[TMJC] Singapore and the Cold War part II
Uploaded by nomz · 25 September 2024
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Text from the first pages1 SingaporeandtheColdWar (1965-91) (Part 2/3)ResponsestotheThirdIndochinaWarRecalltheThirdIndochinaWar fromthepreviouslecturenotes.Thispartof theSingaporeandthe ColdWar focuseson howSingaporerespondedto theThirdIndochinaWar. Youshouldconsider:- WhatwereSingapore’sinterests?(national,regional,international)- HowdidSingapore’sactionsshowitsafeguardingtheseinterests? ● Singapore’spositiononsanctityofsovereignty- SingaporeadoptedanunprecedentedlyhighprofileafterVietnam’sinvasionofCambodia.- TheSingapore’s governmentsawVietnam’s invasionof Cambodiaasanaffrontto theprinciplesof sovereigntyandnon-interference,principlesthattheleadershiphelddearlybecauseofitsgeopoliticalpositionasthesmalleststateinSoutheastAsia.- Toprotectitsnationalinterestsfromthegeopoliticalchallengesposedbytheinvasion,theSingaporeforeignpolicyapparatusstroveto achieveseveralobjectives: KeeptheCambodianCrisisontheinternationalagendaanddelegitimisethepuppetgovernment,thePeople’sRepublicofKampuchea Supportthe formationof a coalitiongovernmentas an alternativenon-communistleadershipto PolPot’s KhmerRougeorHengSamrin’spuppetgovernment EncouragetheUSgovernmenttoremaincommittedtotheregiondespitethe‘Vietnamsyndrome’ ConvinceChinatosupportthepeacefulresolutionoftheconflict. AchievearesolutiontotheCambodiancrisisthroughASEANdiplomacy ● LobbyingeffortsatNon-AlignedMovementconferencesandtheUN- SingaporestrovetokeeptheCambodianCrisisontheinternationalagendaas wellasdelegitimisethepuppetgovernment,thePeople’s RepublicofKampuchea(ThegovernmentinCambodiaatthetime). - LobbyingatNon-AlignedMovementConferences UnliketheUnitedNations,Singaporefounditmoredifficulttodealwiththemembersof the Non-AlignedMovements,manyof whichweresympatheticormorestrategicallyaligntotheUSSRandVietnam. HavanaSummit(1979)
2 ✔Atthe6thNon-AlignedMovementSummit,alsoknownastheHavanaSummit,thatwasheldinSeptember1979,Cuba,astheChairmanofthe summit,steeredto NAMto a pro-SovietalignmentandwaspoliticallysupportiveoftheHengSamrin’sVietnamese-backedregime.✔Muchto the unhappinessof Singapore’s ForeignMinisterS.RajaratnamandtheASEANcountriesMalaysiaandIndonesia,CubaunilaterallyanddeliberatelyremovedDemocraticKampuchea(DK)’sseatat the NAMsummit,andwhiletheNAMalsodidnotgrantrecognitiontothePeople’sRepublicofKampuchea(PRK),FidelCastroinvitedHengSamrintopayanofficialvisittoHavanawhilethesummitwasinprogress.✔EventhoughRajaratnamspokeoutrobustlyanddefiantlyagainstCubaandtheotherSovietsupporters,heandtheotherASEANdelegatescouldnotrescueDK’sseat.✔ThepoliticaldeclarationmadeattheendofthesummitalsofailedtomentionandcondemnVietnam’s militaryinterventionnorcalledforVietnamesewithdrawalfromKampuchea. NewDelhiNAMConference(1981)and7 th Non-AlignedSummit(1983)✔InFebruary1981,Singapore,MalaysiaandIndonesiatiredbutfailedtoreinstatetheDK’sseatattheNAM.✔ThereasonwasthatIndia,thehostof theDelhiNAMConference,adopteda pro-Soviet-Vietnamposition.LikeCuba,IndiainvitedHengSamrinfortheopeningceremonywhilesimultaneouslydenyingboththeDKandPRK.✔SingaporeagainfailedtoreversethedecisionmadeatHavana(1979)NewDelhi(1981)againatthe7thNon-AlignedSummitthatwasalsoheldinNewDelhiinMach1983regardingtheDK’sseatattheNAM.✔SincemanyNAMcountriesbelievedtheNAMandsocialistcountrieswere‘naturalallies’whosharedthe sameinterestsin thwartingWesternimperialism,theyweremoresympathetictowardsVietnam’sinterventioninKampuchea.✔Singapore,togetherwiththeASEANcountries,werethusrelativelylesssuccessfulattheNAMmeetingsthanattheUNinpushingtheiragendaontheCambodianissuealthoughtheydidsucceedinresistingtheattemptbyCubaandtheVietnamesesupporterstoseattheHengSamrinregime. - EngagingtheUnitedNations
