RI H1 HISTORY P1

Copyright. Raffles Institution, Paper 1 International History Preliminary Examination 2014 RAFFLES INSTITUTION Year 6 Preliminary Examinations 2014 HISTORY 9731/01 Higher 1 and Higher 2 16th September 2014 Paper 1 International History, 1945-2000 3 hours COVER SHEET Name : CT class : Question No. For Examiner’s Use Only Marks 1 TOTAL

Copyright. Raffles Institution, Paper 1 International History Preliminary Examination 2014 RAFFLES INSTITUTION Year 6 Preliminary Examinations 2014 HISTORY 9731/01 Higher 1 and Higher 2 16 September 2014 Paper 1 International History, 1945-2000 3 hours READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST Write your name and CT class on the cover sheet and all the work you hand in. Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper. Do not use staples, paper clips, highlighters, glue or correction fluid. Indicate the question numbers attempted in the space provided on the cover sheet. Section A Answer Question 1. Section B Answer any three questions. At the end of the examination, fasten all your work and the cover sheet securely together. All questions in this paper carry equal marks. This document consists of 5 printed pages, including the cover sheet.

RAFFLES INSTITUTION 2014 3 Section A You must answer Question 1. The USA and United Nations Peacekeeping 1. Read the sources and then answer the question which follows. Source A The shock of American losses, etched on television, galvanised President Clinton into a decision to withdraw all American troops from Somalia. Clinton administration aides whispered that the White House had known practically nothing about what was going on in Somalia and publicly blamed Boutros Boutros-Ghali and the UN for leading American soldiers into a debacle. New American forces en route to Somalia “will be under American command” leaving the false impression that the troops already there were not under American command. The American decision to withdraw crippled the Somalia operation. The name Somalia became a buzzword for failure. The Clinton administration issues stringent new guidelines for American participation of UN peacekeeping. If these guidelines were follow ed strictly, the US would never support any peacekeeping operation again. Views of a Los Angeles foreign and diplomatic correspondent, 1995 Source B However, a growing body of legal and academic writing justified the failures of these international peacekeeping interventions in Africa under the pretext of UN Member States’ unwillingness or inability to respond to a burgeoning number of crises, citing non-compliance by one of the parties. The problem is that the UN Security Council is a forum for the domination of powerful super-powers which can sometimes solve secondary issues where fundamental (primary) interests are not at stake. Since decision and review of UN peacekeeping operations is at the behest of the UN Security Council, then this plays a crucial role in determining what are acceptable international norms or defining the proper practices of states and other actors in a given context, thereby defining what appropriate practice ought to be. The more the great powers have strategic interest in conflict regions of the world, the more they will be willing to actively participate in the peacekeeping missions, and the more they will be committed to ensure a successful peacekeeping outcome. In other words, when the great powers have little or secondary interest in a particular state conflict, they would have less interest in peacekeeping mission, and would be less concerned about the success of the mission. Adapted from the UK Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences, 2012 Source C Kofi Annan, the UN secretary general, has said the US government's lack of leadership and desire to avoid the loss of American lives is to blame for the failure of peacekeeping operations around the world. US position has hampered efforts by the inter national organisation to act effectively in trouble zones. "Unless we are prepared to counter force with force, there is very little we can do," he says of humanitarian crises. "The problem is that you have countries like the US that will not accept a single casualty. And that philosophy is spreading." He implicitly criticises the current administration by praising the behaviour of President George Bush in peacekeeping operations before Mr Clinton was elected in 1992. "Bush had no problem in the Gulf - a vital national interest was at stake there -

RAFFLES INSTITUTION 2014 4 but he had no problem in Somalia either." Mr Annan's comments come at a sensitive time for the UN. Some 159 heads of state are to convene for a summit in New York next week. At the same time, the US Congress has agreed to pay $582m (£390m) of its dues to the UN in return for a reduction in its annual payments. Views of Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General quoted in Global Policy Forum, 2000 Source D The United Nations itself recognized that it was dangerous to deploy a peacekeeping force without the political prerequisites of success, such as a previously concluded settlement and the consent and cooperation of the belligerents. UNPROFOR is not supposed to be a coercive mission, although NATO airpower has been used for limited enforcement actions. The key operational imperative of the mission is still the willing consent and cooperation of the belligerents. However, there are no incentives for the belligerents to cooperate, and the UN intervention has produced an operational environment in which it is easier for the local factions to go on fighting and forget about negotiating for peace. There is no peace to sustain, there is no will on the part of the leading UN member states to incur the enormous costs in blood and treasure of imposing peace through force, and the middle way perversely encourages the belligerents to continue fighting. The three factions-- Muslims, Serbs, and Croats--have become adept at manipulating the United Nations to advance their war aims. Adapted from a book on the strategy of UN military operations written by a former U.S. Army officer and research scholar, 1995 Source E From the beginning, U.S. officials insisted on a total Iraqi pullout from Kuwait, without any linkage to other Middle Eastern problems, fearing any concessions would strengthen Iraqi influence in the region for years to come. Within hours of the invasion, Kuwait and U.S. delegations requested a meeting of the United Nations Security Council, which passed Resolution 660, condemning the invasion and demanding a withdrawal of Iraqi troops. Acting on the Carter Doctrine's policy, and out of fear the Iraqi Army could launch an invasion of Saudi Arabia, U.S. President George H. W. Bush quickly announced that the U.S. would launch a "wholly defensive" mission to prevent Iraq from invading Saudi Arabia under the codename Operation Desert Shield. To ensure that economic backing, Baker went on an eleven day journey to nine countries that the press dubbed "The Tin Cup Trip". A coalition of forces opposing Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait was formed from 34 countries. It was the largest coalition since World War II led by the U.S. Army General Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr. Views of an academic historian writing in 2014 Now answer the following question. How far do Sources A-E support the view that, the United States was a major hindrance to United Nations peacekeeping activities between 1989 and 2000?

RAFFLES INSTITUTION 2014 5 Section B You