JPJC Prelim 2025 QP

Name:__________________________________________ Class:_____________ JURONG PIONEER JUNIOR COLLEGE JC2 Preliminary Examination 2025 HISTORY 8838/01 Higher 1 2 September 2025 Paper 1 The Cold War and the Modern World 3 hours (1945 – 1991) Additional materials: Answer Booklet READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST An answer booklet will be provided with this question paper. You should follow the instructions on the front cover of the answer booklet. If you need additional answer paper, ask the invigilator for a continuation booklet. Section A Answer Question 1. Section B Answer two questions. The number of marks is given in brackets [ ] at the end of each question or part question. This document consists of 5 printed pages and 3 blank pages.1 [Turn over

Section A You must answer Question 1. THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE 1 Read the sources and answer the questions which follow. Source A On 7 October, around 4:00 pm, while the festivities organised by the government had not yet ended, in downtown East Berlin a spontaneous protest erupted. The protest was primarily attended by young Germans and, shortly after it began gained considerable proportions. A few thousand demonstrators tried to approach the Palace of the Republic*. A reception attended by all foreign delegations to the GDR was taking place at that time. The protesters were asking for “freedom, reforms and democracy”. The participants were chanting Gorbachev’s name and were carrying signs which read “To learn from the Soviet Union means to learn to win”. *refers to East Germany’s parliament building. From a telegram sent by the Romanian Embassy in Berlin to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 October 1989. Source B Following the state visit of Gorbachev during the GDR’s 40th anniversary (October 6 and 7, 1989), demonstrations in Berlin, Leipzig, and elsewhere continued to grow. During Gorbachev’s visit, crowds cheered “Gorbi, Gorbi!” I have read the record of conversation of Gorbachev with GDR leader Erich Honecker in Berlin. I spoke with him [Gorbachev] about this. Gorbachev referred to Honecker as ‘an [expletive]’ and added, “He could have said to his subordinates: I have undergone four operations, I am 78 years old, the stormy time requires too much strength, let me go, I have done my job. Then he might have kept his place in history.” I voiced doubts that even if he had done so he would have kept his place in history. 2-3 years ago it might have been possible. Today he has already been cursed by his people... The politburo in East Germany is in crisis session for the second day. Egon Krenz (a top East German official) also told the Soviet ambassador he would raise reforms and whether leader Erich Honecker should stay in office. From the diary of Gorbachev’s chief foreign policy advisor, 11 October 1989.2

Source C Photograph of tanks patrolling the streets during martial law in Poland, December 1981. Source D It is evident, for example, that force and the threat of force can no longer be and should not be instruments of foreign policy. The compelling necessity of the principle of freedom of choice is also clear to us. Denying that right to the peoples, no matter what the pretext, no matter what the words are used to conceal it, means infringing upon even the unstable balance that is, has been possible to achieve. Freedom of choice is a universal principle to which there should be no exceptions. Today I can inform you of the following: The Soviet Union has made a decision on reducing its armed forces. In addition, by agreement with our allies in the Warsaw Pact, we have made the decision to withdraw six tank divisions from the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and to disband them by 1991. The Soviet forces situated in those countries will be cut by 50,000 persons, and their arms by 5,000 tanks. From a speech by Gorbachev to the U.N. General Assembly, December 1988. 3 [Turn overSource E

As events unfolded in the late spring, summer, and early fall of 1989, a good deal of uncertainty persisted at all levels in Eastern Europe about how the Soviet Union would respond in an emergency. Memories of past Soviet military interventions in Eastern Europe, especially in 1953, 1956, and 1968, were still vivid for most people in the region. Amid this uncertainty, drastic change in the Soviet bloc could not just occur on its own. Instead, millions of ordinary people had to overcome lingering concerns and fears to make it happen. The vast number of Poles who voted for Solidarity in Poland’s June 1989 legislative elections, the huge crowds of East Germans who took part in protest demonstrations in cities throughout the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in October and November 1989, and the millions of Czechs and Slovaks who participated in the Velvet Revolution against the hardline Czechoslovak Communist regime in November 1989, all played crucial roles. From an analysis of the end of the Cold War by an American historian, 2011. Now answer the following questions: (a) Compare and contrast the evidence provided in Sources A and B regarding Soviet influence on the German Democratic Republic’s regime in 1989. [10] (b) How far do Sources A–E support the assertion that that people power was primarily responsible for the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989? [30] 4 Section B

You must answer two questions from this section. EITHER 2 ‘The Sino-Soviet split from the late 1950s was primarily driven by ideological differences between the two communist powers.’ Discuss. [30] OR 3 How far do you agree that Japan’s relations with China were driven by economic interests between 1952 and 1991? [30] AND EITHER 4 ‘The USSR and China played an active role in the development of the Second Indochina War from 1959 to 1975.’ How far do you agree with this statement? [30] OR 5 To what extent did ASEAN’s response to the Cold War reveal its weaknesses as a regional organisation? [30] END OF PAPER5 [BLANK PAGE]

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