2023 H1 TMJC

TAMPINESMERIDIANJUNIORCOLLEGEJC2PRELIMINARYEXAMINATION CANDIDATENAME CIVICSGROUP H1HISTORY TheColdWar andtheModernWorld(1945–2000) 8821/01 13September20233hoursAdditional materials: 12PageAnswer Booklet READTHESEINSTRUCTIONSFIRSTWriteyour nameandCivicsGroupinthespacesat thetopof thepage.Writeindarkblueor blackpenonbothsidesof thepaper.YoumayuseanHBpencil for anydiagrams, graphsor roughworking.Donot usestaples, paper clips, glueor correctionfluid. SectionAAnswerQuestion1. SectionBAnswertwoquestions.Thenumber of marksisgiveninbrackets[ ] at theendof eachquestionor part question. Thisdocument consistsof6printedpagesand1blankpage. 1

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SECTIONAYoumust answer Question1. SUCCESSANDLIMITATIONSOFSUSTAININGALLIES TheKoreanWar1 Readthesourcesandanswer thequestionswhichfollow: SourceAFollowing our withdrawal from the Security Council, America became entangled in a militaryintervention in Korea and is now squandering its military prestige and moral authority. Few honestpeople can nowdoubt that America is nowactingasanaggressor andtyrant inKoreaandthat it isnotas militarily powerful as it claims to be. In addition, theUnitedStatesof Americaispresentlydistractedfrom Europe in the Far East. Does it not give us an advantage in the global balance of power? Itundoubtedlydoes.Let us suppose that the American government continues to be tied down in the Far East and pullsChina into the struggle for the freedomof Korea and its own independence. What might comeof this?First, America, just like any other country, cannot cope with China, a country with such large armedforces at the ready. It follows that America would overextend itself in this struggle. Second, havingoverextended itself in this matter, America would be incapable of a third world war in the near future.Therefore, a third world war would be postponed for an indeterminate period, which wouldprovidethetime necessary to strengthen socialism in Europe, not to mention that the struggle between Americaand China would revolutionize the entire Far East. Does all this not give us an advantage from theperspectiveof theglobal balanceof power?It unquestionablydoes.Stalin’sletter totheleader of Czechoslovakia, 27Aug1950.SourceBWe must remember that Stalin made decisions always to serve the Soviet Union's strategic interests.He would never decide solely to promote China’s interest or to help North Korea. The key, in myopinion, lay in Lushun (Port Arthur) and the China Eastern Railway (CER). Both were of criticalimportancefor theSoviet Union’saccesstothePacificOcean, aconsiderationthat hadlongoccupiedacentral positioninRussianandSoviet securitystrategiesinAsia.Upon Mao’s arrival in Moscow, Stalin initially showed no interest in signing a newtreaty withChina, inpart because he feared that this would deprive Moscow of the privileges to use Lushun and CER. Inearly January 1950, Stalin yielded to Mao’s persistent push and agreed to sign a new treaty. OnJanuary 26, Mao rejected Stalin’s proposal of keeping Soviet’s privileges to Lushun and CER. As acompromise, Zhou Enlai proposed that China would reclaim Lushun and CER in three years aftertreaty’s signing. On January 28, Stalin accepted the Chinese proposal “in principle,” but added a newclause: if a war occurred in East Asia, the Soviets would continuously be abletousebothLushunandCER. TheChineseagreedtothisclauseandStalingot what hewanted.Adaptedfromanarticle, writtenbyleadingcontemporaryChinesehistorian, 3

entitled'Re-visitingStalin’sandMao’smotivationsintheKoreanWar, 2020 SourceCChina’s decision to enter the Korean War, despite Stalin’s breakingof hispromiseof Soviet air supportplayed a decisive role in convincing Stalin, that Mao and his comrades were “genuine internationalistCommunists.” Shortly after Chinese troopscrossedtheYaluRiver, StalinorderedtheSoviet air forcetohelp defend the Chinese supply lines. Thereafter, Soviet military and economic assistance pouredintoChina, guaranteeing that Chinese logistical needs in Korea would be met whilesignificantlyenhancingChina’s overall capacity for domestic economic reconstruction. When Chinese troops successfullydrove the enemy forcesbacktothe38thparallel, NorthKoreabecameasecuritybuffer for China. All ofthis substantially strengthened the foundation of the Sino-Soviet alliance, as well as the CCP’s newregimeinChina.However, Mao never forgot Stalin’s suspicion of the Chinese at so critical and historic a moment.Though the Chinese experience in managing the Korean crisis bridged Sino-Soviet differences for themoment, it sowedtheseedsfor theSino-Soviet split adecadelater.AdaptedfromanarticlebyaleadingcontemporaryChinesehistorian,entitled'Re-visitingStalin’sandMao’smotivationsintheKoreanWar, 2020 SourceDBy the end of 1949, KimIl Sung arrivedtoholdconsultationswithStalin. TheNorthKoreanswantedtoprod South Korea with the point of a bayonet. Stalin couldn’t oppose the idea. It appealed to hisconvictions as a Communist. Stalin persuaded Kimthat he should thinkit over, makecalculations, andthen come back with a concrete plan. Kim went home and then returned to Moscow when he hadworked everything out. He told Stalin he was certain of success, but Stalin had his doubts. He wasworried how Americans would respond, but he was also inclined to think that if the war was foughtswiftly, then war with the USA could be avoided. The war wasn’t Stalin’s idea, but KimIl Sung’s. Kimwastheinitiator. But Stalindidnot trytodiscouragehim. AdaptedfromNikitaKhrushchev’smemoirsin2004about USSR’sinvolvement intheKoreanWar. 4

SourceE StudytheadvancedproductionexperienceoftheSovietUnionfortheindustrializationofourbelovedcountry. Chineseposter andbanner producedin1953. Nowanswerthefollowingquestions:a) Compare and contrast sources Aand Bas evidence for Stalin’s reason for drawing ChinaintotheKoreanWar. [10] b) How far do sources A-E agree with the assertion that the Soviet Union had successfullysustaineditsCommunist alliesintheKoreanWar? [30] 5

SECTIONB:ESSAYQUESTIONSYoumust answertwoquestionsfromthissection. EITHER2 ‘Ideological differencesworsenedSino-Soviet relationsmorethanpersonalityclashes.’Howfar doyouagreewiththisstatement? [30] OR 3 Howfar doyouagreethat ASEAN’sresponsestothe2ndand3rdIndo-Chinesewarwaseffective? [30] ANDEITHER 4 ‘Great Power politics were more a curse than a blessing for United Nations peacekeepingfrom1945-2000.’ Howfar doyouagreewiththisassertion? [30] OR 5 Towhat extent doyouagreewiththestatement that “TheUNpeacekeepingmissioninLebanonfrom1979- 1985wasafailureonall counts.”? [30] Endof paper 6