H2 9174 History paper 1 SBQ + Essay Question Notes (IH)

README: Somesectionsmaynot becomplete. Pleaseforgivethat or addontoit asyouplease! SBQsegment 1. **Emergenceof theColdWar after theSecondWorldWar** Bit of backstorycontext AmericanhostilitiestoSovietswerealreadypresent in1917..duetotheinherent clashinvalues.Sovietsalsodidnot likeAmericans, particularlyafter their interventiononthesideof the‘WhiteRussian’ forces+Marxist-Leninist thinkingimpliedthat aclashwithcapitalismwasinevitableandavoidable. Confrontationwouldhappenonewayor another Molotov-ribbentroppact worsenedrelations…’unholyalliance’ +incorporationof easternpoland,balticstatesandbessarabiawasviewedasexpansionist andunjust Rationalefor cooperationduringWW2: WesternPOV1. Kill Germany. Power vacuumwouldbediscussedlater, but kill germanyfirst andforemost2. USSRwasn’t viewedasexpansionist after abolitionof Cominternin1943+RooseveltrecognisedStalin’ssecurityinterestsaslegitimateandbelievedthat cooperationinthisregardwouldpersuadeUSSRtowithholdsupport for commiemovementselsewhere3. Economics. MoneytobemadefrompotentiallyeconomicallyravagedUSSR→exportmarket for bothcountriesRationalefor cooperationduringWW2: USSR1. Neededreinforcementstosupport thewar against Germany. Nov‘41Lend-leaseagreement →USmilitaryaidtoUSSRat nocost2. AlsobelievedfriendshipwithUSAwaspossibledespiteMarxist-Leninist thought,percentagesagreement further encouragedStalin(Searchuphowinfluencewassplitup) But fundamentally, it wasonlyamarriageof convenienceduetocommonenemyGermany Onereasonfor mutual distrust evenduringthewar.1. Stalinwantedthewest toopenupasecondfront inFrancetoput morepressureonGermany→but theUKandUSdidnot until Normandy(June‘44). PartlybecauseofBritishinsistencetostrikeItalyandAfricafirst (soft whiteunderbelly) 2. **Causesfor theemergenceof tensionsbetweentheUSAandUSSR**Onereasonfor mutual distrust evenduringthewar.

1. Stalinwantedthewest toopenupasecondfront inFrancetoput morepressureonGermany→but theUKandUSdidnot until Normandy(June‘44). PartlybecauseofBritishinsistencetostrikeItalyandAfricafirst (soft whiteunderbelly)2. It madeStalinbelievethat theWest wantedtoprolongthewar betweenGermanyandtheUSSR, sothat theywoulddestroyeachother intheprocess3. 3. **Manifestationsof emergingtensions:**3.0: Tehranconference, Nov1943(NOT- not actuallyasignof tensions. Actuallyasignofconsensus)Withrespect toPoland, interestsof all partiesweresecured1. UKwent towar tohelpPoland→USSRagreedthat eventhoughit wouldannexEasternPolishterritoryasper itssecurityinterests, it wouldstill not forcecommunism2. USA- samedeal →Wantedtopromotedemocracy→Thought that USSRwouldremainongoodstermwithUSA3. Recognitionof securityinterests+Noconfederationof central EUor BalkanstateswhosegoalsunderminedSoviet securityinterestswereallowed 3.01: MoscowConference(Just betweenChurchill andStalin), 1944- USSRwantedcontrol over formerlyPolishterritories, andannexedtheBaltics,KonigsbergandBessarabiainlinewithretakingformer RussianEmpireterritories.Sought tomakeother EasternEuropeanstatessatellitestateswhowouldserveasabuffer regionbetweenUSSRandGermany(andthewest)- West sawGreeceasimportant tocontainSoviet naval influenceintheMediterranean→Aforementionedpercentagesagreement- 3.1. YaltaandPotsdamConferencesYalta(Feb‘45) 1. Reparationsissue- USSRwantedmassivereparationsfromGermanzonesascompensationfor havingtheir industrial capacitydestroyedbyGermaninvasion→AlsowantedtodismantleGermanfactoriesandtransfer resourcesbacktomotherland- USAwantedtoalliedtoextract moderatereparations, astheysawGermaneconomicrecoveryasfundamental toEuropeaneconomicrecovery 2. Poland- West POV: Went towar over Poland. Soviet actionsinPolishinvasion(Nazi-SovietPact), Katynwoodsmassacre(‘43) andinfuriatedwest- SOVPOV: Polandwasamatter of lifeor death→Polandwasthetraditional routeof aninvasionof Russia→Stalinmadeit clear throughout WW2that theywouldnot tolerateahostilePoland

