[TMJC] Singapore and the Cold War (1965-1991)

1 SingaporeandtheColdWar (1965-1991) Part 1/3LearningOutcome:EvaluateSingapore’sresponsestothedevelopmentoftheColdWarinSoutheastAsiaSomequestionstoconsider: HowdidColdWarpoliticsaffectSingapore’sforeignpolicy? HowwelldidSingaporerespondtotheColdWardevelopmentsandchallenges? HowdidASEANshapeSingapore’s foreignpolicyduringtheColdWar?/ HowdidSingaporeshapeASEAN’spoliciesduringtheColdWar? Singapore’sresponsestoColdWardevelopmentsinSoutheastAsiaRelationswiththeUSA,theUSSRandChina(Part1)In1984,DeputyPrimeMinister, LeeHsienLoongsaidinaspeech“(Singapore’sforeignpolicy)dependsonthecompetinginterestsof severalbigpowersin a region,ratherthanonlinkingthenation’s fortunesto oneoverbearingpartnerThebigpowerscankeeponeanotherin checkandwillpreventanyoneofthemfromdoinatingtheentireregion,andsoallowsmallstatestosurviveintheintersticesbetweenthem.It isnotafoolproofmethod,astheequilibriumisa dynamicandpossiblyunstableone,andmaybeupsetif onepowerchangescourseandwithdraws.NorcanasmallstatemanipulatethebigpowerswithimpunityThemostit canhopetodoistoinfluencetheirpoliciesintheirfavour.”● TheUSASingapore’s relationshipwiththeUSAhasbeenjudgedthemostimportantamongthe majorpowers.TheUSAhaslongbeenregardedas a benignpresencein theAsia-Pacificregionasnotonlyareitsinterestsmostin accordwiththoseofSingaporebutit is alsothestatemostcapableofprotectingthembecauseof its globalreach.Therelationshiphasbeensubjectto recurrentdifferences,especiallyoverpoliticalvaluessincetheendoftheColdWar, butthosedifferenceshavenotseriouslydisturbedbilateralties,whichhavecometobevaluedin WashingtonbecauseoftheirstrategicutilitybearingonAmericaninterestsin theGulfaswellasin SoutheastAsia.Thosetiesarevaluedallthemorein Singaporebut havebeencontinuouslyjoinedwitha concernthatAmerica’s regionalsecurityrolecouldbeprogressivelydiminishedbecauseofanationalpreoccupationwithdomesticpriorities.

2 - EarlytensionswiththeUSA(pre-independence)1. USunderlyingrolein indirectlycontributingto thepoliticalsituationthatbirthedKonfrontasi DuringKonfrontasiandthelimitedtenureofPresidentKennedyandintothatofPresidentJohnson,SingaporehadreasontolackconfidenceintheregionalpolicyoftheUSA. WashingtonhadplayedadecisiveroleinpersuadingtheNetherlandstorelinquishcontrolof thewesternhalfof theislandof NewGuineatoIndonesia.Thegovernmentin theHaguehadrefusedtotransferthatperipheralpart of its East Indiesto Indonesiaon internationalacknowledgementofitsindependenceinDecember1949. The unresolveddisputehad not only souredthe post-colonialrelationshipbuthadalsobecomea sourceofnationalistferment,whichthe latePresidentSukarnohadexploitedto his personalpoliticaladvantage. In early1964,USAttorneyGeneral,RobertKennedy, wassentbyPresidentJohnsonon a diplomaticmissionto SoutheastAsiain anattemptto resolvetheproblemof Konfrontasiwhichseemedto beservingtheinterestsof Indonesia’s CommunistPartyanditsexternalpatrons. ThetenorofthemissiongavetheimpressionofanactofappeasementonAmerica’sbehalfattheexpenseofMalaysiaofwhichSingaporewasthena constituentpart.In theevent,PresidentSukarno’s obduracyworkedtoMalaysia’s advantage,whilehiscontinuingactsofcoercivediplomacyagainsttheFederationalienatedPresidentJohnson,thenabouttodeependAmerica’sfatefulinvolvementinVietnam. - Theneedfornon-alignment WhenSingaporeseparatedfromMalaysiainAugust1965,theSecondIndochinaWarwaswellunderway. Notlongafter9 August,USforcesandtheVietnameseCommunistsconfrontedeachotherintwomajormilitarycampaigns. Singapore,in responseto this,startedestablishingan increasinglynon-alignedpositionontheglobalstage. LeeKuanYewwentoutofhiswaytorepudiateanymilitaryassociationwiththeUSA.Moreover, hedeemeditpolitictorevealpubliclyanactofpoliticalindiscretionby America’CentralIntelligenceAgencyinSingaporein1960duringitsperiodofself-government.

