NJC H2 HIST P1 (International History)

1 NATIONAL JUNIOR COLLEGE General Certificate of Education Advanced Level PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION 2015 HISTORY 9731/01 Higher 2 Paper 1 International History, 1945-2000 2 September 2015 3 Hours READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST Write your name and registration number in the space provided on the answer paper. Write in dark blue or black ink. Write your answers on the separate answer paper provided. Section A Answer Question 1. Section B Answer any three questions. At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together. All questions in this paper carry equal marks. You are reminded of the need for good English and clear presentation in your answers. This question paper consists of 4 printed pages.

2 Section A You must answer Question 1. THE UN AND THE COLD WAR 1. Read the sources and then answer the question. Source A The structural weakness in the Security Council has resulted from a dichotomy. In the Council, the five permanent members (P-5) have been given power without responsibility; the ten elected members (E - 10) have been given responsibility without power. The great paradox about the Council is that this structural weakness surfaced during the phase of its history when it became more active and, often, more effective, in the 1990s. From its creation in 1945 to the end of the Cold War, the Council lay moribund, paralyzed by t he dynamics of the Cold War. The cross -vetoes of the United States and the Soviet Union prevented any effective action, except for the deployment of a few peacekeeping operations by mutual consent. Both powers used each other’s vetoes in their propaganda b attles. The respective positions of the fifteen members in the Cold War would determine their role in this political theater. There was no divide between the P-5 and the E-10 then, because the P-5 were divided. Kishore Mahbubani, Singapore’s Permanent Representative to UN, 2004 Source B Peacekeeping in the early years was primarily limited to maintaining ceasefires and stabilizing situations on the ground, providing crucial support for political efforts to resolve conflict by peaceful means. Those missions consisted of unarmed military observers and lightly armed troops with primarily monitoring, reporting and confidence -building roles. The earliest armed peacekeeping operation was the First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) deployed successfully in 1956 to address the Suez Crisis. The UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC), launched in 1960, was the first large -scale mission having nearly 20,000 military personnel at its peak. ONUC demonstrated the risks involved in trying to bring stability to war-torn regions - 250 UN personnel died while serving on that mission, including the Secretary - General Dag Hammarskjold. From the UN website on their peacekeeping during the Cold War Source C For all its failures there is no question that Chapter VI peacekeeping has bee n the most important contribution made by the UN to international peace and security over the past thirty -five years or so. However, the system has three inherent defects. First, in fact that a force or observer group is dependent on the acquiescence of the parties is a serious weakness. The fate of UNEF 1, deployed in the Suez Canal Zone in 1956, is a classic case in point. When President Nasser ordered the force to leave Egypt in 1967, the UN had no choice but to comply. Second, because of its peacekeepi ng rather than enforcement task, forces have been lightly armed and their rules of engagement have effectively excluded opening fire except in immediate self -defence. This point was proved when, in 1982, the Israelis decided to invade Lebanon. The presence of UNIFIL in south Lebanon did not deter them.

3 Thirdly, peacekeeping has been infected by the East/West disease. Until 1987 the Soviet Union took the view that any military action taken by the UN outside Chapter VII would be beyond its legal authority. Hence Soviet refusal to contribute financially to peacekeeping has on occasion brought the UN to bankruptcy. Soviet complaints have consistently undermined discussion in the Security Council and restricted the initiative of the Secretary-General. Sir Anthony Parsons, UK permanent representative at the UN from 1979 to 1982, in a newspaper article written in 1989. Source D The Six -Day War intensified the Israeli disdain for the United Nations. Israeli leaders had long ago decided that they could not trust the security of their country to the UN. Even during the country’s bi rth year of 1948, when the UN was known by the acronym UNO (for “United Nations Organization”) in Israel, Premier David Ben -Gurion had set the tone with his dismissive appraisal of its si gnificance. “UNO, schmuno,” he said. The Six-Day War only proved how ineffectual the UN could be. In the Israeli view of things, a wimpish U Thant, with barely a protest, had removed his barrier of peacekeepers and allowed Nasser to march toward the Gulf o f Aqaba and choke an Israeli lifeline. UN resolutions always seemed to take something from Israel and offer nothing in exchange. Unlike the denouement of the Suez crisis in 1956, the Israelis did not intend to give up their conquered territory in 1967. The Israelis also felt that the UN provided the Arabs with a convenient escape from dealing directly with Israel. So long as UN resolutions ended wars and UN peacekeepers patrolled cease -fire lines, the Arabs did not have to negotiate directly with Israel for an armistice and peace. Stanley Meisler, ‘United Nations: First Fifty Years’, 1995 Source E UNEF II was established on October 25, 1973, and was tasked with supervising the implementation of the ceasefire between Egyptian and Israeli forces. The mandat e of UNEF II which was originally approved for six months, was subsequently renewed eight times by the Security Council. The signing of the treaty between Israel and Egypt heralded the end of UNEF II’s mission, and it remained in the region until July 24, 1979. Clearly, UNEF II was successful in carrying out its mandated mission. While the presence of UNEF II was not the direct cause of the peace agreement, it may reasonably be said that its presence contributed to a calmer environment in which the Egyptian -Israeli negotiations could be pursued. Although the success of UNEF II is clear, ultimately, the key to its success would appear to have been the commitment of the parties in conflict to cooperate with the peacekeeping forces and their mutual desire to reach an accord. Adapted from a JCPA (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs) academic paper, 2010. Now answer the following question. How far do Sources A to E support the view that UN was completely ineffective in maintaining international peace and security during the Cold War?

4 Section B You must answer three questions from this section. 2. To what extent did the Cold War break out in Europe because of the superpowers’ misjudgment and misunderstanding of each other? 3. How far do you agree that it was the rise of nationalist sentiments that caused the collapse of the USSR? 4. “Protectionism was the most important problem that the global economy faced from 1945-2000.” Discuss. 5. Assess the reasons for the d ecline of the Japanese economy during the period 1970 to 2000. 6. “The main reason for the failure to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict was Israel’s provocative actions.” How far do you agree with this statement? ~ GOOD LUCK! ~