SRJC H2 HIST 9752 P2

This document consists of 5 printed pages and 3 blank pages. © Serangoon Junior College 2018 [Turn over SERANGOON JUNIOR COLLEGE JC2 PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION 2018 Higher 2 HISTORY 9752/02 Paper 2 Making of Independent Southeast Asia (to 2000) Wednesday, 19 September 2018 3 hours Additional Materials: Cover Page Answer Paper READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST Write your name and civics tutorial group in the spaces provided on the cover page and on every sheet of answer paper. Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper. Write clearly the question numbers on the first page of every question attempted and the cover page. Do not use staples, paper clips, highlighters, glue or correction fluid and tape. Section A Answer Question 1. Section B Answer two questions. At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together. The number of marks is given in brackets [ ] at the end of each question or part question. You are reminded of the need for good English and clear handwriting in your answer, and to leave two lines between each paragraph on the answer paper.

© Serangoon Junior College 2018 9752/02 2018 JC2 PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION 2 Section A You must answer Question 1. ASEAN’S RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM, 1976-1990 1 Read the sources and then answer the questions which follow. Source A When Vietnam attempted to diversify its overall foreign relations out of the limited orbit of socialist countries in 1976 and 1977, efforts were made to visit ASEAN capitals so as to improve and expand contacts with the ASEAN member states. However, Vietnam also continued to criticise the ASEAN countries, one accusation being that the Association was too closely linked to the USA. Vietnam’s policy of engagement was reinforced in 1978 as Vietnam Foreign Minister Pham Van Dong sought to gather regional diplomatic support in its deepening conflict with Cambodia. Once the Cambodian conflict came to dominate the relationship from early 1979, further rapprochement was not possible. The importance of ideology in inter-state relations was high in the 1970s and was detrimental to an enhanced rapprochement between Vietnam and ASEAN from 1975-1978. The perception of ASEAN as being too closely linked to the USA did negatively affect relations. The international status of ASEAN was much less developed and prominent in the 1970s, and the member-states had yet to emerge as fast-growing economies. Thus, as seen from Vietnam’s perspective, ASEAN and its member states were not perceived to be able to assist Vietnam in its economic development in the 1970s. A European professor of Southeast Asian international relations, writing in 2016. Source B It should be made clear that the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has many times declared its support for the efforts of the Southeast Asian countries for genuine independence, peace and neutrality. But we do not agree to insert in the Resolution of this Conference the 1971 Kuala Lumpur declaration of ASEAN, a declaration issued at the very moment when the ASEAN countries were directly or indirectly serving the US aggressive war in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in complete contravention of the principles of the Non-Aligned Movement. ... The Vietnamese people are ready to forget the past and establish new relations with other Southeast Asian countries … but we decidedly do not tolerate any scheme to revive a none-too-br ight past of ASEAN and to sell an outmoded and bankrupted policy of this organisation. A Vietnam Foreign Ministry spokesperson, speaking during the Non-Aligned Movement Conference, 1976.

© Serangoon Junior College 2018 9752/02 2018 JC2 PRELIINARY EXAMINATION [Turn over 3 Source C On 12 January 1979, shortly after the incursion of Vietnamese forces into Cambodia, the five ASEAN foreign ministers met in Bangkok and released a joint statement deploring the ‘armed intervention against … Kampuchea’ and calling for ‘the immediate and total withdrawal of the foreign forces from Kampuchean territory’. … ASEAN presented itself as de fending the principle of the inviolability of a nation’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and the unacceptability of regime change through force, no matter how detestable the regime. The real strategic motive was to prevent Vietnam from dominating all of Indochina and extending its presence to the Thai border, and thus, as feared at the stage in the Cold War, threatening Thailand with subversion, and destabilising the whole region. This concern was particularly acute in the light of perceived Soviet support for Vietnam, which had just joined COMECON and entered into what amounted to a treaty of mutual defence with Moscow. The Secretary-General of ASEAN (1998-2002), writing in a book published in 2006. Source D The cover of a news magazine published by left-wing Cambodians in the UK to campaign for the liberation of Cambodia from Vietnamese occupation. It illustrates Soviet leader Brezhnev (left) and Vietnamese leader Lê Duẩn (right).

© Serangoon Junior College 2018 9752/02 2018 JC2 PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION 4 Source E From 1979, to maintain political and economic pressure on Vietnam, ASEAN kept the conflict in the international public eye, working to define the terms of the international debate, establishing the belief that the Cambodian crisis was caused by Vietnamese invasion and could only be resolved if Vietnam withdrew. ASEAN succeeded in coordinating a 91-21 vote in favour of a General Assembly resolution calling for a withdrawal of foreign forc es. ASEAN’s diplomatic success reflected not only its own efforts but also its inclusion in a larger informal international coalition opposed to Vietnam and the Soviet Union. The United States responded to the invasion by imposing sanctions on Vietnam. Despite concerns with driving Vietnam more firmly into Soviet arms, and partly under pressure from ASEAN and the USA, Europe and Japan followed suit. By 1987, the economic and political consequences of its actions in Kampuchea were having a concrete effect on Vietnam’s development. Economically, its Southeast Asian neighbours were leaving it behind. It could not catch up without outside help, and could not afford to fight a perpetual war. A Canadian academic specialising in Southeast Asian security, writing in a book published in 2002. Source F The time has come for ASEAN to lay down its heavy and now risky burden of trying to find a solution to the Cambodian problem if not to suffer further humiliation and hurt from its Western partners. The villains and victims that ASEAN and its Western allies had agreed upon eleven years ago have been unilaterally reversed by the latter. The new objectives, now that accord has been reached between the Western nations and the Soviet Union, require that the Vietnamese, rather than the Cambodians, should win the battle for Cambodia. It was fear of the Soviet Union which earlier prompted the Western powers to cheer ASEAN efforts to force the Soviets’ proxy to disgorge its fruit of aggression. But since Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev descended from the mountain five years ago bearing the perestroika and glasnost tablets proclaiming an end to the East-West Cold War, it has become necessary to reward the Soviets by ditching the Cambodia coalition and reinstating the Vietnamese as overlords of all Indochina. Hence the need to also ditch the ASEAN solution. The Foreign Minister of Singapore (1965-1980), writing in a Singaporean newspaper to comment on a UN Security Council meeting about Cambodia, August 1990. Now answer the following questions: (a) Compare and contrast the evidence in Sources E and F of ASEAN’s impact on the international response to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia. [10] (b) How far do Sources A-F support the view that ideological differences were the main factor pre