Essay — Vietnam War (35/40)

(a) Compare and contrast the evidence provided in Sources A and Babout thestrengthof theSouthVietnameseregimeintheearly1960s. Both sources concur that the local South Vietnamese regime was weak on its own due todomestic unpopularity and resistance. In Source A, Diem’spositionisdescribedas“difficult”—he was“without popular support” andfaceda“struggle” fromtheVietnamesecommunistsin his south. Not only does the presence of local insurgencies alreadyevincetheweaknessof Diem’s regime, but the communists were also sanguine about their prospects: theybelieved “the conditionswereripefor reunification”, whichentailsacompleteoverthrowingofthe South Vietnamese government. Hence, Diem’s rule is presented as a weak andprecarious one. Source Btells a similar story: Diemis unflatteringly called a “lackey” of theUS, presented as a weak, puppet regime that lacked true autonomy and required foreignbacking to survive. Additionally, the South Vietnamese people have “unite[d]” to “wage aresolute struggle” against the government, with widespread domestic resistance similarlyrevealing the weakness of Diem’s grip on power. In this light, both sources offer a unifiedportrayal of theSouthVietnameseregimeasweakandunpopular. This similar presentation is unsurprising given that bothsourcesdiscussthetwilight yearsofDiem’s regime —Source Afocuses on 1962 and Source Bon 1963, both years where thepopular resistance towards Diemwas obvious to all. In 1962, DiemintroducedhisStrategicHamlet Programme that forcibly resettled reluctant populations into American compounds,drawing much public ire. Additionally, he narrowly survived an assassination attempt whenthe Independence Palace was bombed by two dissident pilots, highlighting his immenseunpopularity. It is this backdrop of evident domestic discontent in 1962 that informs theassessment of Diemas weak in Source A. In 1963, popular oppositiontowardstheCatholicDiemintensified after he banned the flying of the Buddhist flagonVesakDay, incensingthemajority Buddhist population. Subsequently, the shooting of nine unarmed protesterssparked a series of mass demonstrations and the self-immolation of Thich Quang Duc.Thus, Mao’s statement — created in the thick of the Buddhist crisis and at the regime’sweakest point —similarly reflectsthat Diem’sregimewasfragileinthefaceof massivelocalresistance. However, the sources diverge in their presentation of the extent to which American supportwas able to bolster the strength of the South Vietnamese regime. Source Asuggests thatAmerican military support significantlystrengthenedDiem: eventhoughthelocal regimewasweak as previously discussed, the communists were so afraid of the “risk” of American

intervention that they “decided to fight cautiously” and urged “[the] exercise [of] restraint” toprevent “a war with a military enemy” By intimidating the communist insurgents, Americanmilitary might successfully dampened resistance towards the South Vietnamese regime,strengthening itsgriponpower. Incontrast, SourceBpresentsAmericansupport aswoefullyinsufficient to save the fatally weak Diem regime: even though the US “unleashedcounter-revolutionary war”, the South Vietnamese people have “won major victories bothpolitically and militarily” in their “struggle for liberation”, revealingthat theSouthVietnamesegovernment was crumbling under the weight of popular opposition even with extensiveAmerican military support. In fact, Mao is “convinced” that the revolutionaries will “attainthegoal” of reunification, hispredictionof theUS-backedDiem’sinevitablecollapseevincingtheinadequacy of American assistance. Hence, while Source A argues US support was asubstantial source of strength for the South Vietnameseregime, SourceBcontendsthat USsupport washardlyenough. The aforementioned difference in the time period —Source A’s 1962 and Source B’s 1963—accounts for this difference in portrayal, as US support for Diemdwindled over time. In1962, US support seemed more resolute: Kennedy had sent helicopters and green berets,authorised search-and-destroy operations, and sprayed Agent Orange as part of OperationRanch Hand to aid the South Vietnamese regime in their counter-revolutionary efforts.Hence, the communists in Source A were far warier of American support as a source ofSouth Vietnamese strength, since the extent of US involvement was larger. However, thetide had turned by 1963: the Vietcong had earned a stunning military victory intheBattleofAp Bac that shookAmericanresolve, anddecliningUSfaithintheSouthVietnameseregimethroughout the Buddhist crisis is revealed by Cable 243 in August, which effectivelyendorsed the coup that woulddeposeDiem. Hence, eventhoughMaowaslikelyunawareofthe full extent of US disillusionment, it would be apparent that US support for Diem isnowhereasresoluteastheyear before. Further, their varying provenances shed light on the differing portrayals. Source B is astatement by Mao to a Vietcong delegation, in which Mao would be forced to indulge informal pleasantries about his optimistic hopes for the success of their revolution since theyare ideological alliesunitedbycommunism. Hence, Americansupport for Diemwouldnot bepresented as asignificant obstacletotheNational LiberationFront. Comparatively, SourceAis a Singaporean academic’s article written in 2000, benefitting from a large amount ofhistorical distance that enableshimtowriteamorenuancedaccount of thewar. Additionally,his access to Vietnamese sources allows him to detail internal communication among thecommunists (e.g. Le Duan’s letter), providing an insider perspective on the strength of the

South Vietnamese regime. Hence, he is able to offer a balanced, objective presentation ofDiem’sstrength—weakonhisown, but stronger withUSbacking.

(b) How far do Sources A-F support the view that US policy in Vietnam wasmotivatedbyfear of communism? Sources A and D support the view, while Sources B, C, E and F disagree for varyingreasons. Sources Aand Dcollectively arguethat USpolicyinVietnamprimarilysought toprevent thefeared spread of communismtotherest of Southeast Asia. InSourceA, LeDuan“explainedthat the Americans believed asocialist Vietnamwouldserveasaspringboardfor thespreadof socialismin Southeast Asia”, before urging South Vietnamese communists to“playdownthe political element of their struggle” to “prevent awar” withtheUS. Inthislight, USmilitaryinvolvement in Vietnam seems largely oriented around the goal of containing the spread ofcommunismin the region, making fear of communismacentral motivationbehindUSpolicy.Source Bpaints a similar picture: McNamara argues a communist victory in Vietnamwouldbe the first step towards “eventual Chinese hegemony over… Southeast Asia” and“communism absorb[ing] Southeast Asia’s people and resources”, with the presentation ofthis doomsday scenario elucidating the intensityof Americanfearsof acommunist takeover.McNamara further equates “defend[ing] Southeast Asia” with “meet[ing] the challenge inSouth Vietnam”, indicating that this aforementioned ideological fear was a driving factor forUS policy in Vietnam. Hence, Sources A and D contend that US actions in Vietnam areinextricablytiedtodeep-rootedfearsof communist expansion. This argument has empirical merit: in fact, Eisenhower himself argued in 1954 that acommunist takeover inIndochinawouldcatalysethespreadof communismtotheregionlikea series of “falling dominos”, coining the “domino theory” that would be utilised by bothKennedy and Johnson to explain US policy in Vietnam. Additionally, the US had a trackrecord of funding anti-communist efforts in Vietnam: it provided $2 billion in military andeconomicaidtotheFrenchduringtheFirst IndochinaWar, funding80%of thecostsincurredby the French campaign to defeat theVietminh. Additionally, theUSurgedDiemtocarryoutland reforms in 1956 and resettle villagers away from the Vietcong into Americancompounds under the 1962 Strategic Hamlet Programme to undercut communist support.Hence, containingcommunismwasindeedakeyobjectiveof