2012 RI H2HistoryP1

2012 International History Prelims Raffles Institution 1 RAFFLES INSTITUTION YEAR 6 PRELIMINARY EXAMS 2012 HISTORY Paper 1 International History, 1945-2000 H2 HISTORY 9731/01 H1 HISTORY 8814/01 13th September 2012 3 Hours COVER SHEET Name : CT class : Question No. For Examiner’s Use Only Marks 1 TOTAL

2012 International History Prelims Raffles Institution 2 RAFFLES INSTITUTION YEAR 6 PRELIMINARY EXAMS 2012 HISTORY Paper 1 International History, 1945-2000 H2 HISTORY 9731/01 H1 HISTORY 8814/01 13th September 2012 3 Hours READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST Section A Answer Question 1. Section B Answer any three questions. Candidates are advised to spend not more than 45 minutes in answering each question. Please attempt each question on a fresh sheet of paper. All questions in this paper carry equal marks. Start each answer on a fresh sheet of paper. At the end of the examination, securely fasten all your work to the cover sheet provided. This document consists of 4 printed pages.

2012 International History Prelims Raffles Institution 3 Section A: The United Nations in Somalia You must answer Question 1 1. Read the sources and then answer the question which follows. Source A Determined to establish as soon as possible the necessary conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance wherever needed in Somalia, in conformity with resolutions 751 (1992) and 767 (1992), Determined further to restore peace, stability and law and order with a view to facilitating the process of a political settlement under the auspices of the United Nations, aimed at national reconciliation in Somalia, and encouraging the Secretary -General and his Special Representative to continue and intensify their work at the national and regional levels to promote these objectives, Recognizing that the people of Somalia bear ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation and the reconstruction of their own country. UN Security Council Resolution 794, 1992 Source B It ended with an acknowledgement by the Clinton Administration and the United Nations that their military policies had been wrong and that a solution to the fighting in Somalia could only be achieved by the Somalis themselves. Yet there were successes acknowledged by both the Somalis and relief officials. The famine has ended, and in much of the countryside life is returning to normal. Hundreds of thousands of children were vaccin ated, wells were dug, roads were built and farmers returned to their fields under military protection. And there are positive political signs. After repeated delays, all 15 warring Somali factions represented by General Aidid and his chief rival, Mohammed Ali Mahdi, signed a reconciliation pact in Nairobi on Thursday that calls for a cease -fire, repudiates violence and sets a date for a future reconciliation conference. "Everybody seems to be tired of the stalemate, insecurity and chaos that is happening in Somalia," said Salimatu Khan, a United Nations spokeswoman. "We hope this time the leaders are well-meaning." From The New York Times, March 1994. Source C The US objective in Somalia proved to be a constantly shifting target. Somalia was a frequent agenda and discussion topic for the President and his senior advisors, but for the months between November 1992 when President Bush decided to intervene and October 1993 when President Clinton decided to pull out, imprecision and drift often reigned. Discussions in the Deputies Committee, where guidance was formulated, came to revolve around short-term tactics without reference to long-term objectives. Steps that General Hoar condemned as “mission creep” really depended on how and by whom the mission was being defined at that moment.

2012 International History Prelims Raffles Institution 4 The UN proved a suitable instrument for carrying out a humanitarian operation, but not a peace enforcement one. Joint Staff officers had started meeting regularly with UN counterparts in New York during December 1992 and recognize d these shortcomings sooner than did many State Department and White House officials. Ultimately, though, disenchantment with UN peacekeeping was reflected in the stringent criteria that President Clinton applied on 3 May 1994 to any future US participation. Report of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995. Source D As mentioned “National reconciliation” was from the very beginning an integral part of the mandate. But what was meant by this? S/RES/794 e.g. just termed “facilitating the process of political settlement under the auspices of the United Nations”; S/RES/814 encouraged the Secretary-General to assist the people of Somalia “in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy” and recognized for the first time the re -establishment of “local and regional administrative institutions”, S/RES/897 then was even more explicit as it mentioned next to assisting in the ongoing political process the reorganization of the police and judicial system. Therefore one could assume the United Nations were well aware of what they had to rebuild. But it took the United Nations actually until 1993 before they realized that they were successful only when they used the so -called “bottom-up approach.” This means a strong and consistent commitment to the local and regional level. And here another thing comes into play. Somalia – A Very Special Case, Christiane E. Philipp, 2005 Source E The deployment of UNITAF forces improved the security situation and facilitated the flow of food and other emergency relief supplies into the neediest areas of Somalia. The level of malnutrition and death from starvation fell dramatically in many areas. However, the humanitarian and political situation in many parts of the country remained difficult and tense. Following the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II in May 1993, it became clear that, although signatory to the March Agreement, General Mohammed Farah Aidid's faction would not cooperate in the Agreement's implementation. Attempts by UNOSOM II to implement disarmament led to incr easing tensions and, on 5 June, to violence. In a series of armed attacks against UNOSOM II troops throughout south Mogadishu by Somali militia, 25 Pakistani soldiers were killed, 10 were reported missing and 54 wounded. In support of the UNOSOM II mandat e, US forces were deployed in Mogadishu. These forces were not under United Nations command and control. Prepared by the Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1997 Now answer the following question. How far do Sources A-E support the view that UN operations in Somalia were a failure?

2012 International History Prelims Raffles Institution 5 Section B You must answer three questions from this section. 2. Assess the significance of the Truman Doctrine in the development of the Cold War in Europe to 1949. 3. How far can improved US-Soviet relations in the period 1985-89 be explained by developments in Eastern Europe? 4. ‘The principal engine of economic growth in the period 1945 to c.1973 was the state’. How far would you agree with this assessment of government contributions to the Golden Years? 5. To what extent was United States responsible for the problems of the global economy in the period c.1970 to c.1990? 6. The main reasons for the rise of religious fundamentalism after about 1970 are political and economic, rather than religious. Discuss. End of paper