RI H2 HIST P1

RAFFLES INSTITUTION 2017 YEAR 6 PRELIIMINARY EXAM HISTORY (REVISED) 9752/01 Paper 1: Shaping the International Order (1945 to 2000) September 2017 3 hours Additional Materials: Answer Paper READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST Write your index number, CT group and name on all the work you hand in. Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper. Do not use staples, paper clips, highlighters, glue or correction fluid. Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper. Answer each question on a separate sheet of paper. Write your name and civics class at the top of each new page of writing paper. Answer question 1 in Section A and TWO questions in Section B. It is strongly recommended that you spend approximately 1 hour 15 minutes in Section A. Begin every question on a separate sheet of paper. At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together. All questions in this paper carry equal marks. This document consists of 5 printed pages.

Section A You must answer Question 1. THE VIETNAM WAR Read the sources and answer the questions that follow. Source A Their objectives have been clearly spe lled out in captured documents – to destroy or subvert the GVN/ allied forces, eliminate the GVN governmen tal structure, create a general upri sing among the people, and establish a revolutionary government dominated by the National Liberation Front. In what appears to be an almost incredible miscalculation of their ow n military capabilities and degr ee of support they could command fro the people, the Communists failed to achieve these st ated objectives. It has cost them dear ly in manpower – in 12 days some 31000 killed, 5700 detained, probably another 10000 dead from w ounds, and unknown numbe r dead from air and military strikes – a total probably amounting to more than half of the forces sued in this attack. Central Intelligence Agency Report, ‘The Tet Offensive – A Plus or a Minus?’, February 1968. [GVN refers to Government of Vietnam, or South Vietnam] Source B As part of a nationwide wave of surprise attacks by the Communists during the Lunar New Year—the Tet holiday—the resulting six-hour battle wa s militarily inconsequential. In fact, in strictly military terms, the two- month struggle known as the Tet Offensive was a disast er for the attackers. It ended with the expulsion of the North Vietnamese Army and the souther n-based insurgent troops, known in the West as Vietcong, from each place they invaded. In the theater of public opinion in the United States, however, the attack s were a great success for the North Vietnamese. Brought into the living r ooms of Americans by new communicati ons satellites over the Pacific, scenes of the carnage, particularly at the embassy, severely damaged national confidence in the war policies of President Lyndon Johnson, who was alread y under fire from a frustrated citiz enry in a presidential election year. The dramatic developments set in trai n during Tet led eventually to the wi thdrawal of Amer ican forces and the collapse of South Vietnam. Tet was a historical anomaly: a battlefield defeat that ultimately yielded victory. Taken from an article ‘Tet: Who won?’ published in the jounal ‘The Smithsonian’, 2004

Source C Both in Vietnam and Washington to have faith any longer in the silver linings they fi nd in the darkest clouds. For it seems now more certain than ever, that the bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a stalemate. To say that we are closer to victory today is to believe in the face of the evidence, the optimists who have been wrong in the past. To say that we are mired in stalemat e seems the only realistic, if unsatisfactor y conclusion. On the off chance that military and political analysts are right, in the next few months we must test the en emy's intentions, in case this is indeed his last big gasp before negotiations. But it is increasingly clear to this r eporter that the only rational way out then will be to ne gotiate, not as victors, but as an honorable people who lived up to their pledge to defend democracy, and did the best they could. A commentary of Vietnam by Walter Cronkite, aired on a special CBS News broadcast on Feb. 27, 1968. Source D From the Los Angeles Times, 1970

Source E Soviet observers reported that, contrary to expectations, their generous supplies of capital and materiel were not reciprocated with influence and respect. If anything, the opposite was true. Historian Ilya V. Gaiduk has summed up the emerging view of the Kremlin in the late 1960s : "The Vietnamese Communists turned out to be unreliable and selfish allies who often caused difficulties for their Soviet comrades. Soviet influence on Hanoi's policy failed to measure up to the scale of Soviet assistance to North Vietnam" The Soviet Union and China continued to offer the North Vietnamese and the NLF assi stance after 1968. At the same time, the two regimes (secretly) pursued better relations with the United Stat es despite Nixon's increased use of air power in Vietnam. Both Moscow and Beijing looked to Washington as a potential ally in t he Sino-Soviet rivalry, and bot h recognized that improved relations with the United States woul d help to stabilize Indochina. Détente was for all three of the major powers about Vietnamization, which meant making the Vietnam War a more ex clusively Vietnamese affair and eliminating the fighting as a source of Cold War c onflict among the biggest states . Washington, Moscow, and Beijing all recognized that they had a lot to lose if the Vietnam War continued al ong its existing course. The Soviet Union cooperated with the United States as early as 1968, pushing the North Vietnamese to enter negotiations. Observations of the role of the So viets and Chinese in the Vietnam War adapted from US History in Context, 2006 Source F When it comes to war, the American public is remarkably fickle. In Augus t 1965, when Americans were asked if the U.S. government had made “a mistake in sending troops to fight in Vietnam ,” 61% of them said “No.” But by August 1968, support for the war had fallen to 35%, and by May 1971 it had dropped to 28%. The antiwar movement gained national prominence in 1965, peaked in 1968, and remained powerful throughout the duration of the conflict. The Civil Rights leaders (were) active pr oponents of peace in Vietnam. Martin Luther King, Jr. openly expressed support for the antiwar movem ent on moral grounds … asserting that the war was draining much-needed resources from domestic programs . He also voiced concer n about the percentage of African American casualties in relation to the total population. The Tet Offensive of late January led many Americans to question the administr ation's veracity in reporting war progress and contributed to Johnson's decision to retire. After Tet American public opinion shifted dramatically, with fully half of the population opposed to escalation. Dissent escalated to violence. In April protesters occupied the administration building at Columbia University; police used force to evict them. Most Americans pragmatically opposed escalating the U.S. role in Vietnam, believing the economic cost too high. In February 1970 news of the My Lai massacre became public and ignited widespread outra ge. In April President Ni xon, who had previously committed to a planned withdrawal, anno unced that U.S. forces had entered Cambodia. Within minutes of the televised statement, protesters took to the streets with renewed focus.

…Antiwar sentiment, previously ta inted with an air of anti-Americanism, became instead a normal reaction against zealous excess. The antiwar cause had become institutionalized. By January 1973, when Nixon announced the effective