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1   PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION 2016 HISTORY 9731/2  Paper 2: Southeast Asia History 1900-1997 Wednesday 14 th September 2016 3 hours READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST   1. Answer four questions. 2. You must answer Question 1 (Section A), and any three questions from Section B. 3. Begin each question on a new sheet of paper. 4. Fasten all your work securely together. INFORMATION FOR CANDIDATES All questions in this paper carry equal marks. You are reminded of the need for good English and clear presentation in your answers. NAME: CLASS:

2   You must answer Question 1. THE ASEAN WAY 1 Read the Sources and then answer the question which follows. When answering Question 1 candidates are advised to pay particular attention to the interpretation and evaluation of the sources both individually and as a group. Source A Two major events further tested ASEAN’s collective action approach to foreign relations and cohesion. The first was the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and the second issue was the Indochina refugee crisis which held ASEAN’s attention and concern in the first half of 1979. The refugee crisis which came in the midst of the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea represented the most important challenge to ASEAN’s collective diplomacy. It saw ASEAN acting collectively and simultaneously on a number of issues. They included ASEAN’s pressure on Vietnam as well as diplomatic insistence that the industrialised nations intervened to stop the exodus of the boat people and accelerate the intake of Indo-Chinese refugees. In maintaining its strong collective position on the refugee crisis, ASEAN achieved a common foreign policy on the issue. It certainly added signi ficant foreign policy value to the member states. From a book ‘ASEAN’s Foreign Relations’ by Rajendran, M., 1985. Source B We must now think at two levels. We must think not only of our national interests but assert them against regional interests: that is a new way of thinking about our problems. And these are two different things and sometimes they can conflict. Secondly, we must also accept the fact, if we are really serious about it, that regional existence means painful adjustments to those practices and thinking in our respective countries. We must make these painful and difficult adjustments. If we are not going to do that, then regionalism remains just an imagination. Extracted from a speech by S. Rajaratnam after the signing of the Bangkok Declaration in 1967. Source C This ASEAN Way, with its emphasis on non-interference and consensus, had developed into an approach that provided an alternative to the more dominant Western one. Post Cold War Southeast Asian dynamics offered the so-called ASEAN Way as an approach that may provide a positive model of engagement. But the ASEAN approach quickly became more challenging since ASEAN's attempts to mimic the values of other regions were puzzling in their complexity. To start with, ASEAN was an anomaly as far as regional groupings are concerned, as it asserted itself as the driving force when conducting external relations. This engagement challenged the prevailing norm in which major powers were the only entities free to engage in security competition. In a confusing manner, ASEAN deemed it had a similar capacity to do

3   so, though it did not act on it to compete, but to stabilise. However, ASEAN's engagement with bigger powers posed a double-edged sword. Theoretically, it might well serve the weak and major powers’ mutual interests, but the extent to which ASEAN member states individually put regional interests before their national ones remained to be seen. From Jakarta Post published in 2014. Source D ASEAN’s commitment to national sovereignty pl aced national priority ahead of community priority. This cultivated an atmosphere that was akin to the politics of envy across the ASEAN community. In this environment, countries with less developed infrastructures believed they would get the short straw when entering into free trade agreements with countries with well- developed infrastructures. They potentially became obstacles even though economic research and the history of trade both supported the view that free trade agreements were not a zero- sum game and that all participating countries would benefit. The ASEAN Way resolved this situation through lengthy non-confrontational consultation that might take years to arrive at a mutually satisfactory decision. I believe that by pursuing extreme consensus, ASEAN missed many good things as free trade liberated resources and improved productivity. Extracted from a presentation by a Singaporean academician in front of an international audience, 2015. Source E Singapore was unclear what exactly ASEAN hoped to specifically achieve at this International Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance and Relief to the Kampuchean people in Geneva but had gone along with the initiative out of a commitment to help Thailand. Singapore was aware that Hanoi was using the humanitarian assistance as a bargaining chip to gain greater recognition of the Heng Samrin regime. While Singapore opposed the Heng Samrin regime, it had to allow aid to Kampuchea for the Kampucheans. Singapore could not obstruct aid to help starving victims. Beijing had not complained and aid to the Kampucheans also went through Thailand and to both sides of the conflict. There were some quarters which were in favour of giving aid to Vietnam in order to persuade Vietnam from the Soviet Union but Singapore was not persuaded by this. Singapore was determined to campaign vigorously against any aid given to Vietnam. Excerpt from a book chapter entitled, ‘The Invasion of Kampuchea to the Formation of the CGDK’, 2013. Now answer the following question. How far do Sources A to E show that the methods used by ASEAN members were inconsistent with the ASEAN Way?

4   Section B You must answer three questions from this section. 2. How far were the successes of the nationalist movements before World War Two highly dependent on experience? 3. Why did the pace of decolonisation vary in post-World War Two Southeast Asia? 4. Assess the importance of intervention in the political structures of independent Southeast Asia. 5. Critically evaluate the role of ideology in the economic development of independent Southeast Asia. 6. To what extent was Southeast Asia’s regional stability contributed by interstate tensions?