3 At that time,Lee KuanYew was concernedto demonstrateadeclaratorynon-alignmentin order to ensurefull internationalrecognitionofa new-foundindependence,bearinginmindtheextenttowhichIndonesiahad beenable to representMalaysia,and byassociationSingapore,as a neo-colonialistenterpriseamongfellowpost-colonialstates.SingaporeandtheColdWar(1965-1991)Part1/3 AngChengGuanpointsoutthatnon-alignmentallowedSingaporethe‘freedomofmanoeuvrabilityonspecificinternationalissuesbasedonitsnationalinterests”.NotaligningitselfwithmajorpowersalsogaveSingaporegreaterflexibilityto achieveeconomicandsocialstabilityduringtheColdWar. Singapore’spositiononnon-alignmentwasclearlyarticulatedinForeignMinisterSRajaratnam’s addresstotheUNGeneralAssembly(21Sept1965):Singaporehaschosenthepathofnon-alignment.Itsimplymeansthatwedonotwishtobedrawnintoalliancesdedicatedtoimposingourownwayoflifeonothercountries.Friendshipbetweentwocountriesshouldnotbeconditionalontheacceptanceof commonideologies,commonfriendsandcommonfoes. Andin a speechto Singapore’s parliamenton16December1965,SRajaratnamexpressedthenecessityofnon-alignment:…becauseto be alignedto anybigcountrywouldeventuallyhavemeantthe lossof our freedomof actionevenin domesticfields,becauseforeignpoliciesarein factanextensionofdomesticpoliticsintotheinternationalfield. Therewereseveralreasonswhy Singapore’s adopteda policynon-alignmentuponindependencein1965-66: a)BalancingtheperceptionsofaSingapore-USalignment ▪ WhenSingaporebecameindependentin August1965,manycountriesthoughtthatSingaporewasaligningto theUnitedStatesandBritain.▪ ThePAP wasoutwardlyanti-communistsandhadevidentlybeenfightingagainstleftistandpro-communistelementsinSingapore.▪ Moreover, SingaporegovernmentwaskeentoretainBritainandUSmilitarypresenceintheregiontomaintainregionalstability.

4 ▪ Adoptinga non-alignmentpositionwouldhelpSingaporetodeflectcriticismsfromanti-imperialistAfro-Asiancountries,particularlyIndonesia,SovietUnionandthePeople’s RepublicofChina. b)FearofprovokingIndonesia▪ Singaporewantedto avoid unnecessaryprovocationofIndonesiawhileKonfrontasiwasongoing.BearinginmindthatIndonesiaunderSukarnowasstaunchlyanti-Westatthatpointin time.Sukarno’s ultra-nationalisticstancewasaptlysummedupbythefollowingwords,“Amerika…gotohellwithyouraid.”▪ GiventhatSukarnoconsideredSingaporeandMalaysiaas“clientstates”oftheBritish,LeeKuanYewhadtoensurethatSingaporewasnotconspicuouslypro-Westby openlysidingwiththeanti-Communistcamp. c)PreventingexternalinterferencefromtheCommunistpowers▪ The People’s ActionPartygovernmentwasstill fightingapoliticalbattlewiththeleftistBarisanSosialis.▪ Adoptinga policynon-alignmentwouldnotgiveexternalpowerslikeChinaandtheUSSRthepretexttointercedeonthebehalfoftheleftistforcesandtoallowthePAPgovernmenttodealwiththemitasaninternalproblem.▪ Theleftistforcescouldalsorideonanti-USpropagandatocarryout subversiveactivitieswith the supportfrom externalCommunistpowersand threatenthe newlyindependentSingapore. d)GaininginternationalsupportfromtheAfro-Asiancountries▪ The newlyindependentSingapore,ejectedfromMalaysia,placedconsiderableimportanceon securingoverwhelminginternationalrecognitionata timewhentheGeneralAssemblyof the UN was beingincreasinglydominatedby newlydecolonisedAfro-Asiancountriesthat were part of theNon-AlignedMovementandhademergedfromanti-colonialandanti-imperialiststruggles.

5 ▪ SingaporesoughtinternationalsupportfromtheseNon-AlignedMovement(NAM)countriestospeedupitsentryintotheUnitedNations.▪ Almosta monthafterSingapore’s independence,mostof theAfro-Asiannationshad recognisedSingapore.SinceNAMcountriesmadeup significantnumbersin theUN,SingaporehadtowintheirsupportbypubliclydistancingitselffromtheUS,whichwasperceivedtobeanimperialistpowerbyAfro-Asianstates.▪ To provethatSingaporewascommittedtoNon-Alignment,LeeKuanYewinitiallyadopteda somewhatstridentanti-Americanstance,gavepublicassurancesthattheUSwouldbedeniedaccessto Singapore’s basesandtemporarilysouredrelationsbetweenUSandSingaporeofficials(whichwasironicbecauseSingaporeopenlyinvitedtheUSto useitsnavalandaircraftbasesseveralyearslater).▪ SingaporewassmoothlyadmittedintotheUNon21September1965becauseof the overwhelmingsupportfromtheNAMAfro-Asiancountries. InthewakeofrisingColdWarthreatsintheregion,inNove