ACJC H2 HIST IH Suggested approaches SBQ Essays

International History 1945-2000 JC2 Preliminary Examinations 2016 Suggested Approaches 1 ACJC/ History Dept./ JC2/ 2016 JC2 PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS 2016 INTERNATIONAL HISTORY (8814/9731) SUGGESTED APPROACHES SECTION A THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL AND CIVIL WAR IN LEBANON Source A The Security Council, Having considered the letter dated 1 May 1978 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 1. Approves the increase in the strength of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) requested by the Secretary-General from 4,000 to approximately 6,000 troops; 2. Takes note of the withdrawal of Israeli forces that has taken place so far; 3. Calls upon Israel to complete its withdrawal from all Lebanese territory without any further delay; 4. Deplores the attacks on the United Nations Force that have occurred and demands full respect for the United Nations Force from all parties in Lebanon. From the UN Security Council Resolution 427, 3 May 1978. Source B In UNIFIL, the Secretary-General was saddled with the problems which resulted from its flawed terms of reference of 1978, and the Israeli invasion of 1982. The ma ndate remained as unrealistic as ever, because of the presence of PLO, Syrian and Israeli forces or client fo rces. UNIFIL did not represent an uninterrupted cordon along the Lebanese border. It appears the initial rush and political pressure upon Waldheim to deploy, left a legacy of political and organizational problems to his successor. The Secret ary-General’s efforts in the 1980s – personally and through Brian Urquhart and then Marrack Goulding – to bring peace to southern Lebanon and ‘restore’ Lebanese authority were largely frustrated. However, at a more local level, opportunities to quell small-scale fighting, facilitate communication, and protect the local population, were fulfilled to an impressive extent. The UN continued to communicate with senior representatives of the principal parties, achieving minor agreements in an exercise of conflict management. The Secretary-General’s Office continued to issue frank and sometimes outspoken public reports on the status and frustrations of UNI FIL, thereby exerting at least some leverage upon the parties. From a book written by British academic, Edward Newman, ‘The UN Secretary-General from the Cold War to the New Era’, 1998. Source C Mr.Perez de Cuellar could hardly be described as passionate in carrying out the often tedious duties of Secretary General of the United Nations. Today, however, as th e Security Council and General Assembly unanimously elected him to a second five-year term, he flashed a smile and for an instant seemed genuinely happy. When he starts his new term on January 1, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, 66 years old, will be the oldest person to have held the $193,000-a-year Secretary General's job. He will face most of the same international problems and regional conflicts that were there five years ago: the war in Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, conflicts in Cambodia, Central America and southern Africa, the Palestinian question, and the Lebanese civil war. Mr. Perez de Cuellar

International History 1945-2000 JC2 Preliminary Examinations 2016 Suggested Approaches 2 ACJC/ History Dept./ JC2/ 2016 has drawn sharp criticism from the Israelis for his handli ng of the conflict in Lebanon. He achieved no major diplomatic victory in his first term, but did enjoy a few minor achievements. His critics charge he is overly cautious in a job that is ill defined and depends on the personality of its holder. From The New York Times, 11 October 1986. Source D UNIFIL is interesting in the contemporary context. It is an operation about whose viability the then Secretary- General and his senior advisers had doubts. It was nevertheless pushed through the Security Council by the United States for pressing, if passing, political reasons : US President Carter was launching the negotiations which were to lead to the Camp David Accords and did not want that process derailed by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon which had just taken place. UN IFIL has not been able to carry out its mandate because it has never enjoyed the necessary cooperation from all the parties concerned. From a lecture by Under-Secretrary-General of the United Nations, Marrack Goulding, 4 March 1993. Source E A private comment about Perez de Cuellar was echoed by the international press when he was first elected Secretary-General of the United Nations, in Decembe r 1981. He was “somebody who could fall off a boat without making waves”. In his characteristic style, Pere z de Cuellar shrugged his shoulders when he heard the criticism and ignored it altogether. Conflicts of nerves and wills is the perpetual envir onment of the Secretary-Gene ral. He has been held personally responsible “to history and mankind” by an Iraqi minister for the destruction suffered by Iraq during the recent conflict in the Middle East; the French government has in several instances asked him to immediately investigate allegations about the violence in Lebanon; leftist groups in South Africa have blamed him for being a passive instrument of apartheid, while the Pretoria government has at the same time accused him of being a leftist agitator. A wave maker he certainly was not. From a publication by a human rights group, October 1991. 1. How far do Sources A–E support the view that Perez de Cuellar should bear the most blame for the failure of UNIFIL durin g the civil war in Lebanon (1978-1991)? The issue of contention is whether the Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar (1982-1991) was principally responsible for the failure of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon or should other parties in the conflict bear greater responsibility for the failure to resolve the civil war in Lebanon in an ill-fated mission in the first place.1 Sources supporting the hypothesis would show the Pe rez de Cuellar struggled with resolving the conflict because he was not the right person fo r the job of leading the mission and was not able to manage relations between the various stakeholders contributing to the peacekeeping force. Sources challenging the hypothesis would reveal that the Perez de Cue llar should not bear the most blam e because the UNIFIL operation was poorly established to begin with because it was rushed, and occupying forces in South Lebanon would not cooperate with the UN. At face valu e, Source E and Source C support th e hypothesis, Source B, D, and A challenge the hypothesis. In the final analysis, an overall cha llenge of the hypothesis is preferre d because the challenge sources are stronger as a group than the support sources. Taken as a group, the challenge sources are plagued by problems related to their overall reliability and lack of benefit of hindsight. Source C is written in an informal journalistic                                                               1 Some candidates completely forgot the ‘issue of contention’ element and instead commenced their introduction as they would a Section B essay, which only points to the lack of preparation of these candidates. Also, many candidates did not say that the ‘issue of contention’ was either something or something else, completely ignoring the need for balance when establishing the ‘issue of contention’.

International History 1945-2000 JC2 Preliminary Examinations 2016 Suggested Approaches 3 ACJC/ History Dept./ JC2/ 2016 style and in the middle of the conflict, with a severe l ack of a long-term perspective. Likewise, Source E suffers from being heavily biased and lacks any kind of neutrality besides also being deprived of the benefit of hindsight. Moreover, Source C and Source E appear preoccupied solely with making personal attacks on Perez de Cuellar rather than to be fairer in t