3 The VietnamesegovernmentinitiallybelievedthattheirinvasionofCambodiawouldresemblethe Sovietinvasionof HungaryandCzechoslovakiain thatthe internationalcommunitywouldeventuallyforgetabouttheinvasionandacceptVietnam’s dominanceofCambodiaasafaitaccompli. However, SingaporewasdeterminedtokeeptheCambodiancrisisontheinternationalagenda,particularlyintheUnitedNations. TheSingaporeForeignMinistrydelegatesled an ASEANdiplomaticmissiontotheUnitedNationstogarnerinternationalsupporttopromotethenotionthattheVietnameseoccupationofCambodiawasillegal. TheSingaporedelegatesvehementlyarguedthatVietnamhadviolatedthesacrosanctprinciplesof sovereigntyandnon-interventionthatarefoundintheUNcharterbyinvadingCambodia. In February1979,ASEANsponsoreda draftSecurityCouncilresolutionthatcalledonVietnamtowithdrawfromCambodia.Thoughitreceived13positivevotesat theUNSC,theresolutionwasnotadoptedbecauseitwasvetoedbytheUSSR. Unperturbed,theSingaporedelegatesforthenextfewmonthsmadeuseof the UN as a lobbyingplatformto pushASEAN'scaseon theCambodianissuebypersuading,convincingandrallyingthenon-ASEANdelegatedtovoteinsupportofASEAN’sposition. ThisincludedtherejectionofIndia’s pro-VietnameseproposaltoremovetheseatofDemocraticKampucheaanddeclareitvacant,ortoreplaceitwiththePeople’sRepublicofKampuchea. DespitethepoorreputationoftheKhmerRouge,theASEANdelegatesmanagedtoconvincetheUNGAtoretainDemocraticKampuchea’sseatintheUN. On 14 November1979,ASEANjointly-sponsoreda resolutiononKampuchea,callingfor animmediateceasefireandthewithdrawalofVietnamesetroops,whichwassuccessfullyadoptedbytheUNGeneralAssembly. It wasa majorvictoryforASEANandtheSingaporedelegatesastheUNGArejectedpro-Vietnamesedraft resolutionsthat wouldhaverecognisedthe legitimacyof the HengSamrin’s regimeand theVietnameseoccupation. TogarnerWesternsupport,theSingaporedelegatesjoinedtheinvasionofCambodia,theSovietmilitarydeploymentto formerUSnavalandairbasesinVietnam’sCamRanhBayandDanangwiththeSovietinvasionofAfghanistaninDecember1979,andpresentedthemasagrandinsidiousdesignmastermindedbytheSoviets.
4 Thereafter, ASEANsucceededinincreasingthe‘Yes’voteseveryyearintheUNGA,whichin a senseaffirmedthegoodworkconductedbytheSingaporedelegatesfromtheMinistryofForeignAffairsattheUN. - UN-sponsoredInternationalConferenceonKampuchea Anothermajor diplomacyvictorywas the organisationof theUN-sponsoredInternationalConferenceon Kampuchea(ICK)in July1981,authorisedby the adoptionof UNGAresolution35/6.ThedeclarationofthisconferencewasdraftedbySingapore’sdelegation. TheICKwasnotattendedbyUSSR,VietnamLaos,NorthKoreawhoboycottedtheconferenceastheyopposedDemocraticKampuchea’sseatintheUN. herewerealsodisagreementsat theICKbetweenUS,ChinaandtheASEANcountries.ASEANcountrieswantedtodisarmallKhmerRougeforceswhileChinawantedto continuearmingitsally, KhmerRougesothatitcouldcontinuetheprotractedconflictto‘bleed’Vietnam. Nevertheless,theICKcouldbeconsideredaqualifiedsuccessforASEANandSingaporebecausetheconferencewasattendedby79countries,36werenon-aligned. ASEANfurthersucceededin keepingtheCambodianissuealiveandvisibleinternationally TheICKadopteda declarationwhichcalledfora ceasefireallpartiestotheconflict,thewithdrawalof foreignforces,andthearrangementofaUN-supervisedelection. DespiteVietnam’s absence,thedeclarationbecamethebasisforfuturenegotiationwithVietnam.Anad-hocUNcommitteewascreatedtodealwiththeCambodianissue. ● Singapore’seffortsataddressingintra-ASEANdifferencesWhatweretheintra-ASEANdifferencesintheirresponsestothecrisis?- ASEANcountrieshaddifferentviewsof howtheVietnameseinvasionofCambodiaposedaproblem.- ThailandsawVietnam’sinvasionofCambodiaasanexpansionisticthreat.- IndonesiaandMalaysiasawVietnamasabufferagainstChina.Thisresultedina strategicdebateofwhethera CambodiaunderVietnamesecontrolwaspreferabletoChineseinfluencethereandthewiderregion.- ThedilemmadidnotparalyseASEAN.FollowinganASEANstatementon9January1979,a Thaiinitiativeledtojointcommuniqueon12January1979,deploringthe armedinterventionand demandingthe withdrawalofVietnamesetroopsfromCambodia.
5 - Meanwhile,besidessecuringASEANdiplomaticsupport,Thailand’s PrimeMinisterKriangsakChomananalsoconcludedadefactoalliancewithChinaduringa secretmeeting– thereisnoindicationthatASEANpartnerswereconsultedoreveninformedofthealliance.- 1979,ASEANmembersclosedranksbehindThailand,asmanifestedinthestronglywordedcommuniqueofthe28-30JuneAnnualMinisterialMeeting(AMM)andt
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