NJC 2025 JC2 H2 History Prelim P1 QP final

1 NATIONAL JUNIOR COLLEGE SENIOR HIGH 2 PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION Higher 2 HISTORY 9174/01 Paper 1 The Changing International Order (1945–2000) 29 August 2025 Additional Materials: Answer Booklet 3 hours READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST An answer booklet will be provided with this question paper. You should follow the instructions on the front cover of the answer booklet. If you need additional answer paper, ask the invigilator for a continuation booklet. Section A Answer Question 1. Section B Answer two questions. The number of marks is given in brackets [ ] at the end of each question or part question. This question paper consists of 5 printed pages and 3 blank pages. H

2 SECTION A You must answer Question 1. THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM 1 Read the sources and answer the questions which follow. Source A The Polish comrades emphasi sed that it is Poland's difficult economic situation that accounts for the prolonged nature of the political crisis. They acknowledged that these difficulties are caused by Poland's indebtedness to the West, and by the destruction of extremists from Solidarity. “Poland's foreign debt…has grown astronomically. Credits are extended to us at very high interest rates of up to 20 percent.” Comrade Brezhnev drew the attention to the fact that the Western imperialists are seeking to turn Poland into a source of additional international tension. They are speculating about the threat of Soviet intervention and are presenting themselves as champions of Polish independence. One must decisively struggle against this and explain to the Polish nation that the real danger comes from imperialism – our common enemy. It is essential that everyone in Poland understands that credits lent by Western governments are in no way a gift, but a commercial transaction. For Poland, this amounts to slavery. Adapted from minutes of Brezhnev’s meeting with Polish communist leaders, 22 August 1981 Source B Kiszczak* is very concerned over the political strikes now threatening. It is only a short step to bringing people into the streets, with unpredictable results. Military intervention is not the problem. Poland is a nation of 40 million with a fragile economy. A reduction in 2 million tons of Soviet oil, or even iron ore, would exert intolerable pressure. I reviewed the steps we have already taken on food aid in response to the question of assistance to Poland. I said we were very aware of the destabilizing effect that price rises had always had in Poland, and the resultant pressure on the opposition by its political base to produce visible improvements. However, I told him that we regarded the composition of the new government as a purely internal matter to be determined among Poles. I know about the rumour in Warsaw that the West was prepared to offer massive aid if Solidarity seized power. Whatever the source of that rumour might be, it was not the US government. * Kiszczak was a Polish communist leader and army general. Adapted from a cable from the US embassy in Warsaw to the US Secretary of State, 11 August 1989

3 Source C A cartoon in a Dutch newspaper, 1985 Source D Jaruzelski: If not Martial Law, then there would have been in Poland, such turmoil caused by Soviet intervention. With everything that was happening in Poland at the time, anything was possible. This would have made the sort of democratic changes that we undertook later impossible for many years to come. So, however paradoxical it may sound, Martial Law was crucial. If there had been no Martial Law, then Gorbachev would not have come to power when he did, instead some hard-liner would have taken the reins. It is not the case that Solidarity gave birth to Gorbachev or perestroika. No. Perestroika was born of an internal Soviet need caused by international circumstances, among others Reagan. The arms race, Star Wars, the Soviet Union just couldn’t survive this. Europe and the world would look quite different today if we had not saved Poland from all that at the time. Adapted from Jaruzelski’s interview with a Latin American newspaper, 8 March 2005 Poland Lech Walesa, leader of the Solidarity movement Karl Marx Jaruzelski, Prime Minister of Poland Solidarity

4 Source E There were three political miracles: the communists lost, Solidarity won, and – most miraculously – the communists openly acknowledged their loss and Solidarity’s victory. It was the Communist Party’s acceptance of defeat that was most unexpected and miraculous. Why did the party leaders agree to honour the deal? Solidarity’s electoral victory was undeniable, leaving no doubt as to the underlying public sentiment. Second, there was the ‘Gorbachev factor’ and the ‘new climate of détente’ – both conducive to democratic reforms. The Soviet liberal permissiveness made democratic reforms acceptable among those used to following the directives from Moscow. Third, the Polish party leadership was desperate to avoid social unrest. Fourth, by mid -1989, Solidarity had two imp ortant supporters: internally, it was the Catholic Church, backed by the immensely influential voice of the Pope; externally, it was Hungary, which followed the reformist path with new vigour. Adapted from an academic journal, 2010 Source F Gorbachev had the tools of violence, but he did not exercise violence. And again, I considered this possibility, because when Gorbachev came to power, we were already sufficiently strong, we had built up to a level, both in Poland and in the world at large , that anyone wanting to stop this thing would have had to kill between one million to ten million people. He was not prepared to do that. He tried, he shot a few people in Lithuania, but he got it that the resistance was even greater, so he did not continue this path. Rather, he tried to escape into the future. He tried reforming. So, it ended the way it ended . We have to recognize he is a constructive actor, though under compulsion and not as a volunteer. He did not plan this departure from Communism. Extract of Lech Walesa’s interview with an American public policy think-tank, July 2015 Now answer the following questions: a) Compare and contrast the evidence provided in Sources A and B on Western views of Poland. [10] b) How far do Sources A-F support the view that communism in Poland collapsed due to shifts in Soviet policies? [30]

5 Section B You must answer TWO questions from this section. EITHER 2 Assess the claim that between 1945-2000, the US was more of a hindrance than a help in the development of the global economy. [30] OR 3 To what extent was the keiretsu system indispensable to Japan's economic transformation from 1947-1991? [30] AND EITHER 4 “A dispute driven more by territorial interests than religious differences. ” Evaluate this statement regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict between 1948–1979. [30] OR 5 How far do you agree that efforts to manage the Congo Crisis from 1960 to 1965 ended in failure? [30]

6 BLANK PAGE Copyright Acknowledgments Question 1 Source A © Notes from Brezhnev's Meeting with Stanislaw Kania and Wojciech Jaruzelski, 22 August 1981. Bundesarchiv. Institute for the Archives of Parties and Mass Organizations of the GDR. Cold War International History Project. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Question 1 Source B © U.S. Embassy Warsaw to U.S. Secretary of State, "Conversation with General Kiszczak," 11 August 1989, Cold War International History Project, Documents and Papers, CW