TJC H2 HIST P1 QP

Temasek Junior College 2016 [Turn over   TEMASEK JUNIOR COLLEGE JC2 Preliminary Examinations 2016 HIGHER 2   HISTORY 8814/01 Paper 1 International History, 1945 – 2000 9731/01 13 September 2016 3 hours   Additional Materials: Writing Paper   READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST Write your name and CG on all the work you hand in. Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the writing paper. Start each answer on a fresh piece of writing paper. You may use an HB pencil for any diagrams, graphs or rough working. Do not use staples, paper clips, glue or correction fluid. Section A Answer Question 1. Section B Answer any three questions. At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together. All questions in this paper carry equal marks [25]. You are reminded of the need for good English and clear handwriting in your answer. This question paper consists of 4 printed pages.

2    Temasek Junior College 2016   Section A You must answer Question 1. THE UN, NATO AND PEACEKEEPING IN BOSNIA 1 Read the sources and then answer the question which follows. When answering Question 1 candidates are advised to pay particular attention to the interpretation and evaluation of the sources both individually and as a group. Source A Article 52 1. Nothing in the Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security … 2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific* settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or agencies before referring them to the Security Council. 3. The Security Council shall enc ourage the development of pacific* settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council. Article 53 1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken without the authorization of the Security Council, … or until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression… Article 54 The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies… Extracts from Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, 1945 * pacific means peaceful Source B In theory, NATO airpower was intended to provide some enforcement for PROFOR. But in practice, disagreements were common between UNPROFOR and NATO over the nature and extent of the use of air power. Until August 1995, only 10 small-scale strikes had been made. Although according to Security Council resolutions NATO was acting in support of UNPROFOR, in practice NATO made its own decisions when called on by UNPROFOR to carry out air strikes. In sum, the problem of competing credibilities is a particularly serious one between an organization designed to fight war and another dedicated to keep peace. Adapted from comments by Shashi Tharoor, Special Assistant in UN Peacekeeping Operations, June 1995.

3 Temasek Junior College 2016 [Turn Over Source C So what is the UNSC’s strategy for formulati ng realizable and sustainable military objectives? What are its 33,000 peacekeepers doing beyond the humanitarian mission? The simple answer, which utterly discredits the Security Council but not the peacekeepers themselves, is everything and nothing. In more than 60 resolutions passed since the conflict began, the Security Council has enlarged or expanded the mandate of UNPROFOR over a dozen times. Their resolutions have become increasingly disconnected from the situation on the ground and the military resources of UNPROFOR. The UN commanders in the field have reportedly quipped that they do not even bother reading the strategic directives from New York anymore. Extract from a research institute’s findings on the UN Mission in Bosnia, June 1995. Source D Peacekeeping doctrine assumes the willing consent and cooperation of the belligerents to work out a settlement which peacekeepers can help sustain. Peace enforcement, on the other hand, creates the settlement by compelling the warring parties to accept the conditions. Not until the NATO air onslaught in August 1995 did the UN-NATO effort move to peace enforcement. For three and a half years, the Security Council did not provide the means to enforce its resolutions. UNPROFOR has been required to find some sort of middle way between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. As Boutros-Ghali acknowledged in January: “The UN operation in Bosnia- Herzegovina was given additional mandates which required the use of force. These were incompatible with existing mandates requiring consent of the parties, impartiality, and the non- use of force. The resultant combination was inherently contradictory. It jeopardized the mission.” Extract from a research paper titled ‘The Failure of the Middle Way’, Nov 1995. Source E On 1 May 1993, Clinton sent representatives to consult with NATO allies to gain support for a strategy to order air strikes against the Serbs. This failed, exposing issues that would hamstring NATO’s actions in the conflict. NATO members in UNPROFOR were concerned that their troops, lightly armed and widely dispersed, were likely to be taken as hostages and did not share Washington’s enthusiasm for an air campaign. Divergence between NATO’s perspectives on the conflict and little European domestic support for armed intervention added to Clinton’s problems. NATO’s inability to reach consensus … called into question the future of the alliance. In June 1993, Serb attacks on the Srebrenica “safe area” led the U.N. Security Council to authorize the use of air power “to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate.” The resolution established an arrangement where the U.N. and NATO both had to agree before air strikes could be carried out. This arrangement proved difficult for Washington, as the U.N. was extremely reluctant to authorize any effective combat action on the part of NATO. Adapted from a US Government website, 2016. Now answer the following question. How far do Sources A-E show that it was confusion over the roles of the UN and NATO that led to the UN’s failure in Bosnia?

4    Temasek Junior College 2016   Section B You must answer three questions from this section. 2 Assess the significance of the Sovietisation of Eastern Europe in the origins of the Cold War. 3 “The Cold War ended only in 1991.” To what extent is this assessment valid? 4 Which was the most significant of the problems faced by the global economy after 1973? 5 How far were Deng Xiaoping’s policies for China’s economic development merely a continuation of those of his predecessors? 6 How important was the role of religion in the development of the Indo-Pakistani conflict from 1948 to 2000? Credits: Source A http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-viii/index.html Source B S Tharoor, “United Nations peacekeeping in Europe”. Survival, Summer 1995. Source C John F. Hillen, “Killing with ki ndness: The UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia.” Foreign Policy Briefing No. 34. Cato Institute. 30 June 1995. Source D Australian Parliamen