Essay — Vietnam War (35/40)

(a) Compare and contrast the evidence provided in Sources A and Babout thestrengthof theSouthVietnameseregimeintheearly1960s. Both sources concur that the local South Vietnamese regime was weak on its own due todomestic unpopularity and resistance. In Source A, Diem’spositionisdescribedas“difficult”—he was“without popular support” andfaceda“struggle” fromtheVietnamesecommunistsin his south. Not only does the presence of local insurgencies alreadyevincetheweaknessof Diem’s regime, but the communists were also sanguine about their prospects: theybelieved “the conditionswereripefor reunification”, whichentailsacompleteoverthrowingofthe South Vietnamese government. Hence, Diem’s rule is presented as a weak andprecarious one. Source Btells a similar story: Diemis unflatteringly called a “lackey” of theUS, presented as a weak, puppet regime that lacked true autonomy and required foreignbacking to survive. Additionally, the South Vietnamese people have “unite[d]” to “wage aresolute struggle” against the government, with widespread domestic resistance similarlyrevealing the weakness of Diem’s grip on power. In this light, both sources offer a unifiedportrayal of theSouthVietnameseregimeasweakandunpopular. This similar presentation is unsurprising given that bothsourcesdiscussthetwilight yearsofDiem’s regime —Source Afocuses on 1962 and Source Bon 1963, both years where thepopular resistance towards Diemwas obvious to all. In 1962, DiemintroducedhisStrategicHamlet Programme that forcibly resettled reluctant populations into American compounds,drawing much public ire. Additionally, he narrowly survived an assassination attempt whenthe Independence Palace was bombed by two dissident pilots, highlighting his immenseunpopularity. It is this backdrop of evident domestic discontent in 1962 that informs theassessment of Diemas weak in Source A. In 1963, popular oppositiontowardstheCatholicDiemintensified after he banned the flying of the Buddhist flagonVesakDay, incensingthemajority Buddhist population. Subsequently, the shooting of nine unarmed protesterssparked a series of mass demonstrations and the self-immolation of Thich Quang Duc.Thus, Mao’s statement — created in the thick of the Buddhist crisis and at the regime’sweakest point —similarly reflectsthat Diem’sregimewasfragileinthefaceof massivelocalresistance. However, the sources diverge in their presentation of the extent to which American supportwas able to bolster the strength of the South Vietnamese regime. Source Asuggests thatAmerican military support significantlystrengthenedDiem: eventhoughthelocal regimewasweak as previously discussed, the communists were so afraid of the “risk” of American

intervention that they “decided to fight cautiously” and urged “[the] exercise [of] restraint” toprevent “a war with a military enemy” By intimidating the communist insurgents, Americanmilitary might successfully dampened resistance towards the South Vietnamese regime,strengthening itsgriponpower. Incontrast,