SAJC 2021 Prelims H2 History Paper 1 Final

©SAJC 2021 9752/01/21/Prelims ST ANDREW’S JUNIOR COLLEGE JC2 Preliminary Examinations General Certificate of Education Advanced Level Higher 2 HISTORY Paper 1 Shaping the International Order (1945-2000) 9752/01 15 September 2021 3 hours No Additional Materials are required. READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST An answer booklet will be provided with this question paper. You should follow the instructions on the front cover of the answer booklet. If you need additional answer paper ask the invigilator for a continuation booklet. Section A Answer Question 1. Section B Answer two questions. The number of marks is given in brackets [ ] at the end of each question or part question. _________________________________________________________________________ This document consists of 6 printed pages. [Turn over

2 ©SAJC 2021 9752/01/21/Prelims Section A You must answer Question 1. Summit Diplomacy and the End of the Bipolarity Source A Gorbachev said that , as the Geneva Summit was coming to an end , he felt that he and President Reagan had truly made a start. It would have been unrealistic to expect great progress right away. But the whole world was very concerned, and it was a good thing that they had made this start. ‘We have started something,’ President Reagan said, and he felt that these meetings expressed the will and desire of both sides to find an answer that would benefit not only all the people o f the world living, but also the yet unborn. ‘We will continue meeting,’ Reagan said, ‘and continue to work for those causes which had brough t the sides together here in Geneva.’ Gorbachev answered, saying that he was confident that the two of them had sta rted something. After a very long interval between summit meetings, he shared Reagan’s view that it would be wrong to give a false signal from Geneva. ‘If now we have laid the first few bricks,’ Gorbachev said, ‘we have made a new start, a new phase has begun. This is very important.’ ‘The major differences are ahead,’ he said, but he wanted to invite the U.S. side to move ahead on the appointed road together with the Soviet side, with mutual understanding and a sense of responsibility.’ From a memorandum of a conversation between Gorbachev and Reagan during the Geneva Summit, November 1985. *A memorandum refers to an official record of a diplomatic meeting Source B Reagan and Gorbachev’s shared concern over the danger of nuclear weapons did produce some breakthrough proposals at Geneva, especially Gorbachev’s embrace of 50 percent cuts in ballistic missiles where the USSR had a large numerical advantage. The CIA’s Deputy Director of Intelligence remarked years later, ‘Somebody asked me when did I think the Cold War was over. Intellectually, for me, it was November of 1985 in Geneva, when Gorbachev made his first 50 percent proposal. That was serious stuff.’ According to Secretary of State George Shultz, ‘Reagan had previously viewed all Soviet statements as blatant propaganda designed simply to mislead the West… but Reagan had changed his mind following his personal talks with Gorbachev, admitting that the Soviet leader had deep convictions of his own. From an academic book, 2016.

3 ©SAJC 2021 9752/01/21/Prelims Source C The Soviets felt the proposals they had brought to Reykjavik had been highly constructive in spirit. They had made real concessions to the US in a number of negotiations and sought to establish conditions for reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons. But they found that the US was trying to drag things backwards. Gorbachev stated that the Geneva negotiations prior to the Reykjavik meeting had reached a dead end. New approaches were needed, as were political will and an ability to think in broad terms, to escape this dead end. The Soviets had crafted their proposals with this in mind. They had expected the same from the Americans. From Gorbachev’s perspective, the Reagan administration’s approach to arms control proceeded from the false impression that the Soviet Union was more interested in nuclear disarmament than the US. Perhaps the US felt it could use such leverage to force the Soviet Union to make concessions in certain areas. This was a dangerous illusion. Such a scenario could never occur. Reagan said that he had promised the American people he would not give up SDI. He would not destroy the possibility of proceeding with SDI and could not confine its work to the laboratory. Gorbachev maintained that he had to take a principled position that SDI -related work could only be in laboratories. This would mean that it could not be transferred outside, to create weapons and put them in space. From a memorandum of a conversation between Gorbachev and Reagan during the Reykjavik Summit, October 1986. Source D During the first six months of 1986, negotiations for the next summit failed to prosper. Not until June did Reagan respond favourably to Gorbachev’s arms control initiatives, though even then Reagan showed no inclination to abandon his dream of strategic defence. At the Reykjavik Summit, the sticking point was SDI, Gorbachev insisting that it be confined to the laboratory and Reagan refusing to give up testing. Thus, the meeting broke up with both sides registering considerable disappointment; many, including most of the participant s, considered Reykjavik a failure. Given the negative sentiments, it is somewhat surprising that almost all the participants assessed Reykjavik retrospectively as, in Reagan’s words, ‘a major turning point in the quest for a safe and secure world.’ Georg e Shultz, the US Secretary of State, was even more enthusiastic, calling its results ‘sensational,’ because it introduced the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty and created, ‘in an immense amount of detail, the basic structure of the START I agreement.’ From an academic article, 2001

4 ©SAJC 2021 9752/01/21/Prelims Source E An American cartoonist’s impression of the Summit meetings, 1986. Source F The rapid-fire series of events that transpired between 1985 and 1990 stunned governmental decision-makers, foreign policy experts, and ordinary citizens alike across the world. Ronald Reagan, the most unequivocally anti-communist American leader of the entire Cold War era, suddenly found a Soviet leader saying yes to arms control faster than he could say no, moving to ‘de -ideologise’ Moscow’s foreign policy, offering unilateral concessions on conventional armed forces, and vowing to remove Soviet troops from Afghanistan. After a “get acquainted” summit at Geneva in November 1985 that produced little of substance but markedly improved the atmospherics of the Soviet –American relationship, Gorbachev convinced Reagan to attend a hastily arranged meeting at Reykjavik, Iceland, in October 1986. There, the two leaders came remarkably close to a decision to eliminate all ballistic missiles. In the end, though, Reagan’s insistence on continuing with his SDI initiative led the Soviet leader to withdraw the breath-taking proposals he had placed on the table. Yet the setback at Reykjavik proved but temporary. Shortly thereafter, Gorbachev dropped his insistence that America’s abandonment of SDI must be a prerequisite for progress on all arms control matters, and moved to accept the ‘zero option’ first put forward by US negotiators back in 1981. From a book by an American academic, 2003.

5 ©SAJC 2021 9752/01/21/Prelims Now answer the following questions: (a) Compare and contrast the evidence provided in Source C and D on the impact of the Strategic Defensive Initiative (SDI) on the superpowers’ negotiations. [10] (b) How far do Source A-F support the view th