AJC JC2 History Prelims P2 2008
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Text from the first pagesANDERSON JUNIOR COLLEGE JC2 HISTORY PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS 2008 9731(2): HISTORY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA, c.1900 – 1997 Duration: 3 hours 11 September 2008 INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES Write your name and question numbers of the questions attempted on this cover page. Answer four questions. You must answer Question 1 (Section A) and any three questions from Section B. Write your answers on the separate writing paper provided. Start each answer on a fresh piece of writing paper. Draw a right-hand margin on every page of your answer scripts. Detach this cover page and attach it on top of your answer scripts, upon completion. INFORMATION FOR CANDIDATES All questions in this paper carry equal marks. You are reminded of the need for good English and clear presentation in your answers. Question Number: Marks 1 /25 /25 /25 /25 Total Marks: /100 Name :__________________________________ PDG :__________________________________ This document consists of 4 printed pages.
2 Section A You must answer Question 1. ASEAN AND THE CAMBODIAN CONFLICT 1 Read the sources and then answer the question. Source A ASEAN played a prominent diplomatic role dur ing the Cambodian conflict, especially in keeping the issue in the political limelight at the United Nations. In attempting to bring pressure to bear on Vietnam to withdraw, however, it did not act alone but was part of an international division of labour, including China and the United States, which employed complementary military and economic instruments of coercion. There was a period during the late 1980s when ASEAN, under the leadership of Indonesia, which had been accorded an interlocutor role in dealing with Vietnam, held a series of informal meetings in Jakarta in an attempt to find a comprehensive solution to the conflict on a regional basis but without evident success. Southeast Asian Studies expert Michael Leifer, “The ASEAN Peace Process: A Category Mistake”, in The Pacific Review , 1999. Source B ASEAN not only led the diplomatic opposition to Vietnam’s moves in Cambodia; it also actively engaged, under Indonesia’s leadership, in the diplomacy that led to the political settlement of the conflict, including the “cocktail parties”, the Jakarta Informal Meetings, consultations with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, and the Paris Conference on Cambodia. Helped by a growing rapprochement between Beijing and Moscow (as well as between Beijing and Washington), by reportedly, a Sino-Soviet deal specific to Cambodia, and finally by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the settlement, concluded in 1991, resulted in a Vietnamese disengagement from Cambodia; the reduction of the Khmer Rogue to an eventually failed insurgency; a constitution and UN-administered elections; and a reasonably viable and independent Cambodia. It was probably the best outcome for Cambodia and the rest of Southeast Asia possible under the circumstances. Former ASEAN Secretary-General Rodolfo Severino, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, 2006. Source C The Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea impelled the ASEAN countries for the first time to adopt a common stance in rejecting Hanoi’s intervention as an affront to national sovereignty. Over the next ten years ASEAN was to lead the way in barring the Hanoi-backed regime’s admission to the United Nations and supporting a government-in- exile. In doing so, ASEAN acquired enhanced international respect as a body with political and diplomatic influence, promoting a policy in Indochina which found favour with both in the United States and China. Historian C.M. Turnbull, “Regionalism and Nationalism” in The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia (Vol. 2), 1994.
3 Source D ASEAN's encouragement of Chinese and American involvement in Southeast Asia…were in direct contradiction to its own expressed principle of neutrality…[and] the effect was to underline ASEAN's inability to independently manage regional security. Eventually, Vietnam had to withdraw from Ca mbodia, in part because of ASEAN's efforts. However, ASEAN's successes were inextricably linked to the fact that its interests overlapped with those of the United States and China. While the US did not take an extremely active role in the conflict until late in the game, it was willing to give ASEAN political and military backing. China's military and political support was indispensable to the anti-Vietnamese coalition, and China viewed ASEA N's activities as part of its own larger strategy against Vietnam. Without the support of these powerful actors, ASEAN's diplomacy would have been far less effective than it was. Moreover, in the end, the conflict was resolved due to the efforts of the great powers, who acted for their own political reasons. ASEAN's effectiveness was circumscribed by its relationship to powerful external actors. Abstract from “ASEAN and the Management of Regional Security” in Pacific Affairs , 1998. Source E Two days after the establishment of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), ASEAN ‘strongly deplored the armed intervention against the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kampuchea’ and called for the ‘immediate and total withdrawal of the foreign forces’ from Kampuchean territory. These pronouncements marked the beginning of more than ten years of sustained and intense diplomatic activity by the Association with the aim of securing the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea and the right of the Cambodian people to self-determination free from external influence and coercion. ASEAN was particularly successful in mobilising international opinion and votes in the UN General Assembly against the intervention. This ultimately earned it the label of ‘diplomatic community’, notwithstanding the fact that the final settlement of the conflict depended crucially on the political will of the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council. International Relations lecturer at the London School of Economics Jürgen Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture , 2003. Now answer the following question. How far do Sources A-E support the view that ASEAN was ineffective as a regional organisation in resolving the Cambodian conflict?
4 Section B You must answer three questions from this section. You must support each answer with examples drawn from at least three countries. 2 “Before 1941, nationalist movements across Southeast Asia were characterised by their rejection of colonialism.” Discuss. 3 Was the Cold War more of a boon or a bane to Southeast Asian nationalism in the period following World War II? 4 To what extent did the experience of independence demonstrate that democracy was not naturally suited for Southeast Asia? 5 How far do you agree that “self-sufficiency proved illusory for the post-colonial states of Southeast Asia”? 6 Critically examine whether regional organisa tions were successful in Southeast Asia, in the period between 1945 and 1997. END OF PAPER
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