AJC H2 HIST P2

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST Write your name and PDG on all the work you hand in, including this cover sheet. Write in dark blue or black pen. Start each answer on a fresh piece of writing paper. Section A Answer Question 1. Section B Answer any three questions. At the end of the examination, fasten the answer to each question separately , with this cover sheet attached on top of your answer to the first question. Indicate the question numbers of the questions attempted in the table below. All questions in this paper carry equal marks. You are reminded of the need for good English and clear presentation in your answers. Name : __________________________________ PDG : __________________________________ This document consists of 4 printed pages, including this page. ANDERSON JUNIOR COLLEGE JC2 PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS 2009 Higher 2 HISTORY Paper 2 History of Southeast Asia, c1900-1997 No Additional Materials are required. 9731/02 Fri 18 Sep 09 3 hours Question No. Marks Section A 1 /25 Section B /25 /25 /25 Total Marks: /100

© Anderson Junior College 9731/02 2 Section A You must answer Question 1. ASEAN AND THE VIETNAMESE INVASION OF CAMBODIA 1 Read the sources and then answer the question. Source A Thailand was able to determine the course that ASEAN would follow in its policy towards the Cambodian issue, which was characterised by a hard-line approach towards Vietnam. This ASEAN policy, however, caused a lot of dissatisfaction in Indonesia. ASEAN’s de facto alliance with China against Vietnam, and particularly Thailand’s increasingly close relations with Beijing, led many critics in Indonesia to wonder aloud whether ASEAN’s policy was actually not working against Indonesia’s security interests. Criticisms were also leveled against Indonesia’s too low -profile foreign policy which allowed Thailand to dictate ASEAN’s policy on Cambodia, so that the Thai tail was wagging the ASEAN dog. In response to this national dissatisfaction to ASEAN’s stance on Cambodia, Indonesia decided to follow a dual-track policy. From a book on East Asian security in the post-Cold War era, 1993. Source B Deep divisions within the Association marred ASEAN’s initial search for a resolution to the crisis. While Indonesia and Malaysia were prepared to accommodate Vietnam, Singapore and Thailand rejected such a stance. When Vietnamese troops entered Thailand in pursuit of Cambodian guerillas, Indonesia and Malaysia were prepared to alter their positions in the face of a threat to a fellow ASEAN member. Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s willingness to adjust their policies to the ASEAN ‘mean’ on the Cambodian issue allowed the grouping to project and sustain the issue on the international diplomatic agenda through concerted lobbying despite the relatively low attention accorded to the problem by the great powers. From a book by Amitav Acharya, an expert in Southeast Asian politics, 2007. Source C When Vietnam invaded Cambodia, the Vietnamese really believed that the ASEAN response would be no more than passing, sterile r hetoric. ASEAN decided that that it had to do something to help out a partner, Thailand, who was immediately threatened. We were convinced that if we did not stand up to Vietnamese aggression, we would be the next victims. Even when ASEAN submitted a resolution calling on the Vietnamese to withdraw from Cambodia, the Vietnamese told Tommy Koh that the Security Council could pass any resolution it liked but that after three months the United Nations would lose interest in Cambodia. To their surprise, nothing of that sort happened. Despite early bias in favour of Vietnam and the Russians, we were able to get majority support for our resolution against Vietnam in the United Nations. From the writings of S. Rajaratnam, 1987. Source D Following the 1978 invasion of Cambodia, however, the ASEAN nations were united in their condemnation of Hanoi. They took the lead in mobili sing international opinion against Vietnam, and in the UN General Assembly, they annually sponsored resolutions calling for withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and for internationally supervised elections. The ASEAN nations also were

© Anderson Junior College 9731/02 3 instrumental in preventing the Vietnam-sponsored Heng Samrin regime in Phnom Penh from taking over Cambodia's UN seat. In June 1982, ASEAN was instrumental in persuading three disparate Cambodian resistance elements to merge into a coalition resistance government. ASEAN's position on Cambodia was important to Hanoi, because it was through ASEAN's efforts at the UN that the world's attention continued to focus on Cambodia in the late 1980s. The Vietnamese thus saw ASEAN as having the power to confer upon them or to deny them legitimacy in Cambodia. From an academic text entitled Vietnam: a Country Study Source E , 1987. ASEAN’s momentum on Cambodia received a blow when Thai land, suddenly and unilaterally decided to ease the pressure on Vietnam to push its national commercial interest. Thailand’s newly elected Prime Minister General Chatichai Choonhavan announced the country’s new policy in “turning the battlefields into marketplaces” around the same time that ASEAN was trying to break the deadlock on Cambodia. The rest of the ASEAN members were caught by surprise, to say the least. When asked by his Malaysian and Singaporean counterparts, General Chatichai was reported to hav e explained that while Thailand’s official policy remained unchanged, his government was pursuing a two-track policy on Cambodia. This meant that while diplomatic protest would be maintained, private sector dealings would not only be permitted but also encouraged. From an academic text on regional security in Southeast Asia, 2005. Now answer the following question. How far do Sources A -E support the view that “far from bringing ASEAN together, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia only polarised its members”?

© Anderson Junior College 9731/02 4 Section B You must answer three questions from this section. 2 To what extent is it true that “between 1900 and 1941, Southeast Asian nationalism was characterised more by anti-colonial sentiments than any genuine national consciousness”? 3 “While nationalist efforts were important, the pace of Southeast Asia’s decolonisation was ultimately controlled by the colonialists.” Discuss. 4 How far do you agree with the view that “the degree of success in economic development in independent Southeast Asia was fundamentally dependent on the effectiveness of government economic policies”? 5 “More often than not, national unity was achieved by eliminating differences within Southeast Asian societies.” Discuss with reference to independent Southeast Asia. 6 Critically examine the significance of external conditions in the development of regional cooperation from 1954 to 1997.