SAJC H2 HIST 9752 P1

© SAJC 2018 9752/01/J2/Prelims/18 ST ANDREW’S JUNIOR COLLEGE JC2 Preliminary Examinations General Certificate of Education Advanced Level Higher 2 HISTORY Paper 1: Shaping the International Order (1945-2000) 9752/01 17 Sept 2018 3 hours Additional Materials: Answer Paper READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST Write your name and class on all the work you hand in. Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper. Do not use paper clips, highlighters, glue or correction fluid. Section A Answer Question 1. Section B Answer two questions. At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together. The number of marks is given in brackets [ ] at the end of each question or part question. _________________________________________________________________________ This document consists of 5 printed pages and 1 blank page. [ T u r n O v e r

3 © SAJC 2018 9752/01/J2/Prelims/18 Section A You must answer Question 1. EMERGENCE OF BIPOLARITY AFTER WORLD WAR II 1. Read the sources and answer the questions which follow. Source A The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The Government of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation in violation of the Yalta Agreement in Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. I must also state that a number of other countries have similar developments. At the present moment in world history, nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one. One way of life is based upon the will of the majority and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, fr eedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms. The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. Truman in a speech to Congress, 12 March 1947. Source B Economists have long debated the real value of the Marshall Plan to European economies. Some have said that the effect was only marginal. Others have argued that in certain countries, like Greece, it was decisive. Between 1948 and 1952, a total of $13.7 billion was spent by the United States on Marshall aid. No one can question the generosity of the United States in allocating 1.3 per cent of its Gross Domestic Product to the plan. However, much of this aid went straight back into the American economy. Europeans were encouraged to buy American goods with their dollars, and this is wh at many of them did. American industry was looking for new markets to sustain the growth it enjoyed throughout the War years, and it prospered greatly from the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan was political as well as economic. It grew out of the desire to prevent the spread of Communism in Western Europe. No longer could European nations sit on the fence. Each country had to choose whether it belonged to the Western or Soviet bloc. Forced to reject Marshall aid, Czechoslovakia became part of the Soviet sphere of influence. France and Italy were firm members of the Western, democratic group of countries. The Marshall Plan, by giving impetus to Western European integration, was at the core of the new Europe being built. From an academic book on the Cold War, published in 1998.

4 © SAJC 2018 9752/01/J2/Prelims/18 Source C With regard to the Soviet Union’s security aspirations, I said again that the people of the US could not take seriously the idea that any combination of powers now constituted a threat to the USSR. On the contrary, we had noted the fate of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, the present situation in the Balkan States and in the Near East*, and we asked ourselves if this were only the beginning; that it must be said that we were beginning to believe that the Soviet idea of a friendly government and our own was very different. It seemed to us that what the USSR meant by a friendly government was a government which was unde r the complete control of Moscow and not one which was capable of self-determination. I then asked directly why Stalin thought that any power or powers seemed a threat to the USSR. To this, Stalin replied, “Churchill – he tried to instigate a war against Russia and persuaded the US to join him. Lately he has been at it again.” From a telegram sent by US General Lucius Clay to President Truman, April 1946. *Near East refers to lands around North-eastern Africa and South-western Asia Source D Stalin's road to the Cold War, in the years from 1946 to 1950, was strewn with miscalculations. He did not want to provoke American and Brit ish "imperialism", yet he overreacted to any perceived threat of it in Germany and in Eastern Europe. In response to the Marshall Plan, Stalin began to consolidate a Soviet security zone in Eastern Europe by ruthless police methods and intensive Communist propaganda. Trying to stop Western separatist policies in Germany, he triggered the Berlin Blockade crisis. In short, Stalin's post-War foreign policy was more defensive, reactive, and prudent than it was the fulfilment of a master plan. Yet instead of postponing a confrontation with the United States and gaining a much-needed respite for recovery, he managed to draw closer to it with every step. Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, “Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War”, 1996. Source E The Cold War grew out of a complicated interaction of external and internal developments inside both the United States and the Soviet Union. The external situation referred to circumstances beyond the control of either power, left the Americans and Soviets facing one another across a weakened Europe at the end of World War Two. Internal influences in the Soviet Union − the search for security, the role of ideology, massive post-war reconstruction needs, the personality of Stalin, together with those in the United States − the need for self- determination, fear of Communism, the illusion of supremacy fostered by American economic strength and the atomic bomb, made the resulting confrontation a hostile one. It seems likely that Washington policymakers mistook Stalin’s determination to ensure Soviet security through spheres of influence as a renewed effort to spread communism. On the other hand, the United States had a monopoly over the world’s most powerful weapon, its nuclear arsenal. From a book by the historian John Lewis Gaddis, published in 1972.

5 © SAJC 2018 9752/01/J2/Prelims/18 Source F Political cartoon found in a British newspaper, June 1947. Now answer the following questions: (a) Compare and contrast the evidence provided in Sources A and B on American goodwill towards Europe in the immediate post-World War II period. [10] (b) How far do Sources A-F support the assertion that the outbreak of the Cold War was a result of Soviet expansionist policies? [30]

6 © SAJC 2018 9752/01/J2/Prelims/18 Section B You must answer two questions from the following. EITHER 2 How important was the Bretton Woods system towards the development of the global economy from 1945 to 2000? [30] OR 3 ‘Sustained American support played the decisive r