Essay — Effectiveness of Maximum Governments (26/30)

‘Maximumgovernmentswereeffectiveindealingwithpolitical challengesandpopularoppositiontomaintainpolitical stability.’ Howfar doyouagreewiththisjudgement? The political stability of Southeast Asian states was inextricably tied to their maximumgovernments’ varying abilities to prevent andwithstandchallengesfrompolitical adversariesand popular uprisings. While authoritarian regimes successfully clung to power in the shortterm by purging challengers, suppressing movements and courting military and businesssupport, these very tactics would later intensify opposition and contribute to the eventualdownfall of regimes in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. Ultimately, the responses ofauthoritarian leaders were effective insofar that they averted immediatedeposition, but theirdestructive implications for legitimacy—thebedrockof truepolitical stability—render thesesuperficial victoriespyrrhic. At the start, leaders of maximum governments were ostensibly effective in dealing withpolitical challenges in three ways. First, they purged opponents from political and militaryinstitutions, effectively removing key threats to preserve their continued rule and politicalstability. Such purges were common in the initial phases of Suharto’s New Order: theformerly-influential PKI wasexterminatedbySuharto’smassacreof over amillioncommunistsympathisers in Jakarta and Java following the Gestapu coup, and the PNI’s leadingintellectual Sitor Situmorang was imprisoned from 1967 to 1975. This elimination ofopposition extended to the military: Nasution, whose influential stature as an independencewar hero could potentially challenge Suharto’s rule, was forced to retire as MPRS (i.e.Parliament) Chairman in 1972. Coupled with similar purges of Secret Service GeneralSumitro and once-loyal commander Murdani in 1974 and 1988 respectively, Suharto’seffective removal of challengers contributed to his 33-year regime’s temporal durability —amarker of political stability. Asimilar story unfolded in Thailand: after Phibun’scoup, severalnortheastern supporters of Pridi were arrested in 1948, and three pro-Pridi MPs were shotwhile in police custody. Phibun’s response to challenges from the military was even moreresolute: anattemptedcoupbynavysoldiersin1951promptedPhibun’slieutenantstobomband sink the navy’s flagship, deterring any future resistance. Such decisive elimination ofopponents enabled Phibun to retain power until 1957, limiting regime change and politicalinstability. Hence, by swiftly eradicating potential challengers via murder or imprisonment,maximumgovernmentscouldeffectivelymaintaincontrol and, byextension, stability. Additionally, authoritarian leaders successfully suppressed mass movements throughforceful crackdown and legal controls, limiting the scale of popular opposition that entails

instability. In Indonesia, Suharto’s forces clamped down harshly on the 1974 Malari Riots,ending the riots within two days by arresting 770 and firing upontherioters. Tenyearslater,Suharto would violently suppress the Tanjung Priok Demonstrations with the military killing28 and the government jailing 30, including prominent ex-military commander Dharsono.Such harsh repression not only allowed the regime to weather these challenges, but alsoinstilled fear among the populacethat deterredfuturemobilisationandresistance. AlongsideSuharto’s 1974 SK028 and 1977 NKK/BKKpoliciesthat prohibitedoff-campusprotestsandpolitical student organisations, it was difficult for mass movementstogaintraction, shieldingSuharto’s regime from popular opposition and preserving political stability. Thailand’smaximumleaderscarriedout similar suppression: Phibun’sregimedeportedpolitically-activeChinese and arrested over 1000 leftists and student activists in 1952 to counter a growingcommunist insurgency. Additionally, he introduced a Revolutionary Order which enabledsuspected communists to be detained indefinitely and tried in military courts, constrainingthe movement. Sarit would follow in his predecessor’s footsteps, limiting opposition byarresting over 100 intellectuals and journalists after proclaiming martial lawin 1958. Thus,draconian laws and coercivecrackdownsbymaximumgovernmentssubstantiallyweakenedmovements and insurgencies and dampened the threat of popular opposition, ensuringstablerulewhenchallengesaremorelimitedinscaleandnumber. Perhaps more importantly, beyond successfully weathering challenges from rivals and themasses, authoritarian leaders prevented opposition in the first place byobtainingtheloyaltyof powerful business and military leaders via patronage andcronyism. Suharto’sNewOrderwas accompaniedbytheriseof hisclosecukongassociates: LiemSioeLiong’sSalimGroupobtained monopolies in the clove, flour and cement industries, propelling Liem to becomeIndonesia’s richest man. Similarly, Bob Hasan controlled 2 million hectares of prime timberconcessions in Kalimantan, earning him the title “Timber King”. Such patronage co-optedsupport fromeconomically-influential businessgroupsfor Suharto’sregime. Infact, cronyismbecame a source of leverage for Suharto, who successfully quelled the Petition of Fifty bythreatening to exclude its signatories from privileges and rewards. Thus, patronage couldmitigate political challenges and preserve stability in the process. This was even moreevident in Marcos’ New Society: a host of his cronies such as Conjuango, Benedicto, andFloriendo enjoyed export monopolies in coconuts, sugar and bananas respectively, reapingmassive profits. Additionally, Marcos promoted his stalwart supporters to prominent militaryand government posts, making his protégé Enrile Secretary of Defence and loyalist VerHead of the National Intelligence and Security Agency in 1970; the latter would remain astaunch ally even amidst the 1986 EDSA coup. Hence, by giving economic, political andmilitary influence totheir most loyal collaborators, authoritarianleadersbought thecontinued

support of powerful associates, nipping potential opposition from these groups in the budandenablingstablerule. However, the efficacy of maximumregimes’ responses would wane over time —theseverytactics of repression and co-optation ironically intensified political opposition and topplednumerous regimes, eroding political stability. First, leaders’ suppression of challengers andcrackdowns on movementsdestroyedtheir legitimacyintheeyesof thepopulace, fomentingpublic discontent and hurting stability. Marcos’s regime would suffer such a fate when herelentlessly persecuted Aquino Jr: massive opposition erupted after his 1983 assassinationin broad daylight at Manila International Airport, with support coalescing around Aquino’swidowand the Catholic Church openly withdrawing support fromMarcos. Threeyearslater,Marcos’s blatant election fraud led to over a million Filipinos forming a human barricade onEDSA—a revolution that would topple Marcos’s NewSocietyandbringCorazonAquinotopower. Hence, Marcos’s forceful removal of oppositioncreateddestabilisingproteststhat ledto his own removal instead. In Thailand, numerous authoritarian leaders were deposed inasimilar fashion when their repressive tactics hurt their legitimacy: when Thanom deployedtanks and attack helicopters to quell the 1973 pro-democracy uprising, King Bhumibolintervened and ordered their resignations, leading to regime change. History would repeatitself in May 1992: when Suchinda — having seized control in a 1991 coup — brutallysuppressed protests and killed hundreds of demonstrators, the King instructed him to‘reconcile’ with Chamlong and compelled him to step down. Thus, the previously-effectivetactics of purging challengers and quashing opposition actually fatally compromised theirpolitical legitimacy, leadingtorevolutionsdestructivetostability. Likewise, authoritarian leaders’ cronyistic practices also corroded their legitimacy andalienated those who lost out, strengthening destabilising resistance to their rule. Whilepatronage secured support fromthosewhobenefitted, the