SAJC 2021 Prelims Mark Scheme H2 History Paper 1

2021 Prelims_ JC2 H2 History P1_ Mark Scheme 1 1 (a) Compare and contrast the evidence provided in Source C and D on the impact of the Strategic Defensive Initiative (SDI) on the superpowers’ negotiations. [10] Similar View #1 Expected valid responses: • [Success Criterion #4] Both Sources C and D agree that the SDI stalled the negotiations between the two superpowers and had a negative impact. o C: Gorbachev highlighted how the USSR ‘had made real concessions to the US in a number of negotiations and sought to establish conditions for reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons’ but ‘the US was trying to drag things backwards’ due to the apparent US intention of using Soviet amenability to arms reduction as ‘leverage to force the Soviet Union to make concessions in certain areas’. This suggests that the issue of arms control, of which SDI was a major feature, had stalled negotiations to the point that they ‘had reached a dead end’. o D: ‘At the Reykjavik Summit, the sticking point was SDI, Gorbachev insisting that it be confined to the laboratory and Reagan refusing to give up testing.’ This implies that SDI was an impediment to the two superpowers’ making progress in their negotiations with each other due to their divergent views on the issue. • Both Source C and D share this similar view because: o Evidence corroborates how SDI had indeed been a key impediment to the US and the USSR’s efforts towards arms reductions up to 1986. o During the summit at Reykjavik in October 1986, Gorbachev offered comprehensive concessions to set nuclear disarmament into motion. He was prepared to remove all SS-20s from Europe and cut Soviet strategic w eapons by 50%. Arms reduction talks, however, ended acrimoniously and little progress was made. (#3) o Although Reagan was interested in what Gorbachev had to offer, he was unwilling to compr omise on SDI. Gorbachev, on the other hand, insisted that America’s abandonment of SDI was a necessary condition for any arms reduction negotiations to be meaningful. (#3)

2021 Prelims_ JC2 H2 History P1_ Mark Scheme 2 Differing Views Expected valid responses: • [Success Criterion #4] While Source C presents primarily the view that SDI was an impediment to negotiations, Source D highlights how negotiations were ultimately not compromised by SDI. o C: Source C highlights the irreconcilable positions of the superpowe rs regarding SDI, suggesting it remained a major impediment to negotiations where Reagan ‘had promised the American people he would not give up SDI’ and ‘could not confine its work to the laboratory’ but Gorbachev insisted that ‘he had to take a principled position that SDI-related work could only be in laboratories.’ o D: The source observes that ‘ almost all the participants assessed Reykjavik retrospectively as, in Reagan’s words, ‘a major turning point in the quest for a safe and secure world’ with George Shultz even describing the Summit as ‘sensational’ for establishing frameworks for disarmament. This implies that despite the initial barriers presented by SDI, negotiations ultimately bore fruit and the superpowers made significant progress towards de-escalating the arms race. • Both sources offer differing views because: o Source C is a memorandum from 1986 and its primary goal is to offer an accurate recording of events where Gorbachev and Reagan indeed had divergent views on the issue of SD I (#1), and only in February 1987, after Reykjavik, Gorbachev discarded mutual agreement on SDI as a prerequisite for disarmament talks (#3 - CK). o Source D, being an academic article written in 2001, is well placed to access available evidence on how participants in the 1986 Reykjavik Summit ascertained that it was a resounding success and SDI was not a major impediment to negotiations. Significantly, in Source D, the academic is highlight ing how the participants themselves assessed that the Reykjavik Summit was a stellar success despite disagreements over SDI and this is understandable given how individuals such as Reagan and George Shultz would have considerable incentive to highlight that t he US played a key role in securing peace for the world through Summit diplomacy that paved the way for disarmament (#1).

2021 Prelims_ JC2 H2 History P1_ Mark Scheme 3 1 (b) How far do Source A -F support the view that the end of the Cold War seemed inevitable from 1985 onwards? [30] Classification of Sources Support Challenge A, B, F (with elements of Support) C, D, E Treating Sources as a Set (Success Criterion #3)1 Evaluating Sources in Context (Success Criteria #1, #2, #3) Identifying and explaining supporting evidence (Success Criterion #4) Suggested Approach Sources A and B support the view while Sources C, D, E and F – with Source F containing elements of “support” – challenge the view. Sources A and B support the view as they highlight the 1985 Geneva Summit seemed to have broken new ground in superpower relations and set the US and the USSR on an upward trajectory towards cooperation . Source A highlights how both Reagan and Gorbachev concurred that the 1985 Geneva Summit marked something akin to an unprecedented beginning of improved relations between the US and the USSR. This is seen where in Source A, Reagan ‘felt that these [Geneva] meetings expressed the will and desire of both sides to find answers that would benefit not only all the people of the world living, but also the yet unborn’ and Gorbachev agreed that they had ‘laid the first few bricks’ and ‘a new start, a new phase [had] begun.’ Source B reinforces Sources A’s optimistic assessment of the Geneva Summit’s positive impact on superpower relations when it notes how the Deputy Director of the CIA stated his belief that in intellectual terms, the Cold War ended for him in November of 1985 ‘when Gorbachev made his first 50 percent proposal’ as that was ‘serious stuff’. Thus, Source B suggests that the 1985 Geneva Summit meetings was perhaps momentous enough such that the end of the Cold War seemed inevitable from that juncture onwards, due in large part to the radical concessions that Gorbachev was willing to undertake. Overall, Sources A and B are more limited in their credibility and utility as sources that support the view that the end of the Cold War seemed inevitable from 1985 onwards . Source A is a memorandum of a conversation between Gorbachev and Reagan and notes the overwhelmingly positive tone between the two leaders. While this is likely an accurate reflection of the conversations that took place between Gorbachev and Reagan, it is primarily an official record of the two leaders overtly stating that it is imperative that the US and the USSR work towards cooperation, but it is unclear if these intentions manifested in concrete outcomes that would make the end of the Cold War seem ine vitable by 1985. While Source B may appear credible as it was from an academic book in 2016 that presumably would have more time and resources to offer a holistic assessment of whether the Cold War’s end seemed inevitable by 1985, the main “support” for the view stems from the opinion of the CIA’s Deputy Director who was offering his personal view on when the Cold War ended in his individual capacity as opposed to it being a factual observation that rested upon sturdy research . Critically, contextual knowledge reveals how this cordiality between them manifested in no 1 It is imperative that candidates avoid isolating a source for analysis e.g., analysing Source F by itself, doing so confines the answer to Level 3 (11-15) where it “will begin to treat sources as a set”. Exceptions may be made on a case-by-case basis for answers that display exceptional quality of analysis overall.

2021 Prelims_ JC2 H2 History P1_ Mark Scheme 4 concrete outcomes i