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Copyright. Raffles Institution, Paper 1 International History Preliminary Examination 2016 RAFFLES INSTITUTION Year 6 Preliminary Examinations 2016 HISTORY 9731/01 Higher 1 and Higher 2 September 2016 Paper 1 International History, 1945-2000 3 hours COVER SHEET Name : CT class : Question No. For Examiner’s Use Only Marks 1 TOTAL

Copyright. Raffles Institution, Paper 1 International History Preliminary Examination 2016 RAFFLES INSTITUTION Year 6 Preliminary Examinations 2016 HISTORY 9731/01 Higher 1 and Higher 2 September 2016 Paper 1 International History, 1945-2000 3 hours READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST Write your name and CT class on the cover sheet and all the work you hand in. Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper. Do not use staples, paper clips, highlighters, glue or correction fluid. Indicate the question numbers attempted in the space provided on the cover sheet. Section A Answer Question 1. Section B Answer any three questions. At the end of the examination, fasten all your work and the cover sheet securely together. All questions in this paper carry equal marks. This document consists of 5 printed pages, including the cover sheet.

RAFFLES INSTITUTION 2016 3 Section A The United States and the Bosnia Crisis. You must answer Question 1. Source A Secretary-General Kofi Annan laid out in a somber, self-critical report today the tragic story of how the United Nations allowed the Bosnian Muslim ''safe area'' of Srebrenica to be overrun in July 1995 by Bosnian Serbs, who then systematically killed thousands of the town's men and boys. The fall of Srebrenica became a damaging symbol of the United Nations' failure at peacekeeping in a new era of civil wars, and it demonstrated the inadequacy of a system that allowed political considerations to colour military decisions when troops were under the command of the United Nations. ''The tragedy of Srebrenica will haunt our history forever,'' the report concludes. The fall of Srebrenica and other towns that the Security Council had identified as safe areas, but then refused to authorize enough troops to defend, led four months later to the American-sponsored Dayton peace agreement and the introduction of a NATO-led international military force in Bosnia. New York Times, 1999. . Source B Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in a ra re news conference, insisted Tuesday that NATO - and not the United Nations - is at the core of the hesitation over using punitive and strategic air strikes in Bosnia-Herzegovina. With this assertion, the Secretary-General sought to shake himself free of what he believes is a false image of him as the main obstacle to the use of air power in the Bosnian conflict. Boutros-Ghali said officials of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had informed him that their planes were authorized only to provide "air support"--immediate measures in defense of U.N. peacekeepers under attack in Bosnia. The planes, Boutros-Ghali continued, were not yet authorized by the NATO council to engage in "air strikes"--strategic measures such as the bombing of a bridge or an airport and punitive measures such as t he bombing of troops several days after they had attacked U.N. peacekeepers. "I am not at the end of the chain of command," he said. On the matter of air strikes, that falls on the North American and West European governments that make up NATO. Los Angeles Times, October 1995. Source C International protests forced Clinton to shelve his plans. When Secretary Christopher traveled to Europe to "consult" with America's allies, the French and British rejected the lift and strike plan because, while it may have solved Clinton's ow n domestic problems, it would have created domestic problems for the two European powers. Both countries had substantial contingents of peacekeeping troops deployed in Bosnia, which had been sent there to serve as non-partisan protectors of aid convoys. Removing the arms embargo and launching air strikes against Serbs would place the international community on the side of the Bosnian government and render the

RAFFLES INSTITUTION 2016 4 vulnerable peacekeeping troops subject to reprisals by Serb forces. Clinton backed down from the policy of lift and strike because he did not wish to alienate America's liberal allies in Europe. Protecting the trans-Atlantic ties to its liberal NATO allies was more important to the US than the outcome of the Bosnian crisis. Mark Peceny and Shannon Sanchez-Terry in the ‘Journal of Conflict Studies’, 1998. Source D But UN officials, as a UN report later documented, made ‘serious errors of judgment’ in Srebrenica that stemmed from a policy of ‘neutrality and non-violence that was unsuited for the conflict in Bosnia’. To enforce the ‘safe area’, the peacekeepers stripped the soldiers of their artillery and armoured vehicles—a so-called arms embargo that was supposed to apply to all sides equally, but which left the Muslims hopelessly outmatched by the better equipped Serbs. Moreover, as Kofi Annan’s chief of staff Mark Malloch later conceded, member states had failed to provide the UN with the military forces it needed in Bosnia. The blue-helmet peacekeepers, he lamented, should have been more willing to use the forces they had. There was also the role played by the Europeans. In the early 1990s, the conventional wisdom held that ‘Europe’ had become a leading actor on the global stage, unshackled from its Cold War subservience to Washington. In the Balkans, however, Brussels failed miserably and comprehensively to cope with a crisis at its own backdoor. Finally, there was the US. Bill Clinton won power in 1992 pledging to reverse the first Bush administration’s ‘appeasement’ of the ‘butchers of Belgrade’. As president, Clinton allowed Bosnia to bleed steadily for years. In fairness, the American people opposed intervention in a region that represented no direct threat to US national interests. The vacillation and ineptitude of Clinton and his secretary of state Warren Christopher prompted French president Jacques Chirac to declare: ‘The position of the leader of the free world was vacant.’ Tom Switzer, an Australian academic on the ABC TV programme, ‘Between the Lines’, 2015. Source E Senior US officials and Pentagon planners had no intention of becoming engaged in another poorly planned operation risking combat casualties where clear national security interests were not at stake. Moreover, CIA analysts estimated that it would take thousands of ground troops to restore the peace. The turning point was the Srebrenica massacre of mid-July 1995. The single greatest atrocity of the Wars of Yugoslavia’s Dissolution that resulted in the deaths of close to 8000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys, shocked world opinion and galvanised Wash ington to steer NATO in a new direction. According to US National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, Clinton had long advocated a more robust approach, and took the lead in pushing the Allies in a new direction. The United States was not alone in urging a new, more robust Allied approach to the Bosnian War. Attitudes towards the Bosnian Serbs had been hardening even before the Srebrenica massacre especially after UN peacekeepers, many of whom were French, were taken hostage in May 1995. In this way, French President Jacques Chirac was equally vocal about the need for a radically new and more interventionist policy. Ryan C. Hendrickson in ‘The NATO Review’, 2015. Now answer the following question: