NYJC H1 H2 HIST P1

NANYANG JUNIOR COLLEGE Year Two Preliminary Examination 2016 HISTORY 8814/01 9731/01 Paper 1 International History, 1945-2000 16 September 2016 3 hours No Additional Materials are required READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST Write your name and civics tutorial group on all the work you hand in. Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper. You may use a soft pencil for any diagrams, graphs or rough working. Do not use staples, paper clips, highlighters, glue, or correction fluid. Section A Answer Question 1. Section B Answer any three questions. At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together. All questions in this paper carry equal marks. This document consists of 4 printed pages. [Turn over

2 8814 H1 / 9731 H2 History Year Two Preliminary Examination 2016 Section A You must answer Question 1. UN PEACEKEEPING IN RWANDA 1. Read the sources and then answer the question. When answering Question 1 candidates are advised to pay particular attention to the interpretation and evaluation of the sources both individually and as a group. Source A Although the word “genocide” was excised from the final report, the press release announcing it, written by Canadian law professor William Schabas, used the word genocide to describe the mass killings of Tutsis. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Summary, Arbitrary, and Extrajudicial Executions, B.W. Ndiaye, conducted a mission to Rwanda in April 1993 and reported to the U.N. Human Rights Commission in August 1993 that the trial massacres of Tutsis, already begun by then, constituted genocide under the Genocide Convention. During the months prior to the Rwandan genocide, General Roméo Dallaire, commander of the U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), warned the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) that Hutu extremists were planning a campaign to exterminate Tutsis. In a now famous cable to New York on January 11, 1994, which DPKO authorized him to share with the U.S., French and Belgian Embassies, General Dallaire asked for authority to search for and seize the caches of machetes and other weapons that had been shipped into Rwanda for the Hutu militias, the Interahamwe. Iqbal Riza, deputy to then Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping Kofi Annan, in a letter signed by Annan, denied him permission to act, as exceeding UNAMIR’s mandate, and instructed him instead to take the information to the Rwandan government, many of whose members were planning the genocide. Article written in the Journal of African Conflicts and Peace Affairs, 2009. Source B We were all horrified by what was happening on the ground. We felt impotent to stop it. We were deeply distressed, yes, but again I must insist that what you are saying is that we should have saved Rwanda from itself, in the words of the Secretary General - it was Rwandese who planned the genocide, it was Rwandese who carried it out. It was Rwandese who, sadly, were the victims. We happened to be there on a peacekeeping mandate. Our mandate was not to anticipate and prevent genocide. Our people on the ground; as I said, they are lightly equipped troops under a very courageous commander; they did the best they could. They saved lives. When the killing actually started, they could not save every life in Rwanda. Interview with Iqbal Riza, Chief of Staff to UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, 1995. Source C The UN Secretariat had been remarkably quiet between 6 April 1994 (when the assassination of the Rwandan President began the genocide) and the delivery of its report [Turn over

3 8814 H1 / 9731 H2 History Year Two Preliminary Examination 2016 on Rwanda to the Security Council (on 20 April 1994). Though the Security Council was involved in a highly intense debate on Rwanda, the Secretariat’s presentations to the Council were brief, vague and indecisive. This posture hardly reassured the Council, increasing its anxiety and reinforcing the view that UNAMIR should be withdrawn before it was too late. It has since come to light that there was a gap between what Dallaire was telling the Secretariat and what the Secretariat in turn was reporting to the Council. UN staff now concede the point. The Secretariat’s focus on civil war chilled the impulse to intervene. Once the UN staff categorised the conflict in Rwanda as civil war, then its range of responses narrowed considerably and focused on consent-based alternatives.  From an American politics professor and a member of the 1993-4 US mission to the UN, in his book, ‘Eyewitness to a Genocide’, 2002. Source D The Chairman of the Independent Inquiry into United Nations actions during the 1994 Rwanda genocide, Ingvar Carlsson, presented his report to the Security Council this morning, saying the Council had the power to have prevented at least some of the Rwandan tragedy, and could act to ensure such a tragedy did not happen again. He described the lack of political will to act in the face of crises as the most dangerous obstacle to United Nations’ work for the maintenance of peace. The Council's decision to reduce the strength of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) after the genocide started, and despite its knowledge of the atrocities, was the cause of much bitterness in Rwanda. The Council must give missions the mandate t hey needed, mobilize the necessary troops and resources, and accept its responsibility irrespective of where problems occurred. United Nations Security Council Press Release SC/6843, April 2000. Source E On a visit to Rwanda, President Clinton said, ‘We come here today partly in recognition of the fact that we in the U.S. and the world community did not do as much as we could have and should have done to try to limit what occurred in Rwanda.’ This implied that the U.S. had done a good deal but not quite enough. In reality the U.S. did much more than fail to send troops. It led a successful effort to remove most of the UN peacekeepers who were already in Rwanda. It aggressively worked to block the subsequent authorization of UN reinforcements. It refused to use its technology to jam radio broadcasts that were a crucial instrument in the coordination and perpetuation of the genocide. And even as, on average, 8,000 Rwandans were being butchered each day, U.S. officials shunned the term ‘genocide’, for fear of being obligated to act. The United States in fact did virtually nothing to try to limit what occurred. Indeed, staying out of Rwanda was an explicit U.S. policy objective. A political commentary in an American magazine, 2001. Now answer the following question. How far do sources A-E support the view that the UN failed in its mission in Rwanda because it lacked political will to do so? [ Turn over

4 8814 H1 / 9731 H2 History Year Two Preliminary Examination 2016 Section B You must answer three questions from this section. 2. ‘The Origins of the Cold War could be explained by legitimate reactions by the USA to Soviet actions’. Discuss this statement in relation to the period 1945-1949. 3. ‘Not a Cold War conflict’. How far would you agree with this assessment of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962? 4. How significant was the role played by Israel in the development of religious fundamentalism in the Middle East? 5. How far would you agree with the statement that the Indians and Pakistanis were equally responsible f