NJC H2 HIST P2 QP

1 NATIONAL JUNIOR COLLEGE 2018 SH2 PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION HIGHER 2 HISTORY 9752/02 Paper 2 The Making of Independent Southeast Asia 28 August 2018 (Independence – 2000) 3 Hours READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST Write your index number and name on all the work you hand in. Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper. Do not use staples, paper clips, glue or correction fluid. Write your answers on the separate answer paper provided. Please start each question on a new piece of paper, and label your answers clearly according to the question number. Section A Answer Question 1. Section B Answer two questions. At the end of the examination, fasten your scripts securely into FOUR separate sets: - Section A Q1a) - Section A Q1b) - Q2 or Q3 - Q4 or Q5 Tie the Cover Page to Section A Q1a). The number of marks is given in brackets [ ] at the end of each question or part question. This question paper consists of 5 printed pages

2 Section A ASEAN’S POLITICAL EFFECTIVENESS 1. Read the sources and answe r the questions which follow. Source A Apart from nationalist sent iments and legal arguments put forth in support of their claims, the positions of China, Viet nam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam are driven by strategic consider ations. Indonesia is not a claimant to any of the land features, but initiated a series of “Workshops for managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea”. The first workshop took place in 1990, with the participation only of the then- six ASEAN members, which agreed that China had to be involved if the workshops were to have any meaning and effect. To keep tensions down and foster mut ual confidence, and to reassu re China that the South China Sea issue was not being “internationa lized”, the workshops were presented as non-official. Meanwhile, in a number of international forums, the ASEAN countries, working together, succeeded in ge tting support for the ASEAN positions, specifically the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea. China however stated that while it agreed wit h the “principles” underlying the declaration, it could not adhere to it, as China was not involved in the drafting of the document. An extract of a book by a Filipino ex- ASEAN Secretary-General, published in 2006. Source B A major challenge facing ASEAN is whether it can replicate its record in conflict management in the Cambodian conflict in the larger South China Sea dispute, to limit great power competit ion and intervention in Southeast Asia. Like the Cambodian conflict, the South China Sea di spute is not an intra-ASEAN dispute. Unlike the Soviet-backed Vietnam in the 1980s, China, the main non-ASEAN party to the dispute, is an em erging superpower. While the Cambodian conflict was mainly a political matter, the South China Sea conflict revolves around territorial claims and sovereignty. Another key diffe rence is that not a ll ASEAN members are claimants in the South China Seas dispute, a fact that China uses to insist on bilateral approaches to conflict managem ent, rather than engaging ASEAN as a grouping. The Cambodian conflict, however, was a serious and clear violation of the non-interventional principle; hence ASEAN found it relatively easy to mobilize international condemnation of Vietnam, aided by the climate of Co ld War. This is seen from how in the 1980s, ASEAN had little difficulty in securing ever-increasing majorities in the UN General Assembly for its resolution condemning the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. Adapted from a book by an academic, published in 2009.

3 Source C We, the Foreign Ministers of the member countries of t he Association of Southeast Asian Nations; RECOGNIZING that we are bound by similar ideals of mutual respect, freedom, sovereignty and jurisdiction of the parties directly concerned; RECOGNIZING that South China Sea issues involve sensitive questions of sovereignty and jurisdiction of the parties directly concerned; Hereby: 1. EMPHASIZE the necessity to resolve all so vereignty and jurisdictional issues pertaining to the South China Sea by peaceful means, without resort to force; 2. URGE all parties concerned to exercise re straint with the view to creating a positive climate for the eventual resolution of all disputes. 3. RESOLVE , without prejudicing the sovereignt y and jurisdiction of countries having direct interests in the area, to explore the possibility of cooperation in the South China Sea. Adapted from the Declaration of South China Sea, published on 22 July 1992. Source D The historic visit of Hun Sen, Prime Mi nister of the Vietnam-installed Cambodian regime, signals a major shift in Thail and’s policy on Cambodi a. Arrangements for Hun Sen’s arrival appeared timed to ta ke place before the ASEAN countries, Vietnam and the rival Cambodian factions meet for the Indonesian-sponsored Jakarta Informal Meetings. “By talking to Hun Sen, Thailand now has even more leverage against the Coalition Governm ent of Democratic Kampuchea,” says one analyst. Thai Prime Minister Chatichai – whos e initiative it was that led to the Hun Sen visit – assesses that Hun Sen will, in all probability, be a key figure in a government comprising all four Cambodian fact ions. The key international players in the Cambodian Conflict – China, the Soviet Union and Vietnam – all appear ready to break the ten-year impasse. Chatichai has j udged it timely to take advantage of the realpolitik facing Cambodia. The Thai military shares Chatichai’s views on Thailand’s national interests regardi ng Indochina. Thailand’s a ffairs with the neighbouring communist Indochinese bloc and Burma have been traditionally regarded as national security issues, giving the military what it deems as a rightful role in intervening in foreign policy matters. Adapted from a Straits Times article, published on 31 January 1989. Source E I have learnt with deep appr eciation that you have personally approved an immediate airlift of arms urgently needed by us. This important action is demonstrative of the unfailing support the United States has shown towards Thailand, of which we are most appreciative. With the presence of Vietnamese troops along

4 the border, we must remain in a state of absolute preparedness. In this respect, the further expediting of shipments of m ilitary equipment to T hailand is a vital contribution. By now the Secretary of State must have briefed y ou on our and ASEAN’s thinking on the solution of the Kampuchean problem, specifically the continued support of the Democratic Kampuchea’s representation at the United Nations. By advocating the recognition of Democratic Kampuchea in the United Nations, we are not merely thinking about its continued in ternational identity, but also what political leverage Vietnam and the Soviet Union would stand to gain should we waver in our support. It is my earnest hope that Your Excellency will give this matter careful thought so as not to allow the other side to steal the initiative. I am confident in the ability of the United Stat es to assert a vital, positive role in our common strife for peace and stability in Southeast Asia. Adapted from a letter by Thai Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda to President Carter on 8 July 1980. Source F Drawn by a Filipino cartoonist and published in a Filipino newspaper on 11 May 2014. Now answer the following questions: a) Compare and contrast t he evidence provided in Sources D and E on Thailand’s policy towards communist Indochina. [10] b) “ASEAN was effective in promoting regional peace & security”. How far do Sources A-F support the view? [30]

5 Section B