Preview
Text from the first pagesRAFFLES INSTITUTION (JUNIOR COLLEGE) JC2 Preliminary Examinations 2009 HISTORY 9731/02 Higher 2 14 September 200 9 Paper 2 History of Southeast Asia c1900-1997 3 hours COVER SHEET Name : CT class : Question No. For Examiner’s Use Only Marks 1 TOTAL
RAFFLES INSTITUTION (JUNIOR COLLEGE) JC2 Preliminary Examinations 2009 HISTORY 9731/02 Higher 2 14 September 200 9 Paper 2 History of Southeast Asia c1900-1997 3 hours READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST Write your name and CT class on the cover sheet and all the work you hand in. Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper. Do not use staples, paper clips, highlighters, glue or correction fluid. Indicate the question numbers attempted in the space provided on the cover sheet. Section A Answer Question 1 . Section B Answer any three questions. At the end of the examination, fasten all your work and the cover sheet securely together. All questions in this paper carry equal marks. This document consists of 4 printed pages.
RAFFLES INSTITUTION (JUNIOR COLLEGE ) 2009 [Turn over 3 Section A You must answer Question 1. ASEAN’S RELATIONS WITH STATES BEYOND SOUTHEAST ASIA 1 Read the sources, and then answer the question. Source A During the last five years, the ASEAN countries hav e succeeded in mobilizing world public opinion, including the overwhelming majority of the non-aligned countries, against Vietnam. In 1982 and 1983, 105 countries voted for the ASEAN re solution at the UN which, inter alia , called upon Vietnam to approach the negotiating table, and urged a political solution which would include the total withdrawal of Vietnamese forces f rom Cambodia and the holding of free elections under international supervision. The ASEA N countries have also been largely successful in persuading the West and Japan to with hold their bilateral economic assistance to Vietnam until the problem of Cambodia is resolved. From a Singaporean diplomat’s speech delivered to a conference on the Cambodian crisis organised by Save Cambodia Inc. in Washington, DC on 11 September 1984. Source B The concept of neutralization advanced by Malaysia is aimed at safeguarding the same fundamental attributes of countries in this area an d is, therefore, to be welcomed. But if its prerequisite is the willingness of other nations, especially the big powers, to observe and respect such attributes and renounce all acts of illegal in terference and intervention into the internal affairs of Southeast Asian nations, and refrain from using military, political or economic pressure against them, then it would depend on the other nat ions to make it work. Perhaps, as has been wisely suggested, some form of regional approach mi ght be feasible and effective to obtain a big-power guarantee. Such an attempt has been tried so far with little results. Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman addressing the National Press Club on 15 June 1971. Source C Our own expressions of support for regional organiz ations such as ASEAN should be decidedly low-key. The Soviets, from whom the Indonesians hop e to receive additional aid, are already charging that ASEAN is a ‘Western puppet’ and the I ndonesians fear that too close an embrace by us would not only complicate their relations wit h Moscow but also add substance to these allegations and perhaps make it more difficult for ASEAN to enlist the support of additional non- aligned nations. An airgram from the US Embassy in Indonesia to the State Department in February 1968.
RAFFLES INSTITUTION (JUNIOR COLLEGE ) 2009 [Turn over 4 Source D WE, the Foreign Ministers of the member countries o f the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [...] 1. EMPHASIZE the necessity to resolve all sovereign ty and jurisdictional issues pertaining to the South China Sea by peaceful means, without resort to force; 2. URGE all parties concerned to exercise restraint with the view to creating a positive climate for the eventual resolution of all disputes; 3. RESOLVE, without prejudicing the sovereignty and jurisdiction of countries having direct interests in the area, to explore the possibility o f cooperation in the South China Sea relating to the safety of maritime navigation and communication , protection against pollution of the marine environment, coordination of search and rescue oper ations, efforts towards combating piracy and armed robbery as well as collaboration in the campaign against illicit trafficking in drugs; 4. COMMEND all parties concerned to apply the princ iples contained in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia as the basis for esta blishing a code of international conduct over the South China Sea; 5. INVITE all parties concerned to subscribe to thi s Declaration of principles. From the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea signed on 22 July 1992. Source E An atmosphere of optimism and confidence permeated this week’s first ASEAN Regional Forum in Bangkok. Despite the horrific prospects for war on the Korean peninsula, the rhetoric dwelt on the vision of pan-pacific harmony and an end to crude balances of power that passed for security. This was entirely misleading. In reality, the unde rcurrents of Asia’s ancient enmities and suspicions are now resurfacing in the absence of su perpower stand-off. The conduct of the Bangkok forum was a clear demonstration that Beijin g is expanding its influence to dominate East and Southeast Asia. The forum could have been a groundbreaking regional conference on security but the ASEAN states were almost an irrelevancy. China had taken control of the agenda and the other delegates were forced to go along with Beijing. No. There would be no multilateral talks on the Sp ratly Islands. No. Taiwan could not take part in any regional security arrangements. No. The first ASEAN regional forum would not move quickly to establish any formal security network to avoid potential clashes. Well before the conference, Chinese diplomats in South-East Asian c apitals had called on the foreign ministries in their host countries to pass on Beijing's desire for the forum to reject any ambitious security agenda. This instruction was observed. From the Sydney Morning Herald on 28 July 1994. Now answer the following question. “ASEAN has been ineffective in asserting its influe nce on states beyond Southeast Asia.” Use Sources A-E to show how far the evidence supports this statement.
RAFFLES INSTITUTION (JUNIOR COLLEGE ) 2009 3 Section B You must answer three questions from this section. You must support each answer with examples drawn from at least three countries. 2 How effective were colonial responses to nationali st movements in Southeast Asia before the Second World War? 3 Assess the achievements of nationalist movements i n Southeast Asia from 1941 to 1945. 4 To what extent was maximum government in the indep endent Southeast Asian countries a product of communist influence? 5 “By the end of the 1980s, Southeast Asian countrie s had overcome the economic challenges faced during the early years of independence.” Discuss. 6 Assess the influence of the Cold War on inter-stat e tensions in Southeast Asia after 1960.
Content continues in the PDF. Download PDF
Related notes
- Mock History PaperUser Mock Papers
- Theme III 1b_ Indo-Pakistani Conflict (1947-1972)Notes/Practices
- Theme III 2a_ Bosnian War (1992-1995) +Notes/Practices
- Theme II 2b_ Transformation of East Asian Economies (China, 1978-2000)Notes/Practices
- IH EssaysNotes/Practices
- SEA EssaysNotes/Practices
- national unity notesNotes/Practices
- SEA essay outline Notes/Practices · 2024
- Theme III 1a Arab-Israeli Conflict (1948-1979)Notes/Practices · 2025
- Theme II 2a Transformation of East Asian Economies (Japan)Notes/Practices · 2025
- Theme Ib Pursuit of National UnityNotes/Practices · 2025
- Theme II 1b Challenges in the Global EconomyNotes/Practices · 2025
- See all H2 History notes

