Hist SBQ SEA

Sabah Dispute - Not a simple matter of territorial sovereignty, but had larger political and religious implications - Both nations are still ideologically aligned (Pro-West and Anti-Communist) - Alleged Malaysian Support for Moro Muslim rebels in Southern Philippines and influx of refugees and illegal immigrants into Sabah - Cobbold commission rejected by both Indonesia and Philippines,regardless, malaysia ignored their reactions - 1963 Malaysia Agreement incorporated North Borneo into its territory - Philippines reacted in consternation: rejected the unilateral move made by Malaysia and yet they managed to find an amicable agreement through the Manila accords- 31 July 1963 - UN report established that a large majority of the population favoured joining the malayan republic - Philippines claim rest entirely on Sultanate of Sulu - deemed to be precursors to the british - maintained position that it would inherited sovereignty over north borneo despite 1930 anglo-american treaty - Claim was not pursued till 1962 - Macangpal used it to have a PR win after stonehill corruption scandal - political tool used to further own agenda - Malayan perspective: Sabah critical to security against Indonesia - Communism spreading: Sabah a useful buffer and affronted Malayan Sovereignty - Developed precarious relationship - Malaysia wanted to maintain authority and ensure national unity - 1968 - year of tensions - Mar 1968: Corregidor affair - revealed training for guerilla war - June 1968: Philippines congress resolution - delineate boundaries to include Sabah,signed off by Marcos - July 1968 - Malaysians walk out from negotiations - Only in july 1977 did there come a resumption of bilateral ties - once they recognised sabah as part of malaysia through the acceptance with the change of leadership - Willing to sideline the issue in hopes of economic cooperation and other benefits - YET, Marcos offer for indirect resolution was rejected by Mahathir - Insisted that the claim was not a matter for negotiation and that the philippines needs to formally renounce its claim - Reports emerged of malaysian support for MNLF insurgents in the philippines - indirectly undermining their govt - Malaysia being sympathetic, - Only with Tripoli agreement of 1976, outlined libyan agreement to terminate support for MNLF which was done via Malaysia - Conflict’s political use for Leader’s personal animosity - Mutual antagonism between Macangpal and Tunku - ambitions to assert regional dominance and leadership - Hopes for reconciliation crushed by Corregidor affair - Ramos willingness to negotiate helped mend tensions - Yet malaysia only wanted to negotiate with heirs and deemed to sideline Filipino govt - Senate’s refusal to renounce - opposed to losing the territory due to nationalist sentiments - Inaction to solve the issue

Pattern of bilateral relations - INDO traditionally nursed a sense of superiority over its maritime neighbors given its size, population and revolutionary independence heritage. War of independence it waged against Dutch from 1945-1949 gave INDO leaders a sense of superiority over its Malay neighbors who had independence given on a platter. - INDO’s ultra-nationalist regime - “Greater Indonesia” - seen MY’s idea to include new territories of SG, Sabah and Sarawak taken as affront to INDO’s sense of superiority - announce Konfrontasi . - INDO took a non-committal attitude toward formation of MY; busy settling unfinished business of decolonization of West Irian Dispute. Dutch eventually conceded West Irian in 1962, where it was transferred to UN administration and voted in a plebiscite in 1969 to join INDO. - INDO emboldened by withdrawal of Dutch in face of widespread international support; adopted a confrontational approach and military pressure to achieve foreign policy goals. - However, before 1961, behaved peaceably towards formation of Malaysia - had hidden goals to gain international support against the Dutch. Konfrontasi - Sukarno’s reaction to formation of MY in 1963, but had multiple reasons - Formation of MY was part of British plan for the independence of SG, Konfrontasi as a legacy of BR decol. process. - INDO saw itself as “first among equals” in region, INDO viewed MY’s expanded territory as strategic threat to its role as regional leader - exacerbated by suspicions that MY played a part in harbouring dissidents that destabilised INDO in 1958. - Sukarno and Tunku Abdul Rahman held differing ideological inclination and had drastically different backgrounds, with Sukarno’s ultra-nationalist policy and Tunku’s pro-western approach. Sukarno alignment with PKI made anti-communist MY uneasy, given backdrop of MCP insurgencies (& vice versa) - Could have intended Konfrontasi as a distraction for INDO people from dreadful state of economy - Sukarno openly denounced MY as a “manifestation of neo-colonialism”, decrying continuing links between MY and BR.. Armed Conflict, 1963-66

Undeterred by Azahari’s failure, Sukarno stepped up opposition; April 12, first INDO raid into MY territory. Over next 3 years, further raids occurred across the land border in Borneo, with amphibious and airborne incursions on MY; however, achieved little as MY was backed by Commonwealth forces from UK, Australia, New Zealand. - Maphilindo tried in July 1963; failed as 3 countries were unable to overcome disputes with each other. - Jan 1965, INDO left the UN in protest of MY’s admission into the Security Council. Resolution Konfrontasi ended with the Gestapu Coup in 1965, PKI destroyed and Suharto’s anti-communist regime ruled; desperate to mend fences with INDO’s neighbours and restoring economy. However , new geopolitical tensions arose as a result of communist Vietnam in 1975, which led to improvement of bilateral relations. - MY and INDO both saw VIET as bulwark against a resurgent China, especially as the Chinese began to assert their claim of sovereignty over the whole South China Sea - threatened due to geographical proximity and ideological divide.

FORMATION OF ASEAN Context of regional cooperation before 1967 Phases of development of regional organisations SEATO (1945-1977), US’s brainchild - Modelled after NATO, SEATO had 8 founding members, 2 of which were SEA states (TH & PH). Other countries included US, UK, France, Australia, New Zealand and Pakistan - Fundamentally to prevent communism, but VIET war which ended in defeat for the US and its allies; SEATO was a paper tiger against Pathet Lao in LAOS and Khmer Rouge in CAM. - US lost interest in the organisation with 1973 Paris Peace Agreements to withdraw its tr