated the arms race, raising U.S. defence spending from $134 billion in 1980 to $253 billion by 1989, which placed unsustainable pressure on the Soviet Union’s already struggling economy. By 1986, Soviet GNP growth had fallen to 1.4%, with excessive spending on nuclear weapons diverting resources from consumer goods and social services. The economic burden and looming threat of nuclear war compelled both powers to pursue arms reduction, culminating in key summits from Geneva (1985) to Washington (1987), where the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force Treaty (INF Treaty) was signed. o U.S. Public and Congressional Pressure for Arms Control made Reagan more willing to ease the arms race => By the mid- 1980s, there was growing public and bipartisan political support in the U.S. for nuclear arms reductions due to the significant increase in military expenditure that reduced government public spending. Reagan’s political legitimacy and mass popularity were at stake, motivating him to negotiate with Gorbachev on arms reductions, especially given his awareness of the USSR’s economic struggles and inability to match U.S. military power. o The Geneva Summit marked a turning point where both Reagan and Gorbachev acknowledged the unsustainability of the arms race, issuing a joint statement that ‘a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.’ It signalled Reagan’s willingness to ease military rivalry and Gorbachev’s openness to compromise, paving the way for substantive disarmament talks at the Reykjavik and Washington summits.

3 o Both Reagan and Gorbachev shared a strategic purpose at the 1987 Washington Summit: to demonstrate that meaningful nuclear disarmament was achievable through diplomacy. This was reflected in the signing of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force Treaty (INF Treaty), the first concrete arms -reduction agreement to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons, encompassing both intermediate and shorter-range missiles. The INF Treaty also enabled both powers to establish extensive on-site verification, a historic first in arms control. o For Reagan, it reinforced his image as a strong yet pragmatic leader committed to global security. For Gorbachev, it supported his domestic reform agenda by easing military tensions and reducing defence expenditure. Difference based on Purpose Source A • Authorship: American President Reagan • Audience: To both the American public and global media • Purpose: As a staunch anti-communist who had reversed the U.S. policy of détente, Reagan sought to reassure the American public that his administration remained committed to maintaining and strengthening U.S. military superiority over the Soviet Union, even after the INF Treaty. By emphasizing continued advancement of the SDI program, he wanted to tacitly remind the USSR of America’s strategic and technological military edge, deterring Gorbachev from adopting a more aggressive foreign policy in the future and also to hasten the speed of his socio-political reforms to undermine the central tenets communism. The expected outcome was to sustain domestic support for his administration while heightening Soviet paranoia and insecurity over its military inferiority. Source B • Authorship: Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev • Audience: Soviet public • Purpose: Gorbachev thus used this televised opportunity to tacitly criticise American expansion of the SDI programme of undermining the tangible progress towards disarmament and the easing of Cold War tensions. By outrightly demonising American pursuit of SDI as a “dangerous tendency” that could revitalise the arms race, he hoped to mobilise mass domestic and global support to place pressure on the Whitehouse and Reagan to consider halting its missile defense project. This move would also crystallise and solidify his global image as the peace- oriented leader, further bolstering his political legitimacy