Essay — Integration vs Assimilation (24/30)

Was multicultural integration more successful than assimilation in the independentSoutheast Asianstates’ attemptstoachievenational unity? Every nascent state strives to achieve national unity, characterised by territorial integrity,social stability and common identity. Across Southeast Asia, two general approachesemerged: assimilation sought to impose adominant cultureontominorities, whileintegrationpromoted a multicultural social fabric that embraced diverse identities. In most countries,neither approach achieved national unity in its entirety: while assimilation fared better atcreating a central national identity, integration proved better at averting minority challengesto social stability and territorial integrity, the bedrock of unity. Ultimately, integration was themore successful strategy because it was inevitably more accommodative in implementationandwasprimarilyusedinconditionswhereunitywasinherentlyeasier toachieve. Integrative approaches were not alwaysmoresuccessful: integration’sattempt toprotect thecultural spaces of diverse groups counterproductively reinforced ethnic differences.Comparatively, assimilation—with its heavy emphasis on establishing one dominantculture—more successfully forged a shared national identity. In Malaysia, accommodatingdifferent communities led to ethnic compartmentalisation: vernacular private schools wereallowed which protected Chinese and Indian culture but reinforced ethnic segregation ineducation, limiting opportunities for inter-ethnic interaction. Hence, a2000Universiti Malayasurvey found “very little inter-ethnic mixing” among students, precluding any commonMalaysian identity. Comparatively, Thailand’s populace was firmly assimilated under thenational ideology of “Nation, Religion, King”: King Bhumibol was so universally revered thathe successfully forced leaders Thanom and Suchinda to step down in 1973 and 1992,demonstrating his central place in Thai identity. Further, the promotion of Buddhism to hilltribes under the Thammacarik and Thammathut programmes in the mid-1960s successfullyconverted many to Buddhism, with nearly every province in the region beingmajority-Buddhist by 1970, indicating a shared Buddhist identity. Similarly, the Javaneseconcept of gotong royong was successfully established as national culture inIndonesia—both Sukarno and Suharto attached the phrase to key policies (e.g. the 1957Gotong Royong Cabinet, 1960 Gotong Royong Parliament and 1968 BIMAS GotongRoyong), demonstrating popular buy-in. Further, Bahasa Indonesia—widely considered astrategy to facilitate acceptance of the dominant culture by avoiding overt Javanesedomination—enhanced Indonesianidentityasit becamespokenbyover 80%of Indonesiansby 1990. Thus, assimilation’s strong focus on creating a dominant culture has forged a

national identity—a key marker of national unity—while integration often reinforced ethnicdividesinstead. Further, integration often incited backlash and resistance frommajoritieswhentheyfelt theirdominance was threatened by multiculturalism, while assimilation better preserved socialstability by assuring themof their cultural dominance. In Burma, UNu’s attempt to balancethe teaching of Buddhism, Christianity and Islamincensedthesangha, compromisingsocialstability when over 8000 monks protested the policy in Mandalay. In Indonesia, Sukarno’sintegration of the Chinese-dominated PKI into politics via his NASAKOM Cabinetexacerbated anti-Chinese sentiments, leading to pogroms against the Chinese minority inMakassar, Medan and Lombok that killed 2000 from 1965-66. This widespread socialinstability was only quelled after Suharto introducedaseriesof assimilativepoliciesin1967:Chinese script was banned from public display and Chinese were forced to adoptIndonesian-sounding names. Hence, it was assimilation, not integration, that pacifiedmajority anger, delivering three decades of New Order stability. In Malaysia, the PAP’sadvocacy for a “Malaysian Malaysia”—an integrative vision that would remove thefavourable admission quotas Malays received for educational institutions and the civilservice—sparked Malay anger, leading to destabilising and deadly race riots in 1964.Further, the accommodative use of English as an official administrativelanguage, alongsidethe freedom of worship for all religions, frustrated many Malays who desired greater Malaydominance, contributing to the 1969 riots that undermined social stability. Conversely, thisanger was soothed by a policy of official assimilation, evinced by the 1971 ConstitutionalAmendment that made challenges to Malays’ special position punishable as sedition. Thispreserved social stability: Malaysia has not seen riots ever since. Therefore, unlikeintegration which erodes the privileges of the majority, assimilation entrenches theirdominant position, preventingdestabilisingresentment that erodesunity. However, even as integration sometimes provoked majorities, it better preserved socialstability overall by protecting thecultural spaceandrightsof different ethnicities, significantlyreducing minority resistance. Comparatively, assimilation often abrogated minority identitiesby imposing a dominant culture, leading to marginalised minorities asserting theirdistinctiveness. Singapore’s formally multicultural approachgrantednumerousprotectionstominorities, including freedomof worship guaranteed by theConstitution, therecognitionof 4official languages including Malay and Tamil, and the 1969 Bilingual EducationPolicywhichenabled students to study their “mother tongue” in schools. Further, inter-ethnic mixing isfacilitated by the 1989 Ethnic Integration Policy which introduced racial quotas in housingestates. Such multiculturalismhas preserved social stability, withnomajor protestsor ethnicviolence since 1964. Conversely, Thailandattemptedtoassimilatethehill tribes: theMinistry

of Education seized control of all schools in the area in 1967, conducting education fully inThai which led to poor performance among hill tribes. Further, the government forciblyresettled many Hmong people into the lowlands to dilute their ethnic identity, leading to the1968 Meo Revolt that compromised social stability. Similarly, the Philippines erodedCordilleran identity with their majority-dominated national unity efforts. While educationsought to be integrative, school curricula often reflected a Christian bias, making itassimilative in practice. Further, indigenous Cordilleran languages were made auxiliary toFilipino, created based on Tagalog spoken in Manila. This fuelled Cordilleran resentment,leading to protests and armed resistance by the Cordilleran People’s LiberationArmy. Suchdestabilising revolts demonstrate how assimilation could undermine national unity whenattempts toeffaceminoritycultureweremet withpushback. Comparatively, integrationbetterprotectedminorityculturesandpreservedsocial stability. Even for the most intransigent minorities, accommodative concessions that protected theirethnic identities were still more successful in quelling minority resistance. Comparatively,coercive assimilation often radicalised resistance into separatism, threatening the territorialintegrity on which national unity is founded. The Burmese government pursued aggressiveassimilation in the Frontier Areas, enforcing the use of Burmese within governmentbusinesses in 1952 and making Buddhism the state religion in 1961. This abrogation ofindigenous identities led toawaveof separatism, with10%of thenationcontrolledbyethnicinsurgents by 1962. Hence, assimilation made territorial integrityelusivefor nascent Burma,let alone national unity. The Philippines transmigrated Christians intoMindanao, erodingtheMoro culture when they constituted merely 19%of the Mindanao population in 1990, downfrom76%in 1903. Moro resentment culminatedinaprolongedseparatist struggleunder theMoros National LiberationFront, whichwasonlysuccessfullyresolvedusingaccommodativepolicies: Aquino’s 1989 establishment of the Autonomous Regions in