- Potential of collaborationstill there: DeclarationOf LiberatedEurope→FreeelectionswithinEE, AlliesacceptedLublinprovisional government andLondonPoles(formerexile)- June1945: However, StalinexertedpressureonPoland→arrestedPolishHomeArmymembersandleadersof non-commieparties Nonetheless, Spirit of cooperationexistedandit wasagreedthat Germanywasdividedintofouroccupationzones, compensationallowed(thoughexact amount wastobedeterminedlater),GermanytoloseterritorytoPolandincompensationfor Soviet seizureof easternterritories 3. Economicreconstruction- USSRwantedhighreparationsfromGermanywhereasAlliesobjected Potsdam(July/August 1945) 1. Reparationsissue- AlliesrebuffedSoviet reparationsasexcessive- Mainsourceof reparationswouldalsocomefromwithintheir ownoccupationzones→Soviet lossesweredeemedmoreextensive, grantedadditional reparationsfromWesternzonesinexchangefor foodandrawmaterialsBUTsovietsstill unhappyastheiroccupationzonewaslargelyagrarian→Seizedandextractedasmuchresourcesaspossibleinresponse 2. Poland- SovietsDIDaccept LondonPolesandpromisedfreeelectionsinPoland(deliveredpromise)- Bythetimeof theYaltaconferencehowever, therealitywasdifferent astheWesternleadersbegantorecognisetheextent of Soviet consolidationof power astheSovietssupportedall theleft-leaningparties, whichweregraduallygainingimmensepower andinfluence- BUTwithin18monthsPolandfell tocommunists→’Salami tactics’ →graduallyeliminatedoppositionleadersandhelpedLeft-leaningpoliticians→Electionslaterhostedin1947washeavilymanipulatedbycommunists 3. Economicreconstruction- Stalininsistedonmorereparationsat theMINIMUMbeing$10billionwhichthealliesbalkedat- Trumaninitiallywantedreparationstoonlybeextractedfromtheir ownzones→Eventuallyagreedtolet USSRhave25%of machineryfromwesternzonesbut ontheconditionthat USSRsendback60%of itszone’srawmaterials→IncensedStalin- USAendedLend-leaseagreement inMay‘45→Stalinviewedthisaspolitical pressuretocurbhisactionsinEE

- SovietshenceforthrefusedmembershipinWorldBankandIMFinDecember ‘45andhencesought toextract reparationsfromcountrieswithinher sphereof influence→Sovietswantedtoreconstruct their economy→InitiallyagreedtojoinWorldBankandIMFinJuly1944→Asked$6billionloaninJan‘45→USimposed‘unacceptableconditionssuchasopeningof EEmarketstoAmericancapital’ →USSRwaryof ‘dollardiplomacy’ intheir sphereof influence 4. Nuclear weapons- USPOV: USrefusedtosharenuclear techwithUSSR→MadeUSSRparanoidandpromptednuclear armsrace- USalsobelievedthat nuclear monopolyenabledit tonegotiatewithUSSRfrompositionof strength+At Potsdam, nuclear weaponscouldbeusedtoforceUSSRtoacceptAmericanaimsfor post-war world USSRPOV:- Stalinsawdeployment of nuclear weaponsasanti-soviet move→DepriveUSSRofstrategicgainsinfar east andgiveUSSRupper handinpost-war settlement- HefearedSoviet weakness(industrial capacity) andnownuclear 3.2. Sovietisationof EasternEurope(45’-47’)- DespiteYaltapromise→ByJan1947anti-communistswereimprisonedanddetained,communistsclaimed80%of votesinheavilymanipulatedelectionsthrough‘Salamitactics’ whereopponentswereeliminatedbit-by-bit- CommunisminEuropenowstretchedall thewaytotheAdriaticsea- MadeGreece, TurkeyandItalyvulnerable→Borderingnations+poor economicconditions→suboptimal conditions Brief point onIran- Americanperceptionof Soviet Unionworsenedseverelybecauseof Soviet actionsinIran→Joint British-Soviet agreement towithdrawbyMarch1946but RedArmydidnot- UK, USAandIrantookacasewithUNSC, andStalindidnot want toescalatethesituationandonlywithdrewafter UNcomplaintsandcriticisms.- Highlightedgrowingrift andsuspicion AlsoonBaruchPlan(june-Dec‘46)- Sovietsviewedit asanattempt toensuretheir nuclear monopoly→ThePlansought tocreateaUN-administeredorganizationtocontrol all atomicplansanduraniumdeposits- ReinforcedSoviet fearsof westerndesiretolimit USSR- →Vetoedit downintheUNSC-3.3. Churchill’sIronCurtainSpeech- Alsosymbolizedgrowingrift betweenthewest andUSSR→shift awayfrom‘Spirit OfYalta’ andgrowingsuspicionof USSR

- 3.4. Kennan’sLongTelegram- Sought toformulateafirm, vigilant policyof containment tocontainUSSR’sexpansionisttendenciesandsecureAmericanpolitical andeconomicinterests-3.5. TrumanDoctrineandM